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FACT AND DESTINY¹

A

To make himself more or less at home in the universe, man has had to do two things, to learn something of nature's laws and to master some of her facts. To ferret out laws of an uncommunicative cosmos stands as man's proudest mental achievement: to learn the facts rates as a commoner, more primitive, far easier and humbler function. Laws have to be divined by the shrewdest thinking; facts are what nature offers for observation. Yet the two are inseparable. Man has immensely extended his habitat by a happy union of inventive prowess and explorative fact-finding. And whatever his brain has accomplished of theoretic mastery has gone hand in hand with what his eye and ear have done in charting the factual disposition of things. The advance of astro-physics runs *pari passu* with the scope of new instruments on Mount Palomar and the incredible sensitivity of stellar photography. And as with knowledge, so with destiny: our outlook as individuals and as a race depends not more on principles of world structure than on the array of facts drawn up around us. If we neglect this truism, may it be because, for our thinking, fact is, after all, not its simplest but its most formidable task?

For — whatever our eventual sphere of control — the realm of fact is there first and always for our docility. Observ-

¹ The Program of the Gifford Lectures, first series, given at Glasgow, 1938-39.

ing is mental submission. Bacon is right: to master nature we must first obey her. Facts are to be received, learned, set in order: but who will say they are to be understood? They cannot be deduced: they are what they are. Here we meet the problem of these lectures. If man is to fathom his destiny, not to say guide it, must his thinking not penetrate world fact as well as world law? And is this possible?

Let me enlarge briefly on the nature of this issue:

In all experience, there is a vein of fact-awareness. It is not clearly cut off from the play of thought and imagination, but it has, at least, a distinctive *firmness*. Hume called it "impression" as contrasted with "idea." At present, we are more likely to refer to it as "datum." Facts in the plural are our "data" — admirable word! — "things given." Only, we have to be wary of this gift-figure: for unlike other gifts, these we have neither liberty nor opportunity to decline. They are not first offered, and then graciously received: they are only offered as they are received: they are simply there, without apology or permission, with silent finality.

As we reflect further on this intriguing positiveness with which fact announces itself, we may suspect that both words, "impression" and "datum," imply an apparatus more or less mythological. "Impression" suggests an outside impressing force and a receptive wax-tablet; "datum" suggests an outside giver and a receiving self. Most contemporary psychology inclines to banish this apparatus and to speak soberly of "content," — not even "content of consciousness" but just "content" which is there without having arrived by any journey or from any port of departure, without any "act" of reception or any "reference to an object." We listen with respect to the psychological simplifier; yet, to do justice to the impressiveness of fact we shall allow ourselves one further excursion into mythology, prepared to withdraw it if it misleads. When fact knocks at the door of the mind — probably at the gate of sensation — it makes not a request but a demand for recognition: it establishes authoritatively an absolute democracy at the ground level of experience: "Here I am; take me; no play of thought, however lofty, can leave me out." If sense-data

are the proletariat of the mind, they are born to a certain dictatorship.

This demand-aspect of the impressiveness of fact is colloquially referred to as its "*hardness*," a character which deserves a moment's notice. It has, of course, nothing to do with the texture of the "content" — a swamp across the path is surely a "hard fact" for the traveller; the hardness of fact refers to its bearing on our hopeful momentum. For our knowing-processes the fact is something we must receive; for our feeling-and-willing processes the fact is something we must accept, whether we wish it or not. For the most part, however, fact is not at all hard in the sense of being unwelcome: it is simply there "for our information." Eyes and ears are not primarily for making protest against what is factually present in the world, but for taking note of it. The activity of observing, for most people most of the time, is a part of the steady enjoyment of being alive. And this enjoyment persists, *even when we dislike what we observe*. For consider: is it not obvious that an enjoyment of the awareness of fact, in complete independence of what we are going to do about the fact, is a function of great biological importance? What chance for survival would an animal have if the facts which served as signs for aversion or flight had a less perfect reception than those which signified approach and sociability? To be alive and awake is to be alert to the whole range of fact, whatever its active implications for good or evil or none at all. *Reception of fact is prior to reaction* (a thesis which bears hard on the inaccurate psychological bases of much pragmatic knowledge-theory). Now and then, it is true, a fact appears with so atrocious an emotional impact as to close eyes and ears in a spasm of repudiation. But in normal human experience, the hunger to know whatever is there to be known, the wish for "impressions," is omnivorous.² The fact is continuously "hard" only in this

² One of the subconscious allurements of travel is the circumstance that observation has its full fling — of things admirable or deplorable or merely odd — with but a vanishing remnant of a citizen's responsibility: the sight-seer is no doubt a morally dubious character; but as a psychological demonstration of the independence of observation from specific action, he is important.

respect, that it irresistibly displaces whatever we might imagine there in its place. However strong our appetite for the full gamut of experience, there persists this element of quasi-hostile reserve: "Why are these facts what they are? Why must just these facts and no others present themselves as my fate in this irregular universe?" And to this query, "hard fact" offers no satisfaction.

A further element in the impressiveness of fact is conveyed by the term "existence." Fact exemplifies what we mean by that difficult and refractory word; it answers the question, "What exists? What is there in the world?" Hardness has reference to the "what" of the facts — their quality; existence has reference to their "that," their presence in the realm of "being." Factuality is the solid front which all "being" presents as distinct from all non-being — remembered, imagined, dreamed, supposed, feared or hoped for. It is the sign by which "reality" announces itself as distinct from illusion. It is the sharp criterion which can confirm "truth" and reject "error." Considered in this light, it is obviously impossible either to resent or to hold ourselves aloof from the presence of factuality as such; for without it concrete thinking would lack its decisive test. But more than that, we should on our own account sorely miss fact, if it were absent! If nothing were "there" would we ourselves be "here"? For "here" and "there" are of one piece; to ask "Why is fact there?" is to ask "Why am I, at all?" My own reality is of a piece with the presence of reality to me; for I also share in the factuality of fact.

But with its "hardness" and its "existence," fact is impressive in still a third way — its "*impenetrability*": it lends no encouragement to understanding.

It is the universal starting point of enquiry; and enquiry succeeds in discerning multitudes of relations among facts, relations of origin and consequence, relations to our interests and powers of control. These relations facilitate the management of facts; they arrange facts in orderly systems and provide practical familiarity. But the relations are also facts, and the systems are facts. Factuality, in detail or in the gross, offers

no reason for being what it is. Some of this total factuality we find relatively intelligible: we see in it a certain fitness to ourselves. With complete acquiescence in Darwin's assurance that it is we who are adapted to the world, and not the world to us, we remain perhaps conceitedly persuaded that the fitness is mutual! But however far we succeed in describing, explaining, mastering the processes of nature, there remains to our insight the refractory residue — plain fact. It is the blank there-ness of things which, so far as we can see, need not have been there: they and their systems might as well have been other than they are. They, and the whole world because of them, are infected by an air of the "arbitrary," or the "accidental," or what the schoolmen called "the contingent." No general principles of what ought to be can account for them. As giving no account of itself, factuality marks a dead end to the understanding of our destiny. It supplies the main item in the current picture of the purposeless universe.

To remain satisfied with this situation has definite intellectual advantages. It allows continued progress within the limits of scientific method: to have a clear factual basis for all enquiry and a definitive test for the rightness or wrongness of our guesses about Nature's laws — is not this enough? To "accept the universe" has a certain modest dignity as well as Carlyle's approval! And there is wisdom in Alfred Whitehead's genial platform, "Hang it all, here we are; we don't go back of that, we begin with it." We must indeed begin with the fact; our question is, must we also end with it?

I discern in the instinct of our time a true perception that here is the issue on which philosophy as distinct from science stands or falls. This instinct recognizes that if facts were atoms of knowledge, their "impenetrability" would be as endurable and as trivial as that of the vanished Newtonian atom; but that if factuality is everywhere, and the scope of human understanding ceases at its border, man is summoned to resignation rather than to mastery of his fate. If the world as a whole stands over against us with the same impenetrability to reason, philosophy becomes a counsel of acquiescence or a

source of consolation, less valid than that of Cleanthes, the Stoic:

Lead me, O Zeus, and Thou, O Destiny,
 The way I am bid by Thee to go.
 To follow I am willing!
 For were I recusant
 I would but make myself a slave
 And still must follow.

We should have to put it otherwise:

To that impelling shape of Fact
 Which neither Zeus nor Destiny assigns
 I, unpersuaded, yield,
 But with dissembled front of willingness,
 Lest I confess myself a slave
 Compelled to follow!

Fact, refusing to explain itself — perhaps because it has in the last resort no reason at all — receives in common speech the resentful title of "brute fact." As it first presents itself, it is certainly not brute: it is the measure of our vitality, the definiteness and color of our life, its thread of concreteness. It becomes brute only if it remains to the end *dumb*. To end, as we must begin, with a simple acceptance of fact is, for philosophy, prudent, plausible, comradely, and fatal. It is to accept, not merely the universe, but the opacity of the universe.

B

I need hardly remark that this is precisely the conclusion to which much of the philosophy of our time has come. There have always been thinkers disposed to see the stubbornness of fact as an advantage, which it is; and to make a merit of adhering to "the solid ground of fact" to the point of celebrating the defeat of our understanding. Radical Empiricism is a proud declaration of servitude. This is the position which Positivism, old and new, professes in advance: Positivism is the admonition to trim our intellectual ambition to what observation, aided by scientific method, can show. Realism is of the same temper. Realism is many things, but in essence it is an attitude of factual acceptance in the whole range of experience:

see things for what they are and make the best of them. Realism is historically a party of protest against an inveterate human disposition to substitute wishes and poetry for fact. There would be no philosophic occasion to be a Realist, going out with band and banner for doing what everybody has to do — admit the facts — if there had not been Idealists so determined to have Mind in charge of fate as to make fact a creature of the mind itself. This extravagance, to the realist conscience, makes the impenetrability of fact a double mystery, adding to the silence of the cosmos the new problem how Mind happened to make things so hard for itself, concealing so much of its own creation that it can only come on natural law by the most head-breaking guesswork! Theology, from the realist's point of view, is in a much better position, for theology declares that God made the world, which is sufficient reason why you and I should not understand it.

But today Positivism and Realism have been outbidden as a result of one of their own creations, the science of man. According to this science, human nature is also a fact, and human thinking is a fact, both dependent on other facts and therefore variable as facts vary. Then no product of scientific thinking has any more or other validity than the fact that it occurs. And with this, the reputed authority of science vanishes, and with it that of the science of man: science done too well has undone its own position. Result: Nihilism. In Nihilism the universe is not "accepted." It is faced, but with a cognitive despair which includes a repudiation of those philosophic play-things through which soft-bred thinkers of more genial days fancied a glimpse of a rationale of cosmic process. To contemporary Nihilism, Idealism in any modern form is but a denatured theology which, to men having Fact to deal with, has become utterly meaningless. Whereas Realism, holding with equal superstition to the finality of science and scientific method, is even more deceptive than Idealism in the bravado with which it counsels us to mount the scaffold of our own fate in a fated solar system.

It is one of the anomalies of the philosophic picture of our time that just on the basis of Nihilism there arises a form

of philosophy which once more demands to understand. It accepts the opaque universe of the scientific world-picture except at one point: just at the point at which science sets up a science of human nature it enters a violent rejection. This science of man, in the form of psychology, sociology, anthropology, is naturally dedicated to all the high aims of science, (i) to describe, (ii) to predict, (iii) to control the human phenomenon. Such a science, could it carry through its program, should surely save mankind, provided only the controllers know which way to drive the human herd, — on this point the priests of these sciences show no concern! With these priests the adherents of the form of philosophy of which I am speaking enter into no argument: they throw them and their science of man out of doors. Man, they say, is in his central being no scientific object: he is not a creature of causes: he is not made what he is by Nature, nor by Society, nor by any God, — *he makes himself*. The controllers' occupation is gone. Man exists: his existence precedes his "essence"; *that* he is shapes *what* he is; he is radically free. "Existentialism," born not of the polite scholarly continuities but of intuition in revolt, makes its nest in the Nothingness of our physical fate, and concentrates its powers in the defiant will to make something of that segment of reality we do understand, our own being.

The Existentialist is a symptom of a philosophically disordered time. He speaks like an oracle, obscurely, out of order, with violence, and with occasional lightning clarity. The thing is, to take advantage of the flashes of lightning. To take him as an oracle would, I think, be an error: but he is a true witness of freedom and of the irrepressible will to understand, the will to metaphysics which Kant recognized and systematically caged in. He has truly seen the incapacity of scientific method to finish a world view and has found the nerve of its failure, the destruction of science involved in making man an effect of causes. His incoherence is a confession of his inability to justify his own revolt, or to absorb the problematic tradition of modern thought.

C

That tradition, since the time of Leibniz, has slowly uncovered the consequences of scientific method for philosophy, and especially the consequences of the empirical side of that method, the cult of fact. It has recognized that the peculiar oddity of the factual make-up of Nature, including human nature, presents speculative thought with an "irrational" which somehow has to be dealt with, and which no *a priori* first principles can explain. Hume immersed himself in this irrational factuality, and left a confessedly hopeless psychology of knowledge. Kant wrestled with it, and deliberately extracted the "pure" forms from the matter of experience, leaving the matter as a precipitate referred in the end to an unintelligible thing-in-itself. Fichte and Hegel admitted it and (their reputations to the contrary notwithstanding) gave it a place well within their schemes of morality and reason. Schelling was deeply shaken by it, and throughout a long life tried to blend the Fact with the Thought in his account of world and history.

But only Schopenhauer ventured to give the irrational a place in the highest seat of Being, locating unreason in the heart of the total Will to Live. This enabled him not alone to admit but to assert the full disharmony of world fact with world sense; and for this confession Albert Schweitzer, with radically different outlook, holds him in high honor: Schopenhauer refused to call evil by any pretty names in order to save God's perfection. But while attributing unreason in the world to unreason in the world-source may be a reasonable procedure, indubitably candid, it comes as close as speculative philosophy can come to professing that God himself does not understand what he has brought forth, nor why he has done it. We men may well spare ourselves the effort to do better.

The collapse of speculative idealism into Positivism and Marxism was due. The growing science of man was ready to act as receiver: it was prepared to write the psychology of all metaphysics, and thus effectively bring it to earth. Marx does not refute Hegel; he psychologizes Hegel — a more deadly deed. Traditional metaphysics and ethics were "bourgeois": all abso-

lutes were "bourgeois". That finished them. Hegel's grandiose attempt to absorb irrational fact into Idea was reversed in an equally grandiose attempt to absorb the Idea into the Fact of man's economic necessities. To explain a thought causally is to undo its claim to validity.

Here we have a new technique, destined to unbelievable vogue and effect, the technique of discrediting thought by psychologizing it. This is far easier than refutation, and much safer; for he who refutes has to reason, and so runs the risk of being in turn psychologized. A valuable resource for this psychological unmaning of reason was ready to hand in the shape of the "unconscious," partly explored by Schopenhauer and von Hartmann. All high romanticisms of thought and feeling, together with their standards of justice and beauty, are at once vulnerable: they have only to be traced to causes close-bound with obscure biological impulses, all of them naturally shady. Here, in these subterranean roots, we have at last the "real," the true meaning of our aspirations.

Let us call this the psychological revelation. Out of it comes a special brand of realism, a cultural realism, well fitted to unmask ideals as well as thoughts and show them to be subtle hypocrisies. Such revelation, at first resented, becomes the current fashion of a sophisticated modernity and prepares the way for a systematic Freudian reduction of Western man's self-awareness to its elemental irrationalities. A psychology of "depth" — genuine relief from the flat psychology of the well-lit stream of consciousness — is professionally provided in the shape of a dark marine underworld, full of dim, pristine, prowling and squirming shapes — visible, it is true, only to a peculiarly conditioned eye, but surely to be believed! An allegedly empirical science begins an incredible appeal to credulity, incredibly successful. At first appalled by what the sibyls of the new science whisper in his ear *he is*, modern man first tolerates and then begins to luxuriate in the evisceration of his own corruption. Fiction, drama, graphic art vie with one another in spreading the illumination through which man sees darkness as the "reality" of his light. Explanation is precisely inverted: the rational is understood only when it is seen as a

manifestation of the irrational; the civilized is understood as a manifestation of the primitive. Anthropology joins with psychoanalysis in inviting humanity to understand itself *backward*; and we see cultural humanity, especially in America, hesitantly listening and then in large numbers setting itself into reverse.

This progressive pseudo-scientific identification of man's self with his irrational rootages, carried on through a long century, has its echo in the sphere of public action. The "primacy of the will," at first politely proposed as a rescue for the baffled forces of reason, expands its scope: a high and due respect for Deed becomes a cult of force and then an apology for violence. For a world of Fact must be met by Fact, must it not? And Fact in its firmest form is the Factum, the *fait accompli*. Thus, under the guidance of the factual science of man, the 19th century flowers into the 20th.

These, in roughest sketch, are the issues left on our hands; they are the problematic bequest of modern thought, and to them any mature philosophy of our time must do justice.

Crises of human history are at the same time dialectical problems of metaphysics. The tangles of human experience, pursued to their sources — whether political or social or economic or moral — are materials for that inductive labor which is the essence of the historical dialectic. The metaphysical problems, reputedly eternal, thus incessantly alter their shape and import. The great periods of history are the epochs of great enthusiasms. The enthusiasms of modernity through which scientific, legal, industrial and artistic efforts have been carried to their limits and there have discovered their limitations, — these new enthusiasms, like their predecessors, are the partially unrecognized workings of a truth about the nature of things — a truth working forward toward delivery.

It follows that none of these enthusiasms, with their revelations — including the psychological revelation — can be pure fallacy. The follies and corruptions issuing from the burgeoning science of man for our psychiatry, our education, our penology — all goblin-ridden, but with *new* goblins — are measures of its inherent power. The moral and political dilem-

mas created by the abrupt gift of atomic energy permit no denial of the genuine human triumph, intellectual and technical, there involved. The role of fact as a *prima facie* irrational ingredient of experience is not less momentous than our flourishing realisms esteem it to be; it pervades every modern advance. And no malady of our time can be cured by becoming irrationally hostile to the irrational; fact, being greatly there, must have an answering greatness in our comprehension. Only, is Fact the ruler?

If, in its presence, philosophy surrenders, fact in its full antithesis to reason will take charge of our affairs. We require a persistent virility of the will to understand. We proceed to take, in literal terms, the measure of our problem.

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Madison, N. H.



PERCEPTION, RECOLLECTION, AND DEATH¹

IN MEMORIAM: BERNHARD GROETHUYSEN

What has perception to do with metaphysics? What bearing has an analysis of perception, and its corollaries, recollection and anticipation, upon the central question of metaphysics, namely, the question of the nature of being? Moreover, if perception and recollection are phenomenological constituents of the concept of being, what is the meaning of death in the light of this constitution?

The following paper will deal with these questions, in an attempt to push forward to the structural elements of the idea of being.

We shall begin with a hermeneutics of perception and recollection. Next we shall look into the problem of the object of recollection. The third part of the analysis will lead us into the prolegomena of a metaphysics of death; our purpose there will be to determine the interconnectedness of death and being.

I

PERCEPTION AS WILL TO ENDURE

In a study on perception, Husserl, commenting on Brentano's theory of time, writes: "Each note has a temporal extension. When it is struck, I hear it as a now, but as it continues to sound, the now is continually renewed, and each preceding note becomes a thing of the past. Thus at any specific moment I hear only the actual phase of the note, and the whole tone in its objective duration forms an act-continuum, which is in part recollection, in an infinitesimal part perception, and in part, anticipation . . . In every perception of temporal objects (all objects of perception are temporal objects — they extend in time) perceptions and non-perceptions continually pass into

¹ Read at the first meeting of The Metaphysical Society of America at Yale University on April 15, 1950. It contains parts of my forthcoming *Freedom and Death*.

one another and the now is nothing but an ideal limit toward which this continuum converges."²

In other words, perception is constituted as a continual interweaving of the perceived and the non-perceived, of actuality and non-actuality. In this interweaving, the actual, consummated, living now, which is linked with the continuum of the non-perceived and keeps it alive, itself coincides with death; and in this coincidence of life and death there emerges the primary recollection in the life of perception — the will to preserve the dying instant. Although perception lives by the grace of the instant, the instant does not constitute its life. Perception as life, as experience, is duration. To experience or to live is to extend in time. To live is to transcend the instant, to struggle continuously against the sinking of the instant into nothingness. The instant is the ideal limit, the source of life, the source of its evidences, its original intuitions; but at the same time it submerges in the duration that extends beyond it and swallows it. Not the now of the instant forms the life of perception, but the *continuum* of cumulative recollections, anticipations (and hopes), which follow in the wake of the now and by picking it up integrate it into the total experience. We may say: in perception the will to endure or to be triumphs over the instant; or better: extending through time it is the primary medium in which the will to endure or continuity manifests itself.

Each perception (*cogitatio*, in the sense of Descartes) as such is a unit of duration; it is something self-contained — perception of this tree before me, the melody I hear, etc. But now we see that this self-contained unit itself sinks into nothingness, into the no-longer. And yet it does not sink into nothingness. It is recollected. When the last note of the melody is sounded, when we have reached the last now, all notes of the melody are, as it were, inwardly regathered. The dying now lives on transformed along with the whole chain of the primary recollections (retentions) and anticipations (pro-tentions) preserved in it — being a thing of the past it sur-

²E. Husserl, *Vorl. zu Phaen. des innern Zeitbewusstseins* (Halle, 1928), pp. 385, 399.

vives its death. It resurrects, so to speak, as it dies. Our life — ego or existence aware of itself — that strives for duration captures the dying instant. It reproduces it. Reproduction is what we properly call the act of recollection. The last note or last quarter-note of the song is struck. While it is still sounding and dying away it resurrects re-collected and lives on in the whole richness of its inner preserved possession — and this continued life into the future is in fact the time-continuum — a continuous intercourse of recollection and anticipation, constantly interwoven with the dying instant.

We say: what has been perceived passes into recollection. In recollection I inwardly rediscover what I "once" perceived. Perception is potential recollection. But what is "collected" in recollection is not only the whole of what I have just perceived — the Gestalt (tree) that has just been before my eyes — but the very stream of primary anticipations and recollections in which the whole was originally built. In the act of recollection I reproduce the retentional-protentional continuum of being, the stream which is a continuum transcending nothingness. Being, in this primordial sense, is the continuum that holds in check and overcomes the continually invading nothingness of the present. All the efforts of our existence aware of this invasion of death are aimed at the preservation of this continuum.

II

IDENTIFICATION AND REPETITION

In my inwardness I rediscover what has died, and I rediscover it again and again, for recollective and anticipating life is endowed with the faculty of indefinite repetition. The fact that these two modes of duration can be indefinitely repeated is an essential characteristic of the recollecting-anticipating process that is inextricably bound up with the dying instant.

What is the relation between this repeatability of recollection and anticipation on the one hand, and duration on the other?

By being perceived, the perceived content becomes object, i.e., it is recognized as the same in recollection. It becomes identified, or rather, the dying content is transformed into something that is identifiable. In being perceived the particular now is transformed into "always the same."

What has died lasts as the identical. What has been experienced just now or in times past lives on in the acts of identification and re-identification. These acts constitute a duration of a second, higher order. Above the level of primary duration, primary experience-content, there forms the sphere of repeated and endlessly repeatable identification. Perceptions are recollected, in such a way that each act of recollection — as though life were not satisfied with preserving the past only once — projects a horizon of anticipation of ever renewed recollection of the same. What is recollected once, returns again and again. And it seems to me in this repetition of the same, this peculiar iterating of recollection and anticipation, that human existence, i.e., existence aware of happening, primarily asserts itself against the nothingness of happening.

The dying instant endures forever. For what has been is not merely what has in fact been recollected, but the eternally recollectable. Eternal duration consists in the indefinite repeatability of recollection — which is inseparable from anticipation of its repetition. The presence of *eternity* is inherent in each sensory presence. The horizon of permanent duration looms in the percept (*perceptum*), in the identical reproduction of the dying instant.

The instant — sensory presence — is not pure impression, not pure event. Its content is not pure impressional datum. The problem of the sensory datum has time and again been falsely formulated in naturalistic (positivistic) psychology. The question is not: What is sensation? What is given? The question is: What lies in sensory (empirical) seeing, touching, smelling, kinesthesia, in what we perceive and apprehend as phenomenon for us as perceiving existences and being aware of existence? How does that which is given appear to him to whom it is given?

Human life is not a mechanism in which atomized data or even data combined into "Gestalt units" are associated in accordance with specific laws of mechanics. Life is affected by data, by contingencies. But it is not affected in the same way as one physical event is affected or caused by another. Our life responds to what affects it, or happens to it. A physical event is caused. But what is caused in human existence is not merely caused. To exist is to respond continuously. Existence aware of dying happening responds to happening. The impressionable datum enters into the dynamic system of intentional functions that makes this datum into an identical object. Through these functions our life affected by stimuli, circumstances or conditions enters into relation with the objective-identical world outside the stimulus-reaction mechanism. What is perceived is identically the same. It is incorporated into the universe of the recollecting-anticipating intentional life, that is, related to the identical.

We may describe this situation as follows: In each perception (*cogitatio*) there flows the primordial source of all existence — the will to endure. What enters into recollection are units of duration, units of events that continuously invade existence. As experience passes away, the particular loses its character of particularity, and the fundamental, the most magnificent of all phenomena takes place — the transition to that which is opposed to the particularity of happening, the universal. In the abyss of oblivion there arises the process of renewing, repeating, recollecting. Happening loses its character of happening, fate loses its character of fate. The pain suffered, the misery endured, the fear that overwhelmed me, lose the character of the impressionable. Each recollection is, to quote Goethe, "the god that bestowed upon me the gift of saying what I suffer." The specificity of human life consists in the fact that it continually transcends the impressionable (and the mechanics of impressions). The pain that I feel is not merely the pain that I feel. Feeling it I am aware of it. Recollecting awareness is part of the sensation of it. Sensation is not isolated. As I become aware of the pain, it enters into a greater

totality. It is the familiar phenomenon to which I always return or can return, which is in communication with everything, which is, so to speak, at home everywhere. Once this pain has been felt, it has entered into the cosmos of the reproducible world.

We are always beyond the particular. In the dying instant the present loses its character of a discontinuous irrupting event. Once it has been experienced, the instant loses this isolated character. Content becomes object. Each particular is a potential object. The present is re-presented. To represent means both to recollect the identical and to anticipate repetition of the recollected. Thus representing, the present life moves toward the coming event, the irrational. But even before the coming event materializes, we are prepared to respond to it, within our own frame of reference. Human existence is not a *tabula rasa*, it is not thrust into impending death. It is not at the mercy of the outside. It is not at the mercy of "circumstances." It is not "cast" into happening. Before the future is here, it is already harnessed to the possible repetitions and anticipations that respond to it intentionally, receive it, and divest it of its irrationality.

Freedom from fate and representation are correlated. In awareness of the dying instant arises freedom from it. It seems to me that the category of representation with reference to the vanishing now is of basic importance as regards the origin of the idea of freedom. Whatever may be said about freedom and the variants of this concept, it is rooted in the awareness of death and in the will to endure that arises out of this awareness. The will to freedom and the will to endure are interrelated. Recollection and anticipation are its primary elements. A theory of perception, i. e., the response in which life raises its first voice against death, is an integral part of any metaphysics of freedom.

III

THE OBJECT OF RECOLLECTION

Let us take a further step in the hermeneutics of recollected perception. Perception is accompanied by the inner awareness

of it. We not only perceive, we also know, explicitly or not, that we perceive. The *dual* life of perception is characterized by the fact that it is not confined to itself. Perception goes beyond the immanent current of perceiving life. It transcends that which is given in perception. It transcends the perception contents. It is directed toward something that is not itself. Perceiving, we live in something that goes beyond the factual life contents. The peculiar, one might say dialectical, nature of perceiving life implies that what we live, the stream of our experiences, is not what we *imagine* while we experience it. Perception is the perceiving of something beyond perception. It is perception of this beyond. Transcendence, in this sense, is an attribute of perception which is accompanied by self awareness. What is the true meaning of this transcendence of recollected perception? What is the object, the *terminus* of its transcendence?

In the *Sophist* Plato explains that recollection (thought, judgment) is recollection of the One in the Many and of the Many in the One.³ In the *Meno*⁴ it is stated: "True opinions have value only when established through thinking knowledge of the (first) cause. But this is recollection."

In the end we recollect that which transcends all factual connections. It is as though the will to endure, in its increasingly intense efforts to achieve the goal of its longing — freedom from the dying, the particular, freedom from non-being — ends only when it comes to rest in the recollection of that object which has left all happening behind it, and has brought it to unity in the all-embracing cause.

We recollect the One; in the diverse we recollect diversity, in the identical and similar we recollect identity and similarity, in counting we recollect Number. In the perception of the particular and many we recollect the universal and the One. In recollection we reach out beyond all actuality into the realm of the possible. In it we anticipate that which makes actuality possible. The will to endure, in its acts of reproduction, does not confine itself to reproducing that which we have in fact,

³ 352A-E.

⁴ 98A.

consciously, unconsciously or subconsciously, experienced or will experience. Each time we become aware of the passing now, we so to speak anticipate the last potential now of the hour of death and reach into the totality which leaves behind all actual happening, which anticipates and unites all possible happening — the cause of being, that which Plato calls the object of *anamnesis*.

Let us first dwell on the concept of the Platonic *anamnesis*. To recollect, we read in *Meno*, is to rediscover what we have lost. Recollection is the process of recalling the forgotten.

The illiterate slave, the non-mathematician, is called by Socrates to take part in discussions on mathematical objects. The boy does not know geometry but he can be induced to achieve geometric insights. Socrates traces diagrams (rectangles) in the sand. Aside from technical hints he gives no information to the boy. The ignorant slave is supposed to discover by himself geometrical truths (concerning certain ratios between the diagonal and the sides of the rectangle). The pupil is directed only by questions. After some initial errors that he himself corrects, he finds the right answer.

Here Socrates probes the nature of a recollection that is not enriched by any outside content — although this recollection is awakened from the outside by the sight of a sensory content. The functions of recollection are set in motion by sensory data. The senses are pregnant with forgotten truths. The sense datum is more than a sense datum. As the slave perceives the figure in the sand, he recollects certain proportions "from within" (ἐξ ἐαυτοῦ). Equal or similar sense experiences suggest ideal, or better, identical standards to which the contents of experience do not correspond adequately. When we see a straight line we know about the ideal straight line, and we know at the same time that "the" straight line is not adequately given in sensation, but only illustrated. We measure sense experience by the concept that it contains but that it is not itself. Sense experience implies intelligible order, but, as Leibniz put it, this order is only confusedly contained in the perceived content.

It is not recollection of accumulated empirical life that is here associated with perception. Plato teaches us here in the form of theological Pythagorean reminiscences of the divine origin of the soul that the perceptions (and not only perceptions that underlie the study of mathematical objects) open to us the horizon of ideal relationships. We not only identify and re-identify that which we have just perceived, but we place this identical content of reproduction in an invariable *system*. We respond to the variable by potential connections, i. e., connections that are valid not only for this variable but for every possible individual content of the same type. We transcend time and happening in time in the very act of perception. To perceive means ultimately to recollect the beyond time.

What does this concept of the timeless mean in the process of recollection? The instant vanishes. It survives in recollection. What primarily is it that vanishes and then survives? It is the concrete world that I associate with it. What I recollect is not merely the whole or a part of the melody that I have just heard. What has vanished into the past is the whole of my subjective and intersubjective past life. What vanishes with the dying instant is the whole concrete world that has come down to us, that is attached to the living now which keeps it in impressional motion — the whole burden of my traditional heritage whose dimensions of depth were pointed out by Freud.

While I see this specific green on this specific tree, it is not only the what-content of this green that I recollect when I return to it. Forgotten, formerly perceived, anticipated, desired, hoped-for or feared things emerge. It is always the whole universe that grows, changes and ages with every perception — my universe, my whole experienced and anticipated world — that enters into the actual perception. Each sensory (acoustic, visual, etc.) element is associated with the entire sensory world or with the quasi-sensory world of imagined possibilities. Each sensation is a *monad*, each perception a complex monad which combines sensations into a unity of duration. Each instant is burdened by associations. It includes recollected and anticipated time (and space) — my whole life with its past and future.

We do not only associate the familiar (as David Hume thought), but we associate a specific smell of a flower or a specific taste of a food with the unfamiliar. Freud carried Hume's thought further by showing that the vanishing instant is charged with associated unconscious and subconscious elements. The now of perception is charged as it were with the previously experienced universe in which conscious associations or ideas occupy only a small superficial sector.

This is the concrete world, the continually changed and changing concrete universe, that I carry with me in each instant, recollecting and hoping. But now we see that above these acts of awareness there rises a new dimension of awareness.

The slave recollects the rules, the proportions. Confronted with the multiplicity and particularity of phenomena he recollects that which "combines phenomena into unity." We might say, he transforms the particulars into examples or illustrations of a universal that is indefinitely reproducible in particulars. "Wherever I may find these figures of Socrates," he might say, "the ratio between the diagonal and the sides of the rectangle will be the same."

This is the amazing thing. Perception enters into partnership with recollection. But the term "recollection" is equivocal. Recollection traverses dimensions. The process of recollection is dynamic. Recollection does not merely enter into and reproduce the world of concrete past occurrences. Reproduction does not merely go back in time, and we not only anticipate things to come in the near future or hope for objects at the end of time. In its ultimate dimensions recollection breaks through time. The slave becomes aware of possible, invariable proportions that pretend to bear upon the whole of time.

Recollection breaks through the contingency of perception. Its immense dynamic realm lies between the melody I have heard, the drawing I have seen and recollect, on the one hand, and the invariable on the other hand. It is as though recollection ultimately took up its position behind time, following its tendency to duration. Plato speaks of the recollection "from within." Kant (in his inaugural dissertation of 1770) speaks of the *a priori* or of that which is *menti insitum*. Descartes (2nd

Meditation) refers to that which remains the same throughout the "infinite variations" of perceptions. All these are paraphrases of the same phenomenon.

We must avoid all anthropomorphism in interpreting this phenomenon. The term "from within" does not refer to an innate possession of man, it means something that we discover in the inventory of perception. The slave questioned by Socrates "discovers" the invariable in the variable. He reveals hidden truths. He makes the hidden un-hidden (ἀ-ληθές). The act of revealing the invariable in the variable is ultimately recollection. But this invariable does not stand here only for the identical *qualia* into which the contents of perception change in being reproduced and identified, it stands rather for the *relational* system of these *qualia*, the timeless macrocosm of possibilities (ideas), into which the vanishing now is drawn by the dynamic of the reproductive process. In the present is represented the whole of all possibilities, the One encompassing Being.

IV

THE EX-CENTRICITY OF BEING

Perception and One Being are correlates.⁵ What is the authentic meaning of the concept of One Being? What is the meaning of the basic unity of perception, recollection and being? And what is the place of death in this unity?

We have seen that our waking life is a continuum combining constant recollection and constant anticipation, into which happening — birth and death of the instant — constantly breaks in. But perceiving existence is more than that continuum. It has direction. Life has direction. It runs into something that "stands against it," as Kant says. What is against it are not only objects, things which are perceived, but the one object. We say that the intentionality of perception not only hits

⁵ Kant once pointed out that imagination (representation) is a "necessary ingredient" of perception (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 1st Edition, p. 121, footnote). This is another paraphrase of the correlation of perception and being.

upon objects, concrete things, but extends beyond the multiplicity of things. What is in fact this terminus of intentionality? It is the indeterminate, indeterminable, "the" object, to which Kant refers as the *X*, the One of Platonic anamnesis, which causes us, to quote Kant again, "to combine all the multiple into one object by means of common functions."

We might say: Existence — the will to endure — is not only intentional, it is ex-centric (to use Scheler's term). It determines itself in its perceiving-recollecting-anticipating unity by this something toward which it strives, and which transcends everything that it ever perceives or experiences, all its immanent and intentional data. Perception is ex-centric because recollection and hope, the media of its yearning for the One, are ex-centric. Therefore its correlate is not an object in the logical sense, not a "subject of possible predicates," not a predicable. The One transcends all predicates (properties, attributes); it is emptied of these material contents. This One we call "being."

Being is not an object, not an existent. We have to distinguish between being and the existent. What unites existences is beyond the existent. Nor can being be described as an intuitive entity, neither as a subject nor as a substance. It cannot be hypostatized. Perhaps one of Plato's most fateful errors is this — that having established the transcendence of Being, he later made Being a substance (thing). The transcendent relapses into immanence. What is beyond *ousia* becomes again *ousia*. But being has no "supracelestial place," because it has no place at all. Therefore Aristotle (*Met.* A 986^a 19-20) says of Plato's One that it is not a number (as the Pythagoreans thought), but the formal principle of number. Being is the defining present in the existent. *Ousia* is *parousia* (presence). But being present it is nowhere. What Cusanus said concerning the relation between God and the created world applies to being: "Thou doth not desert thy creatures, but thou doth not accompany them either" (*De visione Dei*, xv).

We can describe the ex-centricity of being in still another way. Being is a relational concept, the name for the relation of termini (*relata*), but in such a way that each explanation, each relation connecting S and P, forms the beginning

of a system of transcending relations. The P of each S is constantly broken through. In other words, in each "S is P," in every type of universals, recollection of the ex-centric — the transcendent in this sense — is implicated: the recollection of the last unifying identical "object," which is associated with every sensory experience.

But, again, being, the relational concept, cannot be reduced simply to relations, as Hegelian and Neo-Kantian idealism maintains by identifying being with the system of relations or the invariables that express this system in categories. Being is the ideal limit — toward which the process, uniting the multiple and transcending each particular unification, converges. But that toward which the process converges is not identical with the process itself. Being, we read in the *Sophist*,⁶ is power (*dynamis*). It is the power that defines ex-centrally the whatness (*quidditas*) of each existent. It is the recollected or anticipated possibility of the existent that de-termines the existent.

We say: everything that exists has a being-so (*quidditas*, essence), and a being-there (somewhere and at some time). Everything that exists is the meeting-place in which essence and existence encounter one another. Each *that* has a specific *what*. But the what (regardless of its degree of universality) does not define the that. In each whatness (essence) is implicated a more universal whatness, finally the one being. In each *eidōs* the *ousia* is present. In each form lives the superform. The difference between essence and existence, which has occupied metaphysics so often and so fruitlessly, recedes behind the more fundamental difference between the many existences and the many essences on the one hand, and the one being on the other. The polarity of being and the existent pervades all things. It is this polarity, and not that of essence and existence, that is the backbone of metaphysics.

Being is ex-centric. The recollection of it is implicitly associated with each experience, not merely with the sensory experience (perception) in the specific sense. Each experience

⁶ 247B.

is "directed toward" — evaluation toward the thing that is evaluated, feeling toward the object felt, willing toward the object willed. But experiences are directed in such a way that they are directed beyond the object loved or evaluated each time. In evaluating, feeling, and loving we actually or potentially recollect the remote ideal limit of unity. We are always beyond what we have. The important thing here is that not only our experiences but also the experienced objects are accompanied by the ex-centric horizon. The object evaluated in evaluation, loved in love, is something dynamic itself. In each loved thing or person the recollection of the most remotely loved is co-present. In each evaluated thing the yardstick of the highest value is co-present. The object itself has the character of noëmatic intentionality.

Each experience has the character of a mere phase. Not only each particular object, but the world as the totality of objects, is a fragment. In this sense we speak of *longing* (*desiderium*) as the primal category of all existent. The existent is yearning for the collecting one object.⁷ In this sense Kant speaks of the synthesis of the multiple in regard to the identical object of apperception — the anticipated totality that encompasses all essences and all existences.

V

DEATH - WILL - BEING

Only if we understand the ex-centricity of being do we understand the metaphysical (and I believe also the religious) problem of death. Being and death are interrelated.

⁷ See the definition of the one object (the good) in the new book by Professor Weiss, *Man's Freedom*: "Unlike preference and choice and the acts these promote, the will has no preassignable specific objective to vivify. What we creatively will to bring about achieves its specific nature in being brought about. The creative will produces it by making determinate that radically indeterminate good which is the future of all beings in such a way as to make it possible for them to be so many different versions of a single harmony" (p. 228).

Two questions arise: (1) What has the experience of death to do with the life stream constituted by perception, recollection and anticipation? and (2) What is the meaning of death in regard to the idea of being?

We may speak of death in a twofold sense — death as the constant accompaniment of our life, and death as the end of life.

Death determines life, not only because it is the end of life, but because life is constantly ending. It is ceasing at every moment. The present constantly breaks in and the moment it is, it is no longer. We live no longer living. Life is continually accompanied by dying present. Life is the dying present, but this continual accompaniment itself dies in the end. The living death ceases and life ceases: these two expressions mean one and the same thing.

Thus death doubly determines life. We say that life endures, that it extends in time. It continues beyond the present and projects the past into the future. But into this process continually linking the past and the future, the now irrupts constantly — the dying now, the passing instant. We are constantly dying, but as we die we come to life again and what we call the living continuum, the continuum of time, is actually the continuum of death and resurrection, in which resurgent life recollects what it was before dying and enters, anticipating and hoping, into new duration, into the future.

Time is originally — and each analysis of time must begin at this point — the dialectical interaction of death and resurrection. Resurrection itself is pure nowness. Death clings to it. Life resurrects and dies. But recollection is more than pure nowness: the now is anticipating and hoping. It is the horizon of recollection and hope that, extending infinitely in both time directions, sinks together with the dying resurrection and rises together with the resurrecting now. It is as though the now, to use Aristotle's word, were "suspended" in the universe, the universe of time — a permanent *involutio præteritorum et futurorum* (Chr. Wolff).

Death is continually swallowing the now. The no-longer continually clings to the now. But the horizon of eternal return

just as continually clings to the no-longer. And this return is more than a coming back, more than a returning now. It is recollection and hope. Each now has a place in the horizon of time. This horizon is part of its self-awareness. What has died is not forgotten. It lives over and over again in varied and repeated recollections; and it lives beyond the recollection of it, so to speak drawing into its death the hope of return.

But at a certain point the end comes. The now freezes. The *prototype* of death is the frozen now. It is the freezing that is continually heralded in the decaying now of the life stream. In the end the now is overcome by decay. In the end there is irretrievable oblivion.

Oblivion denotes a quality of the now: the now without the time dimensions of recollection and hope, or the now that is no longer aware of itself. The dead are without recollection or hope. They are cast out, as it were, from that continuum of recollecting-anticipating, i.e., historical time. The now is isolated — is frozen particularity removed from the life stream of resurrection: it is the homeless instant, the other.

We may also say that in death time becomes space. At a certain point the river into which we can never step twice changes into ice. Life stands still. The now has become solid. The now extends. Time becomes space. In death, time becomes space or space-time. Space is the now minus recurrent resurrection. It is the endlessly extended now, void of recollection, the sphere of mere happening, of events, of endless oblivion.

The opposite of life, says Plato in *Phaedo*, is oblivion. The dead are without recollection. In the *Gorgias* oblivion, impulses, and death are interconnected. Death (existence of the dead) is a kind of existence that is no longer aware of itself, i. e., existence without recollection or hope, without the intentional object of these modes of yearning awareness, without the whole and the one. Death is the standstill of the intentionality that points *beyond* the vanishing now. "The dead do not praise the Lord." "For the grave cannot praise thee, death cannot celebrate thee: they that go down into the pit cannot

hope for thy truth."⁸ Death is the pure particularity of the particular.

In a more fundamental sense we may now say that perception is the act in which the fact of dying is continually transcended. In perception, existence, aware of death, manifests its *will* against death. Perceiving life is answer to death. Answer to death is an answer against death. Life is a counter-movement to death. Life is not characterized only by its finitude, by its anxious fear of death, but by the fact that it transcends its power. Not fear of death is the fundamental category of existence, as Heidegger says, but the will to freedom from death. Recollection, anticipation and hope are the attributes of this primordial category of will. They stand against oblivion. The will to continuity stands against the dying particular.

This is a remarkable fact: above the sphere of mortality there rises the realm of continuity. But in itself, this realm, although tending to permanence, is restless. The will to endure does not become stabilized, does not come to an end. Its longing transcends any fixed stabilization, any *opus operatum*. One might say that the will is motivated by something that is not itself. It is motivated by the object toward which it is directed. Yet the object rebounds toward it. The will does not come to rest until it reaches the ultimate object: the undefinable being.

To sum up: in our analysis we have tried to discover the constituents or structural elements of being, because being — the Oneness — is a complex notion and the metaphysician should regard it as his essential task to discover the constituents of this complexity. We discovered that oneness, creative will and death are interconnected. This triad of elements stands for being.

It is not enough to oppose being to nothingness and vice versa, as is done traditionally. We must add to this polarity a third element — namely the will. There is not a concept of being without the experience and the concept of death and

⁸ *Isaiah*, 38: 18.

without the will against death. Human life in its will against death is will to endure and the one being. Life of man, death, and being form an inseparable structural unity.

Perceiving we live, constantly transcending the given contents, driven by that which cannot materialize but which in its very impossibility makes possible the perceiving-thinking-acting will that rises against the dying particular. Knowing of the changeable we are motivated by the unchangeable. Dying we live by our knowledge of immortality. Aware of life as finite we live by that which is beyond the finite. Life of man in its answer to death transcends itself in the object that it sets before itself.

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THE DIVINE RELATIVITY AND ABSOLUTENESS: A REPLY

The conviction of the great rationalists — which with some qualifications I share — is that to understand a true idea is to see that it is true. (The qualifications are that by "ideas" one must in this connection mean those of highest or metaphysical generality, and that none of us can be sure of fully understanding even his own ideas in these matters.) It follows that to believe in a philosophical doctrine is to believe that those who do not believe do not understand, and that if they did understand they must believe. It is natural, then, to look for the straw-man fallacy in every criticism. If it is not there, this is evidence that one is oneself in error.

There is a subtle complication, however. A critic may understand an idea momentarily (not perfectly indeed, but then, who does?) and yet, when he comes to evaluate the view in comparison with his own, he may tend to forget even the understanding he previously exhibited, and to fall back upon some simplicist distortion thanks to which his preference of his own notion seems justified. Thus it is not infrequently possible to answer a critic out of his own exposition of the ideas he criticizes.

With these considerations in mind, let us consider Professor John Wild's review of my book, *The Divine Relativity*.¹ Mr. Wild finds God as thought of in this book unworthy of worship, because "finite," "dependent," "contingent," a "creature," "relative," "lacking" in an infinity of things which he "needs," and "presumably" possessing "sense organs and a physical body." He notes, it is true, that the said deity is also held to be possessed of an aspect which is necessary and absolute, to exist necessarily, and to have an independent nature of his own. Indeed, the principal thesis of the book is an analysis of "absolute" and "relative" from which their rela-

¹ This Review, II, no. 6. (1948), pp. 65-77.

tionship to each other in God follows. But Mr. Wild is evidently unable to enter even provisionally into such ideas. I suggest that this is because he is so completely in the habit of assuming: (1) that pure being is primary and superior, becoming secondary and inferior; (2) that the absolute is primary, and superior to the relative; (3) that the perfection and radical supremacy of deity is to be conceived by "playing favorites" among the categorical contrasts, e.g., through exalting necessity over contingency, being over becoming, unity over variety, monadic or non-relative over relative predicates, and then (*via negativa*) simply and utterly denying as applicable to God the categorical pole in each case judged inferior, while treating the superior pole as capable, in analogical extension, of giving content to the theological idea. These three assumptions are of course interconnected. One who holds to them rigidly cannot easily conceive panentheism or surrelativism (perhaps I should say super-relativism, or transcendental relativism, since, as has been objected, "sur" is not English). To such a one, that is, to Mr. Wild, admitting becoming or relativity in God means degrading him, for since sheer being or absoluteness is taken as the maximum possible value, the only way one can deviate from it is by making God *less* than absolute or purely eternal. And hence when I say over and over that God is *both* absolute and relative, this makes no sense to Mr. Wild, who thinks of himself as the defender of the exalted majesty of deity against the blasphemous notion of a finite or non-absolute God.

In terms of my view, however, it is quite consistent to say that God is *more* than merely "absolute," i.e., more than what is "independent," or the same regardless of what else exists. For in fact, we find that it is process that contains constants and therefore is more than they, not constants that contain process and transcend it. Constants are abstract aspects of concrete, particular happenings. Every becoming, for instance, contains the generic trait of becoming-as-such, which does not become but simply is. This generic becoming is not more, but less, than any concrete becoming. Thus in becoming there are

elements of "being," universals, which are not modified by changing circumstances. Such being is not something alongside becoming, nor is it a richer actuality containing becoming as an abstraction. No, as Aristotle insisted, though to be sure not clearly and steadily, and not in his theory of deity, elements of being are found in concrete happenings, not apart from them.

This is not only no contradiction, but any other view, I hold, is contradictory. Let us consider the possibilities. If (1) being contains becoming, then becoming is an illusion, is not becoming. For, if the least part of a whole changes, we have a slightly different whole, not numerically the same. Change and not fixity is the inclusive category, since it alone can apply to the total reality. And if (2) neither being nor becoming contains the other, then the relations between them must be predicates either of what is or of what becomes. Also they cannot be predicates of what is, for given new terms there must be new relations, hence what includes the relations to that which becomes cannot be free from becoming. (For this reason, Thomism denies that God is related to the world — rightly, on its assumption that in God is no becoming.) But do we not face the truth that being is abstracted from the becoming of experience, and that relations are given in the unity of this experience along with their terms? Surely we do not abstract experience as a process from something that we find simply is, but the simply is from the process of experience? In every experience, itself as a whole something new, we find factors which are not new but familiar. But in an experience completely familiar there could be nothing new. If we shift to certain other categories associated with "absolute," we find the same situation. Two-plus-two-equal-to-four is "independent" of my arithmetical experience, not relative to that experience, and in so far absolute; but my arithmetical experience is relative to the arithmetical truth in question. Also this truth is abstracted from the total experience, not the latter from the arithmetical truth. So the absolute is abstract and is found in the relative, not vice versa. Again, an occurrence "necessary" as

a whole must be so in every part,² but an occurrence which in its totality is accidental may have something in it not accidental. If A is necessary and B is contingent, then AB (or anything including A and B) cannot be necessary; but if it is not necessary, then it is contingent. Thus logic supports throughout the notion that the absolute, or the constant, independent, and necessary, is *in* the relative, dependent, and contingent happening, not vice versa (nor is each just alongside or outside the other). If A is independent, but B dependent, then whatever includes A and B is dependent upon that upon which B depends. If A is "uncaused," but B is caused, then AB, and anything including A and B, is caused, not uncaused. And thus we see that the meanings most reasonably connected with "absolute," as the contrary to relative, must be taken as referring to something contained in relative becoming, as the abstract and universal is contained in the concrete and particular.

How do we save the supremacy of deity, if *qua* absolute God must be abstract and something in a becoming? We do it by observing that just as there is a supreme form of absoluteness, or of being, so there is a supreme form of relativity or becoming in which it can inhere. This I call the "bipolar theory" of divine supremacy or perfection. The supremely absolute, or the strictly, unqualifiedly absolute, is that which is constant, not merely with respect to certain changes, but with respect to *all* change whatever, independent with respect to *any* circumstances or conditions you please, thus unconditionally necessary, in every sense uncaused. And the supremely relative is that which is not merely concrete and actual, but is the all-inclusive actuality, "adequately" related to all other actual terms. The common or generic meaning of "supreme" in supremely absolute and supremely relative is this: no other individual could conceivably equal or surpass this individual; rivalry is logically, and not merely factually, excluded.

² It has been objected by Paul Weiss that *a* or *not-a* is necessary, although *a* is not. But *a* as constituent of *a* or *not-a* is a mere possibility, since the complex only says, one of two possibilities must be actualized. *Qua* possibility, *a* is as necessary as the complex, for were there no such possibility, the complex would express nothing. So the objection is invalid.

This strict *logical incomparability* of deity is his unapproachable majesty. It is this which most doctrines of a finite deity fail to express. According to them, God has immense power and goodness and wisdom, yet another individual might have as much or more. But neither the absolute nor the relative aspect of deity as characterized by "transcendental relativity" could be surpassed by another individual. The absolute aspect is unqualifiedly independent, bound to be itself *no matter what* happens. At most, such strict independence could be equalled, it could not be surpassed. But it can be shown that a being which equalled it in this respect would be identical with it; no principle of individuation could operate to distinguish them. Here the abstract and universal is also individual — though not, as we shall see, actual or particular. God is "not in a class," even though his individuality is the property of an infinite class of particular experiences, a class which cannot be null. (We shall come to that.) All other individualities are *both* class members and class properties whose classes could be null. The relative aspect of God is equally incomparable, unapproachable. Another individual could at most be *equally* "adequate" in the type of its relations to things. But again, the two would coincide, since each would belong to the world of the other and be fully possessed by it. And any non-adequately related individual would necessarily be inferior, since it and its entire world would be wholly, adequately possessed by deity, while it would fail adequately to possess itself and its world.

There is another (equivalent) way to express the majesty or incomparability of God. In all other forms of individuality, the degree of excellence of an individual cannot be stated through pure concepts, but involves factual material. How good and wise or bad and foolish I am as compared to you cannot possibly be stated merely by combining concepts. Reference must be made to the facts which I know and you do not, or the particular deeds I do and you do not, or the particular temptations I resist and you do not. But omniscience or divine knowledge — and the same is true of divine power — is categorically supreme, incomparable in a manner statable without mentioning any particular facts. For the meaning is: for all

values of X, if X is fact, then God adequately knows it to be so; if not-X is fact, then God adequately knows this; and these conditional statements, which are true only of God, remain true whether X or not-X is the fact. So the uniqueness of God as omniscient is statable without presupposing any particular facts. What has generally been meant by a "finite God" would lack such categorical supremacy, transcendent of all facts. The "finite God," in the common meaning, is held to have some degree or other of excellence which surpasses that of others only to an extent which the facts, if we knew them, would specify.

The theory of transcendental relativity accepts the Whiteheadian dictum, "all realization is finite and there is no infinitude of all perfections." But a critic begs the question if he infers that the doctrine thereby sacrifices the incomparable majesty of God. For there are mutually incompatible possibilities of value, and from this the doctrine infers that the infinitude of all perfections would be chaos, and no perfection at all. Thus God lacks no "absolute perfection" which any logically possible being *could* possess. All that is denied is that nonsense becomes sense, even in reference to God. And this is no defect in Him. On the other hand, the doctrine holds that God is indeed absolutely infinite in his potentialities. He is the only being of whom it can be said that *any* possible value you please is a possible possession for him. To say, "This or that is possible," is on this doctrine to say, "God might possess it." For he would possess the world in which it was actualized. But many possible values are such that you or I could not possibly have them. Thus beings are superior not only by their actuality; superiority is just as easily statable in terms of potency. I might have been a poet, had certain decisions in my life fallen otherwise; but an atom *could* not be a poet. God might have adequately possessed various worlds that might have existed; no one but God *could* (with even logical possibility) be conceived as *adequately* possessing any world whatever.

In contrast to the foregoing view, classical theism holds that God has actually all possible value, in the sense that nothing he does not have could he possibly have; and that what

he does not have is not worth his having. He already has something better. He has exhausted possibility, so far as relevant to him. Or rather, one must not speak of possibility but only of actuality, "*pure actuality*," in his case. Transcendental relativists think this is mere words, or else contradiction. We see no majesty or perfection in it, but a most imperfect human confusion, to worship which is idolatry. This classical doctrine has not yet learned what most of the philosophical — yes, and much of the religious — world believes it has learned, that "the primary words are not words for things but for relations" (Buber) or that becoming or process, taken in its fullness, is richer than mere being, and that this is so not as a mere fact but logically. Thus logical contradiction is bound to emerge somewhere in the defence of the classical doctrine. Mr. Wild does not refute the charge of contradiction; he only substitutes softer words, like "difficulty," and raises secondary issues concerning my failure to display adequate historical learning in the book. And he looks for contradictions in the super-relativist doctrine, as outlined in his rather inhospitable and uncertain entertainment of it. Transcendental relativity may have its difficulties, but does Mr. Wild yet know what this relativity is?

For instance, when the reviewer says, "There is an element of sharp transcendence in the object of religious adoration to which Mr. Hartshorne's conception simply fails to do justice," may I not reply that the element of sharp transcendence is precisely what the theory in question seeks to save, by freeing it from logical absurdity so that it can at last come into its own? The suggestion that the transcendently relative God, if he exists, exists "somewhere in the universe," need not detain us, since I think Mr. Wild himself now realizes that the doctrine he is opposing does not involve such notions. *God can no more be localized, according to my doctrine, or have special organs of perception, than according to orthodoxy. But the contention that "Western religious thought and experience is practically unanimous in rejecting the idea of worshipping such a material being," cannot be ignored. One might fill a volume with the exceptions to the alleged unanimity (restricting

"material" to its here legitimate meaning), beginning say with Tertullian, and including an ever increasing number of leading philosophers and theologians, especially from Schelling, Fechner, Pfleiderer, and Soloviev, down to Whitehead, Berdyaev, and Niebuhr, among others. One may grant that Mr. Wild's has until recently been the majority opinion among West European theorists of the religious life; but unless majorities are regarded as almost infallible, it is out of order to appeal to them when what they hold is deliberately and thoughtfully rejected by distinguished students of religious and philosophical thought.

If Mr. Wild cannot see that anything more than "respect and admiration" can be entertained for a God whose sympathetic love has no blind spots, who embraces in this love the unimaginable past and will embrace in it all the unimaginable future, if he cannot feel reverence, or love and worship, for the God who thus *is* love (the God many of us find in the Gospels) but must have instead a deity so completely non-relative that he has no relation of sympathy (simply because he has no relation at all, no genuine relatedness) to the world, then the conclusion seems to be that he worships mere power or "independence," not the suffering love which I suppose is the deepest message of Christianity. But no doubt Mr. Wild is convinced by the traditional device of contrasting a love which springs from "need" and is therefore "selfish," and a love which is without need and therefore can be wholly unselfish. However, as I have tried to show elsewhere, "need" and "unselfish" are ambiguous in just the way required to yield a plausible nonsequitur. Nor is it uninteresting that nothing is said about the divine love in the review. This love is not a "moral quality," but that which is beyond mere morality altogether, since it completely removes any possibility of choice between greater and lesser good, but permits only a choice between alternative ways of willing the greatest good. It is thus completely beyond the realm of "temptation," and resistance thereto, in which morality works. It is also beyond all codes, and is the creative ground from which springs such value as codes may have. In no act whatever can human beings rival the absolute lovingness which is the holiness of God. Our lovingness can only

remotely approximate the ideal of taking other persons as seriously as we do ourselves. But God takes us, in a sense, infinitely more seriously than we do ourselves. He sees our present as implicative of all our past and the world's past, while we cannot be adequately aware of one percent, or one millionth of one percent, of all this. And we love a neighbor or two. God loves all the persons there ever have been or are, and all the possibilities of personality too.

According to super-relativism, God is not and never was without a world; it is therefore incorrect to say he "lacks a world which he is bound to create." He once was without *this particular* world (or world state) which he now has, but this world is not requisite, since another world would have done; some-world-or-other is indeed requisite, but this (according to the doctrine) could not be missing; so can never have been lacked. There is nothing God in the strict sense "needs" which he could possibly ever have been without. Further, those things God now has but once did not have, or now is without but may come to acquire, are the sort of things that in principle *could not* be *exhaustively* possessed, since the exhaustive actualization of possibilities is nonsense, there being incompatible possibilities. The only sense then in which super-relativism admits "deficiencies" in God is a Pickwickian sense, since it is not a deficiency to fail to correspond to nonsense, even if the nonsense is offered as a definition of the word "perfect." Take again "without the vast number of finite creatures he (God) would apparently have very little to think about." Now this sentence in the super-relativist context is self-contradictory, for according to the doctrine God cannot be "without" creatures — the class "creatures" could not be null. So it is no deficiency on the part of God that if nonsense were true he would himself be nonsensically barren. So much for the objections, on religious grounds, to transcendental relativity.

Mr. Wild, further, doubts if any valid arguments for the transcendently relative deity are possible. (This subject calls for an entire book, which I hope to write.) The reviewer notes that I seem to accept the ontological argument, but is puzzled that the orthodox conclusion to this argument is not accepted.

He rightly suspects this has something to do with a different view of "being" or "existence." I have written two essays on the ontological argument in which the matter is at least partly cleared up.³ Essential is the distinction between existence and actuality, the neglect of which vitiates many discussions of the ontological argument. The existence of a person (or of an individual "thing" in the everyday meaning) is to be contrasted with his (or its) actuality. In this I am, on the whole, following common sense, which should please Mr. Wild. According to common usage, a person exists if his personal essence is now actualized in *any* appropriate accidents, e.g., in any appropriate concrete experiences. The experiences, which are always accidents, are alone "actual"; but the person "exists" so long as *any* such accidents expressive of his essence occur. (For simplicity, I abstract from the body and also from sleep, and consider only the waking "soul.") Now to say that a person exists "contingently" is to say that the class of experiences thus expressive might have been null. To say that he exists necessarily is to say that the class, by its very class character, *cannot* or could not, be null. It does not in the least follow that there is any necessity that the class be represented by just this or just that set of actualities — or by all-possible-actuality, which is nonsense. *Any* set, embodying the essence, will do.

We have now to note that in the case of God there is a reason for the a priori knowability of the individual's existence, times assumed that we can know an individual's individual nature without knowing that he exists. But can we? Mr. Micawber is merely a class of individuals; he is a kind of man, not a man. Only a "this man" can be individual, and no "possible individual," so-called, is ever "this man." We can point to the existent, never to the merely possible. The latter we namely the a priori specifiability of his nature. It is some- can only describe, but the description never reaches full individuality. However, in the case of deity, we find that our descrip-

³ Ch. IX of *Man's Vision of God* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941); and "The Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument", *Philosophical Review*, LIII (1944), pp. 225-45.

tion is necessarily that of one individual and no other. Thus the same principle — that individuality and existence go together — operates here to make both knowable a priori, and to prevent either from being thus knowable in the usual case.

That "existence is not a predicate" means, according to the foregoing, first that actuality is not a predicate; and second, that in ordinary cases existence is only relatively distinct from actuality, and hence in these cases is also not a predicate. Only through some factual material can I know either this man, or the actual state of this man. I must have more facts to know the latter, but this is merely a question of degree. In the case of the categorical individual, however, there is an infinite difference between actuality and existence, and the latter is not factual at all, but something embodied in any possible facts, or non-facts. For *this* individuality is inherent even in the most universal categories. Even so, it is not simple "existence" that is a predicate contained in the predicate "categorically supreme"; it is rather the unique *modality* of the existence, its necessity.

Modality-of-existence is *always* a predicate. It is, for example, inherent in our natures as frail, derivative human beings that we exist (if we do) only thanks to some contingency or other. This means, not all possible states of existence involve men (as they do involve deity). If we had not existed, that would likewise have been a contingent fact. Now the same principle that modality is a predicate makes existence inferrable in the divine case and non-inferrable in other cases. Thus, if it is possible that there be men, then there may or may not be; but if (or rather since — there can be no "if" here) it is necessary that there be God, then *a fortiori* there is. If (*per impossible*) it were not necessary that there be God, then, since contingency contradicts categorical supremacy (which includes supreme security of existence), "God" (if the term had cognitive meaning at all) would be a symbol of the strictly impossible, the necessarily non-existent. This, in turn, could only mean that the word stands for a contradiction. This was Anselm's great discovery, that non-existence here can only mean non-sense, the non-being even of a consistent idea

of deity, even of the possibility of such an idea. Positivists of course do deny this very possibility. But the question then arises: if the idea of categorical supremacy is not consistent, what is the contradiction in it? And how can it be "without cognitive meaning" if it is derived from the universal categories?

Thomists are fond of remarking (and Mr. Wild has reminded us of this) that God's very essence is his act of existing. In this way, they feel that the necessity of his existence is provided for. My comment on this should hardly surprise the reader. Necessity is the absence of a possible alternative, and an act is just what by its nature always has such an alternative. The word has no function except to indicate that among possibilities one is carried out into particular realization while the others remain mere possibilities. To say that an individual's essence is his act is to make the act totally unfree. The bipolar theory of divine necessity expounded above (and in my book) implies that God's particular actuality now, or whenever referred to, is indeed an act, in the proper sense of a decision among possibilities, an enactment of this particular divine actuality in contrast to what might have been enacted. The necessity of divine existence is simply this: the alternative possibilities for enactment all belong to the one genus, "expressive of the divine individuality" (either as "objective" or "subjective" forms of divine experience). Necessity is simply freedom over the whole range of possibilities for existence. Wherever the divine self-enactment may wander among potentialities (and no matter what non-divine self-enactments take place), it is always at home with itself, with its own personality. For *this* personality or individuality is at the same time entirely universal, purely categorical, purely abstract. I do not wonder that such a bipolar conception bewilders Mr. Wild, accustomed to monopolar thinking. But it was carefully explained. To have a specific, partly factual individuality is to be at the mercy of factual chances or conditions; and by the same principle, to have a purely categorical individuality is to be absolutely safe, regardless of facts. The concreteness or fullness of factuality which is uniquely absent in God's individuality, however, is uniquely

present in his particular actuality *now*, as the God of our present universe (and of all past ones). God-now is infinitely more than his essence. (That there should be such a more is of the essence: but the particular more is not.)

In spite of our critic, we do not say, *if* there is the essence of God, there must also be some divine actuality. We *find* this essence as a datum of our categorical conceptions, requiring only to be explicated in them, in such fashion that to say, "*if*" there is an essence of God, is already a contradiction. In other words, "God" cannot be consistently construed except as a proper name with an individual designatum, and to accept this construction is shown, by the theological arguments, properly developed, to be no more than to accept the implicit meaning of basic conceptions.

Mr. Wild succeeds in excluding the foregoing theory *ex vi termini*, by falling into the slip: the necessary existence of God (according to my view) is not all of God, ergo "the divine essence (*sic*) is said to be existence plus something further than existence." No, certainly not the essence, but the actuality, of God is more than merely that he exists. For this "existence" is the bare abstraction: the necessary non-nullity of the class, divine actualities. Clearly, any doctrine that affirms accidents in God must mean something more by his "actuality" than by his "essence," for essence by definition excludes accidents. It is indeed the essence of God that he has accidents additional to his essence, just as it is the essence of man (but here one must say, *if* he exists) that he has such accidents. In neither case are the particular accidents in or part of the essence. The contingency of man (in contrast to the necessity of God) is that the essence of man (say, to have a nose) may not be actualized in *any* fashion at all. A creature totally without a nose might still be called a man, and it is a relative question of purpose where we draw the line and say, this is not really a man at all. Essentiality (I hold) does not have a wholly strict meaning in this case, whether one refers to the specific or the individual essence. But God has a necessary essence in a literal sense, which is certain always to be actualized, though never certain to be actualized in this way rather than that, or that way rather than this.

A very ingenious argument of the critic against my view is this: if God's essence is existence, and if (as I contend) the most universal conceptions, such as existence or being, are the most meager and abstract and hence (suggests the critic) equivalent to "nothing," which likewise "abstracts from all real differences," then God's essence is equivalent to nothing! Now God's essence is, I admit or rather insist, an empty outline, and is infinitely less than the divine actuality. But this empty outline is still not in the most extreme sense nothing. Nothing is one of two things: either it is a mere word, with no objective designation at all; or it is the realm of primordial possibilities, apart from all particular actualizations. Objective nothing can only be pure possibility. Now this pure possibility (which is itself not possible but real) is not completely without difference, but only without actual (specific and particular) difference. It has a certain structure, and this structure is that of God-world — no particular world, and not God knowing any particular world (or with any determinate actual content of intuition), but God-as-such knowing world-as-such. Thus God in his essence is the inseparable correlate of world-in-general. If a certain world is actual, then God actually knows this world; and to say, "such and such a world is possible," is the same as saying, "such and such a sort of world might be divinely intuited as a determinate actuality." This correlation, God-as-such and world-as-such, is not "nothing" in the sense of a phrase without designation, but is an objective abstract aspect of every actual state of God-World. God-as-such is not an actuality, but yet it exists, by virtue of some suitable actuality or other.

As for an existence "containing all actuality which could ever be participated by any such finite mode," I hold it to be a pseudo-concept incapable of elucidation according to any intelligible scheme of conferring meaning upon words. If all possibilities of actuality could be actualized, then any "participation" (supposing it could be defined) in what is already all possible actuality and value must be absolutely superfluous and meaningless, and itself no actuality. Super-relativism, of course, is consciously directed toward the supplanting of this classical pseudo-idea of an aboriginally complete actuality.

"Being" ("reality" is better, since it more plainly includes becoming) as potential does not contain all the differences of being as actual — actualization or creation meaning, as Berdyaev says, not the translation of images into another sphere, that of reality, but the production of new images. Of course, any particular actuality contains all the differences it actualizes, but by actuality-as-such or in general we mean precisely something antecedent to and less concrete than those differences. Actualization is determination of the really indeterminate, definition of the really indefinite or vague, as Peirce said. "Determinateness" as such does not contain all possible determinations, any more than concreteness as such contains all concrete things. There is no substitute for "this actuality" as an indexical sign. Actuality as iconically designatable, actuality in general, is infinitely less rich in difference than any designatum of "this actuality." I have often wondered just how far medieval thought was aware of the irreducible function of the index.

We come now to Mr. Wild's question: how do I refute the classical ontological argument for a purely absolute deity? Simply by denying the premise, "of perfect being (in the purely absolute sense) we have a (genuine) idea." What is necessary cannot indeed be false, and it is contradictory to deny what is spoken of as necessary. It does not follow, however, that it must be affirmed. The point is that a "necessarily existent island," to take the famous example, is already nonsense, whether we affirm or deny this nonsense. Islands by their very essence are imperfect and contingent affairs. The alleged concept is in this case to be rejected, and then the question of existence does not arise. My contention, of course, is that the orthodox notion of "perfection" escapes nonsense only when it is reformed into transcendental relativity. Then indeed the ontological argument becomes applicable; because there is then a genuine concept for it to apply to. The other theistic arguments are also valid, if they and their conclusions are somewhat similarly transformed.

From my frequent failure in the book to indicate just which theologians held some view or argument upon which I was commenting, it was not to be inferred that I supposed

all such views were "Thomistic." My basic contention was that whatever way (historical or logically possible) be taken to try to make sense out of the view that God is purely absolute and eternal, the contradictions inherent in this view are not avoided but merely shifted. The question is as to the logical possibilities; does Mr. Wild exhibit any possibility I left out of account?

In one passage I speak, in a fashion which perhaps is dubious, of "Thomists" as holding that our acts are logical consequences of the divine action which infallibly produces its effect. However, the "infallibly" was not my invention. It occurs in Father Meehan's *Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas*, where it is supported by what seem adequate evidences from St. Thomas. For example, the following passages (quoted on p. 306):

"If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this that the will should not be moved to that thing, but it is not impossible simply. Whence it does not follow that the will is moved by God under necessity" (S.T. I-II, 10, 4, 3m).

"The free agent always wills precisely what God moves it to will" (C.G. III, 92, Rursus, Attendenda).

What this says is that God's moving me to do an act necessarily results in my doing it; but nevertheless I might not have done it, because God might not have so moved me. Now this in turn can only mean one (or both) of two things: (1) God's will had a possible alternative state; (2) granting the same volition in God, we might have responded to this volition differently. The first alternative is not open to Thomism, for it implies something inessential or accidental in God. The second means that God does not really "determine" us to a certain act, but he influences us in such a way that we may or may not do a certain thing. He makes the act possible, not certain. He gives us the power to do the act, but also the power not to do it. He is a necessary but not sufficient cause (in the logicians' sense) of the act; the sufficient cause includes the creature's self-determination as well as the divine influence. This would indeed be freedom of man in relation to God; but Thomism does not unequivocally and consistently assert it. However, classical theists are in general vaguer on "omni-

potence" than on omniscience, so that definite contradiction is less likely. The book did not stress this problem particularly, but rather that of the divine knowledge. No important aspect of the argument needs to be changed merely because Thomas wants to maintain a distinction between "permitted" and chosen effects of the divine will. We have all heard of this distinction. But the dual assumption, that (1) God contains in his necessary essence knowledge and creative action, (2) whose objects or intended results yet might have been different, is Thomistic, is it not? From it derive certain contradictions, to be formulated presently.

Regarding these contradictions which I allege against "classical theism," Wild responds as have so many others. He suggests that the answers exist, and refers me to Aquinas. I have read quite a little of what the master says on these matters, also many hundreds of pages of Thomistic writings with especial attention to these issues. And I have corresponded with several Thomists, in two or three cases at length. Three others have publicly debated with me.⁴ Never have I found any unequivocal proposal made for the removal of the contradictions in question, and at times it is virtually admitted that they cannot be removed, perhaps with the suggestion that they are indeed difficulties but not quite contradictions. But how they differ logically from what even a Thomist calls or would call contradiction if he met it in the writings of an atheist — or a super-relativist theist — is by no means made clear. Two prominent Thomists have assured me that somewhere in Jean of St. Thomas the way of removing the inconsistencies is to be found. I doubt it, and I challenge such philosophers: if the solution exists tell us what, not merely where it is.

To illustrate from our reviewer how these things go: — Wild urges, as proof that God can be necessary and yet free, that "necessary" means self-sufficient, rather than necessitated or constrained. The last point may be granted, but that was not the question. The absolutely necessary is by definition

⁴ Father Meehan, in *The Journal of Religion*, XXVI (1946), pp. 50-57; Ferdinand Bergenthal, in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, 1949; Professor Albert Menne, *op. cit.*, 1950.

that to whose existence or occurrence there is no possible alternative. A free choice or decision, according to Thomism itself (and in any case, according to good sense), is that to which there is an alternative. Liberty is liberty to act or refrain from acting (or at least, from acting in this manner rather than that). So if (1) God's actuality is through and through necessary, and if (2) it includes his actual willing-to-create-the-world, then this act has no possible alternative, and the insistence that nevertheless (3) God needs no world and was free to refrain from creating it contradicts the previous assertions.

Of the three propositions, the first and the last surely must be kept inviolate, if there is to be anything left of classical theism, in its distinction from Spinozism on the one hand and transcendental relativity on the other. But one might try to attenuate the second, as I have known more than one Thomist to do. They argue as follows: God's actuality includes his actual willing, but not perhaps his willing-that-there-be-this-world. God wills his own actuality, and it just happens (to put it bluntly, as a Thomist scarcely would) that therefrom the world ensues. The world is created by God, but it cannot literally be said that in God is any such thing as voluntarily creating-the-world. Now I not only do not deny, I insist, that it is possible to will oneself in such fashion that something else accidentally results. I will my own life without regard to all the various consequences (often unknown to me) that this has for others. And, not being a determinist but a Peircean, Whiteheadian, Bergsonian creationist, I hold that from the nature of the cause the whole nature of the effect never follows with necessity. So I do not reject on principle the notion of consequences contingently flowing from a divine self-willing. The notions I do reject on principle, as meaningless or contradictory, are: that an act of will is "free" if it is within, or identical with, something which has no possible alternative but is a necessary, eternal essence, and that a necessary entity can knowingly, deliberately, and infallibly produce consequences which are contingent. The latter is absurd because, while an act of will need not will all the consequences that in fact flow from it, still, if it *intends* just these consequences, then either

its intentions are fallible and may fail of their result, or the result is necessary if the intention is so.

There are indeed reasons for suspecting that God does not intend the details of the world, and Thomists may perhaps sometimes vaguely approximate to this way of thinking in order to avoid the absurdity mentioned. But then the other contradiction, that an act in a necessary entity cannot be "free," remains. And more important (for the foregoing difficulty may seem to depend on an arbitrary definition of freedom), since infallible knowledge — whether or not infallible intention — with respect to the world is certainly a tenet of classical theism; one stark contradiction remains, deriving from the following: (1) God is through and through necessary; (2) he knows that the world exists; (3) that the world exists is not necessary. These propositions involve contradiction; for, from the first two one can deduce that the divine knowledge that the world exists has no possible alternative; and since (by the definition of "infallible") "there is a divine, i.e., infallible, knower knowing that there is a world" entails "there is a world," and since (principle of modal logic) a proposition entailed by one without possible alternatives cannot itself have possible alternatives (for were it false, by the *modus tollens* the proposition entailing it must be false, which is admitted not to be possible), it follows that to the existence of the world there is not and in no sense could have been a possible alternative, which flatly contradicts "that the world exists is not necessary." Again, which of the contradictory assertions is to be given up? Does Mr. Wild give me the answer? He only repeats the contention, either absurd or irrelevant, according as it is interpreted, that even we human beings can have knowledge that is necessary although the known is not. In the sense in which it is relevant, this is erroneous. The case which he cites (that I know that the pen is on the desk) is contingent in the same sense as the fact that the pen is on the desk. To both there is a possible alternative, and that is all that metaphysical contingency or non-necessity means. The sense in which Wild's contention (which of course is in Thomas himself)⁵ is perhaps correct

⁵ *S.T.*, Q. 14, Art. 13.

but irrelevant is this: there is perhaps, though even that is not so clear, a conditional or hypothetical necessity of my knowing that the pen is on the desk, now that it is there. Certainly there would for God be such a hypothetical necessity. He could not be ignorant of a fact, while there was such a fact. But of course, a contingent premise can always yield a hypothetically necessary conclusion. (It can even yield a strictly necessary conclusion, since necessary propositions are implied by all propositions.)

The problem we started with, however, was how a wholly non-contingent premise can be compatible with the contingency of something it logically entails, in other words, how a necessary premise can yield a contingent conclusion. The plain answer is, in *no* way. Yet surely "X, who is infallible, knows there is a world" is logically incompatible with "there is no world" (together they would say, the infallible errs!), and hence the positive form of the latter proposition is entailed by the former. How can an entailed consequence of a proposition be any less necessary than the proposition? You cannot in logical accord with Thomism weaken this necessity into merely hypothetical necessity: not in God's case, for that would mean that, on certain conditions, themselves in some sense possible, he might have lacked something he actually has (his knowledge that the world exists), and therewith the sheer necessity of his actuality would be given up; and you cannot weaken it to hypothetical necessity in the entailed consequence, for an entailed proposition cannot in any sense be less necessary (though it may be more, as pointed out above) than the entailing proposition.

If we turn for light to Wild's *Introduction to Realistic Philosophy*, what do we find? "Such [divine] knowledge [of the world], since it rests upon a divine choice which cannot alter [but could it have been otherwise?], is immutable. But it is not strictly necessary, like the knowledge of eternal possibilities. It is only hypothetically necessary, that is, necessary on the ground of a free choice, immutably made."⁶

⁶ New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948, p. 380.

The bracketed query inserted by me points to the dilemma which I hold is fatal for classical theism. If the act *could* have been otherwise (that is, if an alternative act were possible), then there is a divine volition and knowledge that is not of the essence of God, but is accidental. And if the act and knowledge could not have been otherwise, "hypothetically necessary" becomes pointless, since the hypothesis then expresses something absolutely necessary, and its strictly entailed consequence must share in the same absolute necessity.

Quoting again from the same volume: "But if this future event is known from all eternity with certainty and necessity, does this not mean that the event has lost its contingency and is now really determined and necessary? It does not mean this. A contingent event does not lose its contingency even after it has happened, though it may be certainly known by us. Thus the free choice of my friend having happened, is known by me with certainty as a free act" (p. 381).

To this I object: —

To know with certainty does not imply, to know with unconditional necessity. To know with certainty means, the knowledge is such that, granting its occurrence, the thing known is *in that case* (i.e., hypothetically) necessary. (It may also be intended to imply that, granting the thing, knowledge of it is in that case — again, hypothetically — necessary.) But this has nothing to do with an alleged unconditionally necessary knowledge (such as could not have been otherwise) having as objects things that could have been otherwise. Certainty and infallibility of knowing means that if either thing or knowing-the-thing is, the other is also. This permits both to be contingent, or both to be necessary, but excludes other combinations.

Mr. Wild criticizes the contention that a whole may be related to its parts without their being really related to the whole. He does not object to my doctrine that there are real relations whose converse is only nominal or "external." Thus he and I agree that X-knows-Y is a real relational property of X, whereas, Y-is-known-by-X is not a real property of Y. But then, to my amazement I confess, Wild argues (as a

reductio ad absurdum of my view) that the relation *X has-as-a-part Y* could not be supposed "non-mutual" or non-convertible, for "the relation of difference . . . like that of similarity, is clearly mutual. Hence if the whole is *different from* its constituents, it is impossible that they should not be different from the whole, and hence related to it by a real converse relation." My amazement is due in part to this, that by the same principle one would have to give up the notion that an object of knowledge can be independent of the knower, as Wild and I both believe it can. For the knower is surely different from the known, and if difference always means a real converse relation, then the known is always relative to, thus dependent upon, the knower after all!

But, says our reviewer, one must choose between two doctrines of whole-part. According to one (which he adopts), the whole just is all the related parts, and nothing additional that is related to the parts; according to the other, the whole is something completely organic "working on all its parts to integrate them into something quite distinct." Wild sees that I reject this latter doctrine, and thinks I should therefore accept the other. But surely the dichotomy is inexhaustive. A third view is that in certain cases the whole (or perhaps better, the inclusive reality) is not just the parts, but is something, *W*, inclusive of the parts, one while they are many: and yet this *W* does not "work on the parts" or enter into their being at all. Wild's only ground for ignoring this third position seems to be his argument, which I find unsound, from the supposed convertibility of difference in such a case. On the contrary, the parts are not related at all, either as different or as not-different, to the whole. Only the whole is really related — as different in certain respects, the same in others — to the parts. (Many logicians would find this denial of convertibility paradoxical, but they would then presumably reject Mr. Wild's and my doctrine about the non-convertibility of the cognitive relation.) The whole, then, does not "integrate the parts into something distinct," if that means that it *changes* the parts into more or less new entities, or into itself, the whole; rather, the whole is itself something distinct from the parts, but

including them, and therefore has no need to alter the latter to transform them into something distinct from themselves. The whole produces itself or comes into being as a free act of synthesis, using the parts as data (Whitehead) for its prehensions. But once more, using is a real relation, being-used (in this sense) is not. The parts or data are innocent of and uncolored by the use made of them.

Both Mr. Wild and I wish to make analysis possible. We must therefore reject the notion that wholes are completely "organic." But to admit that W contains X and Y and Z is to admit the validity of analysis, since X and Y and Z are taken as items that can be mentioned one by one and identified without identifying the totality of items. Thus there can be analysis just to the extent that there are parts or items in this inorganic sense. Every statement of the form "contains X" or "contains Y" will be strictly true of W. If there can be an infinity of parts, there can even be infinitely extended analysis. But it does not follow that analysis can be "exhaustive" in the sense, not only of listing all the parts, but in the sense that this listing reaches full equivalence with a direct unitary intuition of the total actuality. I should hold, with Whitehead and Bergson and many others, that analysis is no substitute for intuition of wholes. What analysis does is to locate the whole in a class of possible syntheses of the data in question. These syntheses do not differ by virtue of differing real relations among the parts, for these belong to the latter, or some of them, but by virtue of differing relations of the whole to the parts. These relations of the whole are aspects, not real parts, and cannot be included in a listing of the real parts and *their* real relations. Such is the doctrine I wish to defend.

Now it may seem that W itself becomes one of the items, along with X, Y, Z, so that we need a new whole, W¹ to contain W and the part. But this is invalid. W is self-related to every one of the parts, and thus the inclusive unity is already provided for. (W includes itself in the mathematician's sense, but this is artificial. It merely is "itself.")

In one sense, there is indeed an infinite regress of inclusion. Each new moment of time sees new syntheses of the old factors

and of the previous syntheses. This regress of temporal succession is however not "vicious." Of course, theologians of Mr. Wild's persuasion often argue that endless succession is futile, since it reaches no goal. But this is, as many of us think, a misunderstanding of how goals function. Life is for the living, not for an end result. Essentially neither God nor man is trying to "get somewhere," there to rest in peace, but all are (in their perfect or imperfect manner respectively) at each moment striving to actualize as great a value as the past actualizations furnish material for, in such fashion that opportunity for further creation of value in the future will be maximized (as Dewey likes to say). The notions of getting somewhere, in an absolute sense, or of eternally being somewhere, in some absolute value-once-for-all, is, I agree with Dewey, a flight from living and an attempt to deny the inexhaustibility and incompatibility of the infinitely various value-possibilities. True, though here Dewey might demur, every momentary value is once-for-all, in the sense of being immortal by virtue of the divine retentiveness; but it is never "absolute" in the sense of the greatest possible. God's essence and existence, his individuality, are absolute and the greatest possible, but not his actuality, for that would be meaningless.

According to our keen critic, my doctrine that the really related term includes the term to which it is related, or in his terminology, which I also have sometimes used, the "subject" of the relation includes the "term" of the relation, leads to absurdities. For one thing, it makes the knower include the known, from which it follows (he says) that the thing known is "only" a state of the knower — against the realism of common experience which holds that things known are "both independent of and external to us, not merely our own constitutive states." Note that the force of this stands or falls with the doctrine of whole criticized above. For on my theory, being a constituent of the knower is not a real relation, hence cannot infringe upon the independence of the object. To call the latter a "state" of the subject is not a real description of the object at all, but only of the subject. It merely says over again, and backwards, that the subject has the object. Note too the

phrase "both independent of and external to," as though the reviewer realized unconsciously that a thing might be independent but *not* external (after all, external-to is a relation, it seems, and unless this relation be merely nominal we have relatedness to the subject just as much as we do if the relation constituent-of be a real relation!). Mr. Wild is not the only author who writes that the object is "independent of and external to" the mind — as though he had not quite thought out the answer to the question, Does the one adjective entail the other or not? I suggest that independent-of entails external-to only if the doctrine of the absolutely organic whole be presupposed — the last presupposition that those interested in the independence of the object ever accept!

Of course, it will be urged that common sense itself directly requires not only independence but also externality. Surely, one may say, when we know Africa, it is outside us; similarly, when we know the past, it is outside us, too. Now please remark that both "know" and "outside" are not simple absolute terms subject to no degree of relativity. Man knows always imperfectly, and that means that what he "knows," in one sense, he does not know, in another sense. But if we knew *simpliciter*, without qualification, what is to prove that the "externality" of the known would not also be banished? For note that to be inside or outside of something is also not a simple absolute matter. If externality were absolute in ordinary cases, then what is on the other side of the world would be no more alien to us than what is barely outside our skins. One could not enhance an absolute separateness. Physicists have outgrown the idea of simple location; they say that in one sense every particle occupies the whole of space. Now I ask, how does Mr. Wild, or common sense, know that if the two qualifications, the one of knowledge, the other of externality, be put together, it would not turn out that the known is external just to the extent and in the fashion in which we really fail to know it, but otherwise it is internal? We guess about the object more or less reasonably, and it is also more or less outside-inside us. Observe that what we know most certainly, e. g., "I feel pain", is most clearly inside rather than outside the

knower. So I see nothing conclusive in the appeal to common sense as against my "idealism" — which is really a synthesis of old idealism and old realism, accepting as it does the independence of the object from the particular knower which is the heart of realism.

I also see no reason why I should accept the scholastic distinction between "entitative" and "intentional" presence of things. Insofar as the entitative presence is itself (as just seen) not unqualifiedly affirmable, neither is the intentional. I should also convert this. We have, as Hume saw, no experiential basis for affirming entitative connections, apart from intentional ones (in the broadest sense). If we abstract from all meaning, awareness, and feeling, and consider bare "objects," they exhibit no sort of positively conceivable real connectedness. The structure and unity of reality is not something additional to the structure and unity of experiences (human and otherwise), but is the same structure and unity. These things cannot readily be grasped by a tradition which thinks becoming, relation, and relativity are after-thoughts, secondary to the merely absolute, or to "being."

We are told that the doctrine that knowing includes the known, abolishes the distinction between present and past, so far as the past is known. Mr Wild declares that the past does not exist. The doctrine is common, but paradoxical. If the past is not actuality, then it is either potentiality or non-entity. Not that everything is either actual or potential; the ultimate universals or the categories, and the essence of God, are eternally real but in themselves never can be actual. This is because they are the common factors of all possibility, abstract elements of being in all becoming. Events, however, even though past, are not thus common to *all* possibility and hence are either potential or actual. If they are potential, then we should not say, Washington died, but "he might have died." For these and other reasons I agree with Bergson, Whitehead, Peirce, Fechner, and others that the past has the mode of actuality. It is contained in the present to the extent that it is retained in memory (absolutely, in God). The reviewer has two arguments against this. The first amounts to saying that the relation of

inclusion is not the same as the relation of present-past, because there is spatial inclusion. Answer: present-past inclusion (as has been explained by this writer, and by Whitehead) is a species of inclusion, not the genus. The second argument is that if God includes all present entities by knowing them, and also all past entities, then present entities will be past, for him, since past means *included*. Answer: past means, included in the way in which past is in the present, not in the way in which something not past is in the present. I shall return to this topic presently.

The reviewer's doctrine that the past exists not physically but noetically or intentionally I hold is either an equivocation or meaningless. If it means that what exists as term of the noetic relation is not an actual physical event but an image of it, then it is the image, not the event that is remembered or known. If it means that the term is the event, but not in the mode of actuality, then I reply that I know of no other mode for an event except potency. Actual means determinate, potential means more or less indeterminate; definiteness is "the soul of actuality" (Whitehead) and the reason for its superior value. Past events are either definite or not definite; if they are definite, they have everything of actuality but something completely indefinite, which is surely not what can distinguish actual from potential. So, as it seems to me, "noetic," or "intentional," fails to prevent the alternative from being exhaustive.

Mr. Wild objects further to my holding that there are many possible ways of being aware of the same given object. But our correspondence seems to have shown that this is not a real difference of opinion between us. He also has trouble with some remarks of mine, perhaps badly phrased, concerning the relations of knowledge and virtue, but here too there is probably no real issue. Human virtue is largely a matter of relatively unconscious habit; in God, however, all is conscious, and it was of him I was speaking in saying that his adequate knowledge guarantees his righteousness. For classical theism also, knowledge and will are one in God.

Concerning "substance," I might well have stated that I take Whitehead's analysis of "enduring individuals" as "soci-

eties of occasions" to be as nearly definitive as anything that has been said on this question. We face here again the pair *being* and *becoming*. Do we have to do with beings containing happenings, or with happenings whose relationships and common factors in some cases constitute what we mean by the life or development of an individual thing or person? If happenings are in a being, then we have something which as a whole simply is, although something in it becomes; and that is, in my judgment, a mere confusion. But if elements of being contribute to actualities which as wholes become, if successive happenings have qualities, purposes, memories, expectations, and other predicates, relational or monadic, in common, then there is no contradiction. And no one has, save in the most purely verbal fashion, been able to indicate what observable factor of "self-identity" is omitted in this Whiteheadian account. Whitehead accepts the "I," of course, but as subtly ambiguous in a manner harmless for ordinary purposes. Just as "this" sometimes means, this event, sometimes this group or series of events, or this character pervading this group or series, so "I" or "this subject" sometimes means, the subject unique to this experience, (or a small group of subjects of successive experiences) as in "I feel dizzy," sometimes what a large number of momentary subjects in a "personally-ordered series" have in common, as in "I am a theist," sometimes both in the same sentence, as in "I feel better than I usually do." I see no conflict with common sense in this, but a logical clarity missing in other doctrines.

I have left to the last the point where I feel the most difficulty in meeting Mr. Wild's onslaught. He says that if to be-related-to is to include, then one's head includes one's neck, and we include the great nebula in Andromeda, and so everything would include everything and there would be no real otherness and no relations. Now there are two ways of answering this, and my trouble is to choose between them and to think out all that is involved, in either case. The simplest way is to follow current physics in denying that contemporary actualities (*nota bene*, happenings, not "things" or beings or mere places) are really related to each other. For events to be contemporary

is, according to physics, the absence of relation. If events A and B have nothing causally (and physics knows only causal relations between events) to do with each other, they are contemporary. Then all relatedness between actualities is temporal, and the problem is the one we have already discussed of how the present includes the past. It is true that the present events constituting the head-now will embrace (as prehended data) some of the past occasions constituting the neck-earlier, and vice versa. But that this is absurd or against what common sense has any ground for claiming to know, I should not see reason to grant. We must remember that while memory includes its objects, memory is a very feeble light in most creatures, things are much more forgotten than remembered, and to this extent they are not included. The inclusion is deficient as such, as the memory is deficient. Only in God is there adequate memory-inclusion. Only in God is the past unqualifiedly in the present.

So far, I see no insuperable difficulty, save perhaps this, that I am not able to see clearly that it makes sense to say that contemporary events are unrelated. For they seem to have the relation of coexistence, or rather, of co-occurrence. If this is not a real relation in them, it must be a relation in some mind considering them, above all, God's. But then there is a problem of God as, in a certain phase, contemporary with us in a certain phase. So I suspect (not too happily) that one must admit real relations between contemporary happenings. The consequence, "everything is related to and includes everything," is still subject, however, to two qualifications. (1) Nothing is related to anything more concrete than itself or later in time, these being mere relations of reason, upside-down ways of stating the real relations of the concrete to the abstract or of the later to the earlier; and (2) a thing includes another thing only to the extent or in the fashion in which it is really related to it, so that the deficient modes of awareness or inclusion serve to distinguish things through the endless variations in the items which are most vividly "prehended." Thus distinctions and otherness are not lost. However, as I said in the book, I am greatly troubled about the problem of contemporaries, which

leads straight into questions about physical "relativity" where I always seem to become confused.

What does it "add up to"? I wish I knew. But whatever the difficulties of transcendental relativity, I can imagine no possibility of philosophical salvation in returning to the inversion of the logical relations of being and becoming, or absolute and relative, or abstract and concrete, upon which medieval theology seems to me to rest. That theology has no intelligible doctrine of relations and relativity, or of process. It assumes that primarily something is, and then as an arbitrary addition to or subtraction from this primary being, there is relativity and process. But no adding or subtracting (themselves relational conceptions) can produce the ideas of becoming or relation out of that of absolute being. Yet the converse production is very well possible. Process, creative of self-related actualities, is bound to have aspects, upon which abstraction can focus attention, of primordial and immutable being, independent of any particular changes or novelties, but integral to the actual process that is going on. This is the way, consistent with experience, to go at the ancient problem of the supreme, or logically incomparable, individual. Apart from these technical convictions, which Mr. Wild seems to confirm, in spite of himself, I cherish with a lively faith the religious conviction that there can be nothing greater or more worshipful than sheer love, and I see only sophistry or loose thinking in the traditional identification of supreme love with total independence or non-relativity. Yet I maintain with the classical theists that there is an independent or "absolute" essence of the divine individual. Otherwise, that "God is love" would itself be only contingently and precariously and temporarily true. Here the reviewer and I are in hearty agreement. Would that we might also agree as to the divine relativity, or self-relatedness to the creatures!

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THE DIVINE EXISTENCE: AN ANSWER TO MR. HARTSHORNE

I have read Mr. Hartshorne's comments on my review of his book, *The Divine Relativity*, with interest and instruction. He has, I believe, clarified his position in certain important respects. On some points, my criticisms may have arisen from insufficient understanding. But on others, his clarifying comments accentuate certain issues which lie between us. In view of the basic importance of these issues for metaphysics and natural theology, I am very happy to continue the discussion.

Mr. Hartshorne thinks that I have failed to do justice to his composite conception of Deity as in a certain respect "absolute" and in another "relative." My failure, I suppose, was due to the grave difficulties which seem to me to attach to any such view. In this case, I can only say that Mr. Hartshorne's further explanations have for me rather intensified than solved these perplexities. How can a being be both absolute and relative, independent and dependent in existence?

In his book it seemed to me that Mr. Hartshorne was emphasizing the relativity rather than the absoluteness of this "Deity." Hence I felt that I might be doing more justice to his doctrine by considering this aspect of it alone, without confronting him with what seem to me to be the even greater difficulties attaching to a theory of the Deity as both absolute and relative all at once. But now this seems impossible, for Mr. Hartshorne is clearly defending this composite view (p. 32).¹ Hence I must consider it, and raise some of those objections which such a view in my opinion has to face. I think they may be best suggested by examining the *freedom from need* which Mr. Hartshorne believes he can attribute to his Deity (p. 38).

This I think can be truly predicated of any being who is existentially independent. Mr. Hartshorne argues that it can be truly predicated of the being with which he is concerned, since this being never lacks a world of some sort, the class of

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, all page references are to Hartshorne's *Reply* in this issue.

creatures never being empty, and since "the exhaustive actualization of possibilities is nonsense" (p. 38). Now even though it be granted that God never lacks *some* creatures he requires for His concrete perfection, it is quite clear that on Mr. Hartshorne's view He always lacks an indefinite number of *further* perfections which He might have but does not have. This strikes me as the description of a being which is incomplete or potential in nature, which needs to have this nature fulfilled by change, and which is therefore finite. By finite being I mean precisely something whose nature is potential in this way, lacking further existence which it needs to fulfill itself. I do not understand how the predicates "absolute" and "independent" can be properly attached to such a being.

Nor do I understand how such a being as this can be held to *exist necessarily*, by any version of the traditional, ontological argument or by any other argument. Mr. Hartshorne replies to this objection by asserting that "God has a necessary essence in a literal sense . . . which is certain always to be actualized, though never certain to be actualized in this way rather than that . . ." (p. 43). In other words, once granted that the divine essence exists, it must necessarily actualize itself in concrete "accidents." Here Mr. Hartshorne has definitely misunderstood my question. I am not asking why something must happen *when* such an essence exists. I am asking why any such essence, or essence-plus-accidents must actually exist at all.

The classical arguments of western natural theology have answered this question by asserting that the Divine essence is precisely the act of existing. Such an existence, if there is one, cannot not exist. Whether or not such arguments can be ultimately defended, on this point at least they make sense. But Mr. Hartshorne has clearly cut himself off from any such theory. I am very puzzled as to what he means by the *divine essence*, and even as to whether he means by it anything at all. But certainly it is clearly distinct from the act of existing, for it is "empty or abstract" and definitely opposed to "the concreteness or fullness of factuality which is . . . uniquely present in his (God's) particular actuality now . . ." (p. 42). "Empty outlines" (p. 43) and other abstractions of this sort are no doubt

present in the minds of philosophers. But they certainly do not necessarily exist.

Their non-existence would involve no contradiction, as is indeed true of all the finite entities known to us. The nature of such a thing, plant, animal, or man, is not to exist. Hence they may gain it from some external source, or not. Such contingency also attaches to the essence of Mr. Hartshorne's deity, apparently in a most exaggerated form, since this essence is "abstract," "indeterminate," and as we have seen, "infinitely less than actuality." Now my question is this. Why should such an empty abstraction exist in the first place, or why should it exist with some set of concrete "accidents" which it needs for its completion? More basically the question may be phrased in this way. Why should anything whose essence is not existence itself necessarily exist?

It is true that Mr. Hartshorne has suggested an answer in his new version of the ontological argument.² The first premise of this argument is as follows: "whatever is coherently conceivable is either actual or an unactualized (but real, more than merely logical) potency."³ In my opinion this premise is fallacious. By "coherently conceivable" Hartshorne means: (1) not nonsense; and (2) not self-contradictory like round-square. Hence any concept which is self-consistent, means something which is really possible in the actual world. This I find to be clearly false.

Logical consistency in the concept is a *necessary* but not a *sufficient* condition for *real* possibility. In addition to this, there must be an actual, existent cause, or causes, really capable of producing the consistent effect. To omit this is to confuse logical possibility, the capacity to *be thought*, with real possibility, the capacity to *exist in rerum natura*. Thus I can think of a Chopin prelude, having the proper Chopin style and structure, but quite distinct from any of those composed by him. Such a concept is perfectly consistent. It contains no inner contradictions. Yet this does not show that such a prelude

² *Philosophical Review*, LIII (1944), pp. 225-45.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

is really possible. As a matter of fact it is not, because Chopin no longer exists to compose it. The capacity to conceive of something cannot be equated with the capacity really to exist.

It is not sufficient for Mr. Hartshorne to think coherently of his Deity Whose essence is not to exist, but something far short of actuality. What evidence has he to offer for the real existence of such an entity — even more for its necessary existence? What contradiction would we fall into if we supposed it non-existent?

I have read several times Mr. Hartshorne's lengthy discussion of the divine essence and existence, but I find no clear-cut answer to this question. He devotes considerable space to the consideration of a question which he thinks I raised in my review, i.e., how he can in his own terms refute the ontological argument in its classical form (p. 45). I never raised this question, and I still do not raise it. My question is this: what argument or arguments does Mr. Hartshorne have to offer for the *actual existence* of his surrelative Deity? The classical ontological and causal arguments conclude in a non-finite being Whose essence is the fact of existing, and Who, therefore, exists necessarily. It is quite clear that Mr. Hartshorne rejects these arguments in their classical form, for he wishes to reach a very different conclusion — the existence of a being meeting all the requirements of what has been universally considered *finitude*, an essence really distinct from its concrete actuality, possessing vast capacities for further completion and enrichment. My question is simply this: what evidence has Mr. Hartshorne to offer for the existence of such a being as this outside of his own mind? So far I have received no answer.

One reason for this, I believe, lies in Mr. Hartshorne's tendency to identify being with abstract "constants," "universals which are not modified by changing circumstances" . . . and which are "in becoming" (p. 32). As a matter of fact, he attributes to me the radically essentialist view that subordinates concrete dynamism to such fixed and changeless essences. Thus I cannot enter even provisionally into his concrete mode of thought because I am "so completely in the habit of assuming: (1) that pure being is primary and superior, becoming second-

ary and inferior; and (2) that the absolute is primary and superior to the relative . . ." (p. 32). Hartshorne on the other hand, with logic by his side, "supports throughout the notion that the absolute, or the constant, independent, and necessary, is *in* the relative, dependent, and contingent happenings, not *vice versa* . . ." (p. 34).

I am somewhat bewildered by this charge, as I am unaware of having said anything of this sort in my review or indeed anywhere else, and he fails to give any quoted evidence to substantiate it. Hence I can only assert categorically that I do not hold the ontological conceptions he attributes to me. A brief explanation may perhaps clarify some of the most basic issues that lie between us.

As I use the term *being*, it is certainly not to be identified with that fixed and determinate aspect of finite being which has been traditionally called *essence*. It includes this of course within its range of extension, as indeed it includes everything whatsoever, every mode or kind of being from the most abstract to the most concrete. But being is not exhausted by the constant, changeless essences of finite things and accidents. It also includes *the act of existing* which realizes such possibilities, bringing them out of their causes, and giving them a being of their own *in rerum natura*. Being thus refers to anything which is able to be in any way (essence) and that existence which realizes them. In fact only nothingness is excluded from the range of this primary concept. How can anything whatsoever that is in any sense real fail to be?

Hence when Mr. Hartshorne thinks of being as exclusively identifiable with abstract phases, "elements" of which "are found in concrete happenings" (p. 33), many questions leap to my mind. If being is only an abstract phase of concrete happenings, what then of the remainder? Must we say that this is not? Then it is nothing. Obviously this is far from Mr. Hartshorne's position. But if, as he says, being is only an "element" lying "in the relative, dependent, and contingent happening" (p. 34), how is this to be avoided? I think some further clarification of his ultimate ontological categories is required.

He identifies being with "the absolute or the constant, independent, and necessary" which is an abstract phase of "contingent happenings" (p. 34). But is it not clear that he is here using the terms "absolute," "independent," and "necessary" in a very peculiar, and to use his own epithet, "Pickwickian" sense? If the whole concrete happening is "contingent," in what sense can an abstract phase of this contingent happening, contained within it, be absolute or necessary? Surely not in its existence. If so, it would necessarily exist, and could not be called contingent. If not, then we are surely concerned with a finite entity, whose essence is distinct from its existence. If such an entity is found to be existent, its existence is supplied to it from some source beyond itself. Such an entity cannot be called "absolute," or "necessary," or "independent" in any strict and proper sense.

Of course we can say that the essence (those determinate traits without which such an entity cannot be *such*) is absolute and necessary in the sense that *if* such an entity is given existence, then it must have such traits. But this is only a hypothetical and derived necessity, which does not deserve to be called *absolute*. It is certainly quite different from that *existential necessity* which is the object of the classical arguments for an unconditioned being. This is not a being with a "necessary" essence in the sense that it is fixed and determinate. Any finite essence would meet these conditions. What is involved here is a being whose intrinsic essence demands existence, which can itself account for its own act of existing, and which therefore *exists necessarily*.

Mr. Hartshorne's tendency to identify being with essence leads him, I believe, to slur over this question of existence, to think that he has settled it in the case of his surrelative deity by mentioning certain edifying traits that must necessarily belong to it *if* it exists, the capacity to make a world, the exhaustive knowledge of what has been, an indefinite capacity for further expansion, etc., *if it exists*. But what is the reason for supposing that such a being actually exists? In what sense is this existence necessary? If it is not, what then brought it into existence? In what sense is its existence "absolute" and

"independent"? These are the questions I have sought to bring to Mr. Hartshorne's attention. So far I have not received an answer

Turning now to the question of whole and part, I find again that Mr. Hartshorne has not quite understood the nature of the question I tried to raise in my review. Since this is probably due to a lack of clarity in my own statement, let me try to formulate it again. Mr. Hartshorne still thinks that the whole "is itself something distinct from the parts" (p. 52). He then proceeds to defend his theory that the relation of whole to part is not "convertible," the whole being really related to the parts, but the parts not really related to the whole.

My question, however, did not concern the *kind of relation* between whole and parts. I was questioning rather the underlying assumption. Is there *any* real relation between whole and parts? I question this, for, as I see it, a relation must involve a real difference between that which has the relation, and the term to which it is related. Hence if there is *any* relation of *any* type whatsoever between whole and parts, the whole must be more than all the parts. I called this view "the theory of the organic whole." Perhaps I should have used another term. But irrespective of what we call it, I still think it is impossible, for at least two reasons.

The first is this. If all the parts, A, B, C, both relational and non-relational, of a single whole, when they are present, give rise to a new entity, W, distinct from all of them, but including them (p. 52), I ask why then do not these entities A, B, C, W, when they are present, give rise to a new entity X, distinct from all of them but including them, and so on? If it is answered that they (A, B, C, W) simply do not, since they constitute a finished whole, then I ask why the same cannot be said of A, B, C, i.e. *all* the parts? Why is anything more necessary? Why cannot *they* constitute the whole, W, as I am sure they do, in the first place? If it is answered that A, B, C, W *do* give rise to a new entity X, then we are in an infinite regress, as we always are when we start to imagine fictitious entities.

The second reason is apparently recognized by Hartshorne himself, who notes that "this (i.e., the organic theory) cannot be if any analysis is possible."⁴ What he means, I think, is this. If the whole is more than *all* the parts, then *any* parts into which we analyze any such whole will always be inadequate, and distinct from the whole itself. Such a whole will always be something new and unique which cannot be exhaustively analyzed. I think Hartshorne is correct in pointing out that this must lead to a mysticism in which all true analysis is impossible. We certainly agree on this. But then I wish to know how his own doctrine — that the whole is *distinct from* all the parts (p. 52) — whether it be called "organic" or not, escapes from this criticism.

I suggest that the way to avoid it is to hold that the whole is *not distinct from all the parts*, and therefore *not related to them*, but actually *constituted by them*.

With respect to Mr. Hartshorne's doctrine, concerning the "inclusion" of what is known in the knower, I am not sure that further argument is profitable. Here I think we simply disagree. I cannot see how even the most exact knowledge I could ever conceivably possess of Africa would bring Africa *within me*, except in that particular, noetic, intentional sense, which is quite distinct from any physical or spatial "inclusion." The basic idealism of Mr. Hartshorne's thought leads him categorically to reject any such distinction (p. 55). But without some distinction of this sort his thesis seems to me to be sheer nonsense. To know Africa of course is to *include* it within the scope of my knowledge. It is not physically to include it. Of course my own pain is physically inside me, and I can know it (cf. p. 55). But I fail to see how this proves that everything I know is similarly inside. There is no evident correlation between "being known" and "being inside" in *this* sense. There are many things inside me, like my cortical cells, which I hardly know at all, and many things outside me, like my friends, whom I know rather well.

⁴ *The Divine Relativity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 69. Cf. *Reply*, p. 53.

Mr. Hartshorne suggests that "the known is external just to the extent in which we really fail to know it . . ." (p. 55). In the case of physical things and other persons, I submit that this theory is demonstrably false. Childish views of nature are subjective and egomorphic. At first we interpret others as though they were mere extensions of ourselves. The more we know about these beings, the more we recognize their externality, and come to understand them precisely in their otherness from ourselves.

This failure to distinguish between entitative and noetic presence underlies Mr. Hartshorne's view of the past as being "included in" the present, and therefore actual (pp. 56 f.). He claims to be using the term "inclusion" in a special sense distinct from spatial inclusion, but from his remarks I am not as yet at all clear as to what this special sense is. As a realist, I believe that the noetic faculty immaterially grasps or assimilates its object, and in this sense "includes" it. But apart from this sense, certainly not that of entitative "inclusion," I fail to see any natural meaning for the term "inclusion" which would justify the assertion that the present entitatively "includes" the actuality of the past. In fact this doctrine would seem to me to destroy the distinction between past and present, as I tried to indicate in my review. If the past is entitatively included in the present, how then can it escape from being itself a part of the present, and thus present? So far as I can see, neither the relation of container to contained, nor that of whole to part, is equivalent to that of present to past. To say that the past is still actual seems equivalent to the statement that it is present, and thus not past.

As to Mr. Hartshorne's objection to the view expressed by me that the past is now no longer actual, but that it may be made *noetically* (not entitatively) present by the cognitive faculties of memory, etc. (pp. 56 f.), I answer as follows. We live in a passing, temporal reality. What now is, ceases to be. As past, it is not. But it *once was*. This past cannot, of course, be identified with possible being. But neither can it be identified with absolute nothingness which is not, *never was*, and *never will be*. Our noetic faculties are not restricted to Mr. Hart-

shorne's categories — the actual, the potential, and absolute nothingness. They can also make noetically present what now physically is not, but *once was*, or at some time *will be*.

Mr. Hartshorne now sees some difficulty with the thesis that the subject of a relation "includes" its term (pp. 58 ff.), and the whole subject of relation is at present in a very confused and uncertain state. But I am still puzzled by his assertion that "to be contemporary is . . . the absence of relation" (p. 58). It is not true that I am now related to my children as their father, and that right now Boston is north of New York? These are clearly real relations. But I find no natural sense of the word "inclusion" which would enable me to say that I include my children, or that New York includes Boston. Hence I see no justifiable reason for Mr. Hartshorne's reluctance to abandon the idea that the subject of a relation "includes" its term. This may have something to do with the, to me, obscure and very widespread usage he makes of this term "inclusion," and his acceptance of the idealistic thesis that "If we abstract from all meaning, awareness, and feeling, and consider bare "objects," they exhibit no sort of positively conceivable real connectedness" (p. 55).

I turn now to Mr. Hartshorne's objections to classical theism. I suppose that he would admit the extreme difficulty of this topic, involving as it does a transcendent existence, concerning whose insight and activity we can have at best only a dim and inadequate understanding. One thing that rather worries me about the surrelative deity is the fact that Mr. Hartshorne seems to be able to understand Him so well. The questions he puts to classical theism cannot possibly be answered without becoming involved in all the basic problems of theology. They have been asked before. I am ready to admit that no answer yet formulated fully satisfies me. Is there any theology yet formulated that is fully satisfactory to any active intellect?

And yet these matters lie at the very heart of ontology. They are of central importance for the practical endeavors of men. They cannot be ignored except at the risk of betraying the obligations of philosophy. No solution yet proposed is

fully adequate. All are subject to grave difficulties. It is a matter of selecting that mode of approach which is least inadequate. In the remaining portion of my reply I shall try to indicate my reasons for believing that even with respect to Divine freedom and the Divine *caritas*, Mr. Hartshorne's view is subject to objections more serious than those he urges against a more classical approach.

I agree with his objection to the Thomistic doctrine of Divine pre-motion of the human "free" will (cf. p. 46). As has often been pointed out, the human "freedom" which results from this theory is extremely diluted and attenuated. I should go at least as far as Mr. Hartshorne in asserting unequivocally in accordance with what I take to be unambiguous, empirical evidence that within a certain limited field man is able to choose between alternative courses of action. Mr. Hartshorne, however, has a tendency to identify freedom exclusively with liberty of choice. This leads him to neglect another factor, that of spontaneity, which in my opinion is also required for the exercise of freedom, and which underlies all liberty of choice. The questions Mr. Hartshorne raises concerning the Divine freedom concern liberty of choice. None of them refers to spontaneity. The first (pp. 17-18) is this. If God is necessary in the sense that He cannot not be, how then are we to understand His freedom, and more especially His free choice to create a world of creatures? If this choice is really free, it might not have been. If it is really present in God, must this not require us to abandon the concept of an absolutely necessary and self-sufficient being? Mr. Hartshorne thinks so. Hence he defends the thesis that we must reject this classical conception and substitute that of a Deity Who is incomplete and imperfect, Who needs creatures in some sense independent of Himself, but Who is really free in the sense that He chooses between alternatives that are actually possible in the way that is familiar to us.

Admitting that Mr. Hartshorne has made his point in a cogent way, and raised an objection bristling with well-known difficulties, what of his own view of the Divine freedom? How free is his Deity? Is He free in the most perfect sense of this

word? In dealing with this question we must attempt at least a brief analysis of freedom itself, a task which also has its difficulties.

As we have already remarked, this line of argument identifies freedom exclusively with freedom of choice. I believe that it omits something even more important, on which freedom of choice, if it is to be real, must be based. This is a factor of inner power or command over the situation. Anglo-Saxon ethical thought has in my opinion been singularly blind to this factor, recognizing it, if at all, in purely negative terms as merely freedom *from* compulsion or external restraint. Of course it includes this, but also something positive — a spontaneity of action, welling up in the agent. Without this, freedom of choice cannot be realized, and is either extremely attenuated (provided some spontaneity exists) or purely nominal. We recognize this artificial character in many of the so-called "freedoms" which have been widely celebrated in this country, such as the freedom of a laborer to leave his job and take another, of any man to start a newspaper if he so chooses, etc., etc. Such freedoms can be asserted only if we forget about the actual power and resources of those supposed to be able to exercise them. Genuine freedom of choice must rest on a high degree of security and spontaneous power in the agent. Such actual power is the very foundation of free choice which is a sort of crowning expression of inner, spontaneous independence.

Human nature is essentially weak and dependent upon a vast multiplicity of extraneous factors which always restrict it. Hence human beings realize their freedom only in very limited degrees. Nevertheless even the slightest tinge of inward spontaneity and freedom bestows a peculiar dignity upon the human person when he achieves it. Such free achievements are always hedged in by many external constraints. But we can distinguish in our voluntary activity certain levels, possessing an increasing degree of spontaneity and freedom, starting with *the acceptance of given situations*, like the fact of being born, being in the world, etc., which expresses no spontaneity or choice.

Next there are *the nominal choices* we have spoken of which involve, we may say, a certain insignificant and minimal degree of freedom. A laborer with a family could abstractly and theoretically leave a job for which he has been trained, and prepare himself for another. But unless his circumstances are very exceptional, this would involve such financial loss, and such a material and psychological upheaval that the exercise of this freedom would jeopardize the very life and spontaneity of which it is supposed to be an expression. There is not sufficient power and command in the agent to give it an adequate foundation. Hence it possesses only a minimal degree of freedom, not really capable of being exercised with the survival of the agent's integrity and spontaneity, and hence purely nominal in character.

Next there are *forced choices* between alternatives no one of which would have been freely chosen by the agent. To submit to an overwhelming tyranny or run the risk of death is such a choice. Such situations may be met by choices involving the highest degree of human heroism. But it is not difficult to see that the element of *freedom* is acutely limited by the weakness of the agent, who cannot choose anything he spontaneously desires, but only the lesser evil.

There is a higher level of freedom in which we choose *between what is evil and what is good*. But since evil is what corrupts our activity and destroys our spontaneity, this also is only a subliminal degree of freedom. It is only at the next higher level that we come to human acts that really deserve to be called free.

Here we *freely choose between goods*. Of course such choices concern only means, since the ultimate end of human activity has been determined for us, and is beyond our control. In so far as a certain means is dictated by this natural end, we are less free in choosing it. But sometimes we may choose between means which are so nearly equal that a genuine exercise of free choice is possible. Now in such cases I think we can see that a higher degree of freedom attaches to those means: (1) which are *least necessary* to the attainment of

the end; and (2) which, therefore, make the *least real difference* to the spontaneous activity of the agent.

Think, for example, of a master-violonist, who eminently possesses the power to play a difficult piece, and who spontaneously desires to play it. Suppose then that he is offered two instruments from which he may choose. If one is clearly worse than the other, his choice will be less free, for he will realize that the better instrument will be *required* for the proper playing of the piece. Without this, the end may not be attainable. Hence the choice of this better instrument will make a great difference to him. If this is denied, he may even refuse to play. But if the two instruments are almost equal in quality, his choice will be freer. It will make less difference to him. Of course, the greater his talent and musical power, the more indifferent, and therefore the freer his choice will be, and the less real difference it will make in attaining the end. If great enough, he may be willing to use a very defective instrument. Still even in cases of this sort, *some* instrument is necessary for achieving the end, and the result will be at least slightly different depending on the choice.

As a result of the foregoing analysis, it seems to me to be clear that *perfect* freedom would be the exercise of a free choice resting upon the most perfect spontaneous power and autonomy. If this choice is to be made with the maximum freedom, it must concern something on which the activity of the agent is least dependent, in the limiting case not dependent at all. If so, the choice itself must merge with the spontaneous action itself, making no real difference to *it* at all, though making a vast difference to the violin that is played. To the player, the choice is purely an expression of his activity as a musician. It makes no difference as he sees it, for the piece will be played in either case — just the same. So his choice *adds* nothing to his action, though it is no mere caprice. The piece will be played *either way*.

All right, then; let us turn to theology. As I see it, freedom is one of the most basic human values. It is a *simple perfection*, not necessarily restricted to man. Hence I believe that it must be attributed to God. Indeed, I should defend the proposition that

God is *necessarily* free, in the same sense that He cannot be otherwise than free in an eminent or perfect degree. According to what we can see of the imperfect levels of freedom in man, I should say that this must mean first of all, an absolutely unhampered and unrestricted spontaneity of action. This is the very heart of freedom. If it is to be crowned by freedom of choice, this choice must be free in the most perfect and eminent sense. This must mean a choice wholly uninfluenced by any extraneous, or any internal, natural, or moral necessity of any kind. Such a perfectly free choice could be made only by an existence of infinite perfection, hampered by nothing, needing nothing, obliged by nothing.

The autonomous existence would exist necessarily, not in the sense that any act would be excluded from it, but precisely in the sense that it exists of itself alone, in perfect self-sufficiency, dependent on nothing and necessitated by nothing, not even that essence or nature which our familiarity with finite creatures leads us to attribute to it. In attributing even those simple perfections which are not essentially mixed with finitude to unconditioned being, we must be very careful to remove every incidental element of limitation from them, so that we are left with the pure perfection in its unlimited or eminent sense. Necessity is no exception to this rule. God is not restricted or necessitated in any way. These are finite manifestations of necessity. He is necessary only in the eminent or negative sense of the absence of all constraint. It is this infinite spontaneity, that cannot not be, this free act of existing that must be. Such a being of course lies far beyond our powers of clear apprehension. Nevertheless there is certainly no legitimate reason for refusing to grant it the perfection of liberty of choice. Indeed the existence of finite and contingent creatures shows that such a choice must be granted.

Such an agent, however, beyond both necessity and freedom in the usual senses of these words, would not require the result of this choice as a means, for the choice would be perfectly free. Furthermore the choice itself would make no real difference to the agent, but would merge with the infinite spontaneity of His existential action. It might, however, make a

vast difference to something resulting from the choice (cf. the violin).

I believe that the act of creation *ex nihilo*, as analyzed by the classical defenders of western theology, meets these requirements of perfect freedom. It is based upon an unlimited act of unrestricted existence, subject to no external nor internal compulsion. This creation is not required as a means for the fulfilment or completion of the Divine existence. Finally the choice adds no new *entitative* accident to God, though it brings the world into being.

I see many possible contradictions but no *necessary* contradiction in the view that a perfectly free being should freely bestow existence upon finite beings sharing to some degree in His own free spontaneity, and capable, like Himself, of making genuinely free choices within the limits determined by their nature. I see no insuperable objection to the view that He is aware of our freedom and that He acts towards us in ways which are appropriate to free persons, and which preserve our freedom intact. I see no contradiction in maintaining that He may freely care for us and even suffer for us. But this concern and suffering must be carefully purified of all anthropomorphic limitations before they can be attributed to a being who is infinite and perfectly autonomous.

When purified in this way they will be distinct from our concern and suffering in at least two basic respects. First, they will be freely willed with perfect spontaneity, and thus in no sense externally demanded or imposed. Second, they will be directed solely to their objects, with a radiant generosity which our love can only rarely and remotely approximate.

Sometimes, it is true, we come to love someone freely, almost for his own sake. But in such human love there is always a certain element of self-reference and constraint. We love our friend partly because of the joy *we* feel in his presence, of what he does *for us*, etc. In God these factors of self-reference are completely eliminated. If He loves us it must be for our sake alone, with a completely outward-going generosity, since He has nothing to gain. If He suffers for us it must be similarly a suffering spontaneously given to us, and for us alone, not a

suffering for Himself, since He has nothing to lose. I see no necessary contradiction between the divine infinity and the divine freedom and necessity when these are eminently and properly understood. These traits must all be analogously attributed to Him in the most perfect degree. They must belong to the object of any rationally purified human worship.

But now let us examine Mr. Hartshorne's Deity. In what sense is He free? The view I have been briefly outlining no doubt has its difficulties, and certainly its mysteries. But Mr. Hartshorne's more anthropomorphic conception, while possibly freer from any sense of mystery, is nevertheless subject to far more serious objections from the standpoint of religious worship.

This Deity has, of course, a certain degree of spontaneity, but this is definitely limited. He is incapable of creation in the strict sense (*ex nihilo*), the most spontaneous form of transitive action that is conceivable, for, as I understand it, he rejects this idea. His God is, therefore, always confronted with something external, for which He is not responsible, and which limits His freedom from the outside. He is also subject to an inner necessity, which binds Him to act⁵ on the given situation confronting Him. This also limits His freedom of choice. He is apparently not free to do evil, for His decisions are always "right." But this means that in His externally directed acts He is subject to a moral necessity which obliges Him to do what is best.

This may make Him very "moral" and worthy of the highest respect, but so far as *freedom* is concerned, it leaves Him only those clearly imperfect modes of which men are capable. He may make "forced choices" between evils. On occasion He may choose between means that are almost equally good. But such a choice will be distinct from the future end to be attained which it will actually benefit to a greater or less degree. Hence the choice will be partly determined by this end, and not *completely* free. What is this end?

As I understand Mr. Hartshorne, it is the greatest possible maximizing of limited goods. But such a quantitative conception

⁵ *The Divine Relativity*, op. cit., p. 86.

is subject to indefinite increase. An indefinite future time confronts this Being. No matter how great an aggregate of goods is achieved, more are always possible. Can a final, ultimate good ever be achieved? It would seem not. But if not, I find it hard to reconcile any concept of perfect liberty with the picture of an immortal Sisyphus, condemned to the constant climbing of a steep ascent which has no final summit. If there is no final end, in what sense are these moral means? Means to what? How are they to be justified?

I have merely tried to indicate some of the difficulties which one may honestly feel in connection with Mr. Hartshorne's view of the divine freedom. The picture he leaves in one's mind is that of a finite being, something very much like a man on a vastly magnified scale, hemmed in by external obstructions and necessities, and struggling with heroic intensity for an unattainable and non-existent goal. I cannot see any very high degree of freedom in this picture. Hence it seems to me that with all its defects and difficulties, which are in desperate need of clarification, the classical approach is preferable. It is, in my opinion, capable of yielding an intelligible concept of more perfect liberty, and certainly a sense of sharper transcendence.

Mr. Hartshorne devotes considerable attention to the many difficulties and downright contradictions which he claims to find in classical theories concerning divine foreknowledge of free acts and divine knowledge of creatures in general. So far as his polemics are directed against the Thomistic theory of divine pre-motion I believe that a strong case can be made. As I have already stated, this Thomistic theory allows for genuine human freedom only in an acutely attenuated form. The traditional theories of predestination and providence are open to very serious objections, and need to be revised and reformulated in major respects so as to take account of the genuine freedom of man. This I believe can be done without jeopardizing either the perfect freedom of God, which depends upon his unqualified self-sufficiency, or the genuine freedom of man. But Mr. Hartshorne's objections for the most part (pp. 48 ff.) proceed along quite different lines.

He attributes to me the view that God "is a necessary, eternal essence," Who "is through and through necessary," and Who "knows that the world exists." Then he argues (pp. 49 ff.) that my belief in the non-necessary existence of the world is irreconcilable with these assertions. I think that this whole discussion suffers from a failure of Mr. Hartshorne to define what he means by *necessity*, and to distinguish between different types of necessity, as for example the logical necessity of entailment which he seems to have chiefly in mind, as over against the *existential* necessity involved in the classical concept of God. But since this argument seems to be specifically directed at me, I should like to make a few further comments upon it.

First of all I do not accept the first two propositions attributed to me that God "is a necessary eternal essence" who "is through and through necessary." The view I should attempt to defend would be rather that God is the pure act of existing, with no "necessary eternal essence" whatsoever, distinct from his existential act. He is by no means "through and through necessary" in the sense in which I am afraid Mr. Hartshorne uses this phrase, namely that all his other traits and accidents are necessitated or determined by this necessary essence, as all the acts and accidents of a finite being are determined by its necessary essence (what is must be if it is to exist at all). As I see it, God has no such essence distinct from His existence, as Mr. Hartshorne maintains. Any such ontological composition would render him finite and existentially contingent, like ourselves and all the beings of which we are immediately aware.

God has no essence in this sense. He is the pure act of existing, of which we may gain a confused, analogical notion from the imperfect existences of finite entities, all necessarily limited by their divergent essences. The divine act of existing, as I conceive it, is indeed necessary in the peculiar sense that it is unrestrictedly spontaneous and autonomous, altogether independent of any necessitating factors, and therefore incapable of being hampered or thwarted in the realization of itself. Such an act is necessary only in the sense that it cannot not be.

Its own act of existing cannot be frustrated or reduced to nothing. But the acceptance of this proposition does not entail any specific consequences with respect to *what* this being must be or do *ad extra*.

I see nothing in it which would prohibit such a being from creating a world of finite creatures, sharing in His existence to some degree, and rational creatures capable of guiding their own conduct freely, thus sharing in His own perfect spontaneity to some degree. Where is there any contradiction here? Why should He not deal with these creatures as the free beings they are? Why should He not act upon them, love them, and suffer for them? As to *how* He can do all these things, this is no doubt far beyond the level of anything we can ever clearly comprehend. We cannot create. We can only remould or reform something already existent. At the highest levels of human conduct we cannot love another for his sake alone, or suffer solely for another. It is always at least in part for ourselves that we love and suffer. We are not pure acts of existence, but only restricted existences of this kind or that. Existence itself transcends us. But we can see that it is required for the explanation of the limited beings around us. By analogy we can dimly grasp it.

The creative acts to which we have just referred would involve contradictions only if they involved a sacrifice of that spontaneous energizing which constitutes an infinite act of existing. Mr. Hartshorne has not shown any such contradictions. As a matter of fact, when closely examined, they would seem to be precisely those manifestations which a free and spontaneous being might freely choose to make. How more effectively could He manifest Himself than in the creation and support of finite creatures sharing to some extent in His own autonomous spontaneity? Where is there any contradiction in this?

Mr. Hartshorne is especially concerned about God's knowledge of the world He has created (pp. 49 ff.) This knowledge, as indeed all knowledge, is necessary in some sense. God knows necessarily and certainly that the world exists. From this proposition Mr. Hartshorne believes that with the aid of

modern logic he can show that the existence of the world is absolutely necessary, not contingent. Unfortunately, however, as is the case with all meaningful propositions, something more than mere logical structure is at stake. The nature of knowledge and its relation to its object is also involved. This question cannot be settled by logic alone. Mr. Hartshorne's implicit idealism leads him to identify knowledge with its object in an unqualified way. Hence to him it is quite evident that if the mode of knowledge is contingent, the object known must also be contingent, and that if the mode of knowing is necessary the object known must also be necessary. There is a vast array of empirical evidence, however, which shows that this is not the case.

The child may apprehend a logically necessary object, such as a proposition in geometry, by a mode of knowing which is extremely tentative and hypothetical. Furthermore, contingent objects such as the pen on my table, once they exist, may be known by a knowledge that is certain and necessary, in the sense that given the object, the knowledge cannot be otherwise, and knows that it cannot be. Such examples as this make it abundantly clear that there is a definite sense in which the object of knowledge is distinct from the noetic mode *by which* it is known. The knowledge by which we know change, for example, does not have to change. The knowledge of vice need not be vicious. Hence we cannot safely argue, as Mr. Hartshorne wishes us to do, from the modal character of a certain kind of knowledge to an identical modal character of the object known.

This will only involve us in countless fallacies, as it has involved Mr. Hartshorne in the fallacy of assuming that because God knows the contingent world, once it exists, with noetic necessity, therefore the world must exist with the same existential necessity as that which pertains to the knowledge by which it is known. This is a fallacy. By the same line of argument I could prove, with the Bergsonians, that *by* my concept of change (which is changeless) I can never know an object that is really changing. Since the existence of the object must be distinguished from the relational knowledge by which

it is known, there is no reason for supposing that God cannot know a contingent world by a knowledge which is hypothetically necessary.

At this point Mr. Hartshorne will object that we have fallen into another contradiction, for such hypothetical necessity will "mean that, on certain conditions, themselves in some sense possible. He (God) might have lacked something He actually has (His knowledge that the world exists); and therefore with the sheer necessity of his actuality would be given up . . ." (p. 50). I can well understand how this might seem to be a contradiction to anyone holding a panentheistic view like that of Mr. Hartshorne, according to which creatures are "parts" of God. A composite creature, without certain parts, is indeed in a state of privation or need. But I hold no such view.

The God in Whom I believe is in no sense made up of creatures. He needs them not at all. He transcends them altogether. His act of creation is a free and spontaneous gift from which He derives no benefit at all. But Mr. Hartshorne will ask, did He not at least derive new knowledge which He lacked? (cf. p. 50). I fear that this question also must be answered in the negative. More *beings* have been created. But there is no more *being* than before. How can the pure act of existing lack any perfection possessed by those participating finite acts which it bestows? Knowing its own act of pure existence, how can God fail to know the various ways in which this may be participated? Does Mr. Hartshorne really think that an infinite creative agent may be surprised by what it spontaneously creates?

There are certainly mysteries here, and innumerable difficulties for our minds, as we attempt to clarify them further. But a mystery is not a contradiction, and I see no contradiction here.

Mr. Hartshorne criticizes me because "nothing is said about the divine love in my review" (p. 38). He says this presumably because he holds that the classical religious conception is very weak in this respect, and that its defects are definitively remedied by the new theories of surrelativism. I have already made a few comments on this difficult subject, and since I believe that there is no better way of bringing out

the issues that lie between us. I shall conclude with a brief summary of what I have tried to say on this topic.

I should define *caritas* or love in general terms as the seeking for that which is good. In man it may become conscious or voluntary. It becomes purer and higher in quality in so far as that which is desired is freely or spontaneously desired *for its own sake*, with no admixture of self-aggrandizement. It seems to me that Mr. Hartshorne admits this, for he objects to the "traditional" view which holds that our love of God is directed only to benefits we expect for ourselves, and which therefore reduces morality to self-interest.⁶ I agree with Mr. Hartshorne here, at least with his opinion that the higher manifestations of love involve the seeking of what is good *for its own sake* with a minimum of self-interest. But now bearing this in mind, let us turn to that concept of Divine Love which seems to be implied by his view. God's love for us, as he makes quite clear, is far from being devoid of self-interest. He needs us to benefit Him, etc., etc. Is there not a peculiar reversal of roles here? Is he not more worried about us than about the Divine? Does he not place God on a lower moral level than that of man?

Here also it seems to me that the traditional approach can do more justice to the demands of a perfect and transcendent, sacrificial love. According to this view, there is not the slightest admixture of self-interest in God's love for the creature. It is perfectly free and pure from any desire for self-aggrandizement. The creature is loved *for his own sake* with no reverberation of self-benefit. Does this not come closer to perfect sacrificial action? As Mr. Hartshorne points out, such love is partially approximated in the highest examples of human love. The essence of religious worship and adoration is the love of God for His own sake alone, not primarily for any benefits we may attain. He is right here. Any benefits to be attained by us are certainly dependent upon this in the first place. Nevertheless, owing to our weakness and imperfection, the thought of our own needs can never be wholly absent from our minds. This thought can be subordinated, not eliminated. We are not divine. Nevertheless this basic desire for our own perfection

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

can be definitely deposed from a ruling position, and ordered to the love of the good for its own sake. Indeed it must be, if even the most rudimentary levels of religion are to be attained.

In conclusion I should like to say that I sympathize profoundly with many of Mr. Hartshorne's objections to certain classical doctrines of natural theology. They often portray the divine being as a cosmic dictator and pantocrat rather than as a spontaneous energizing and liberating power. The theories of predestination and providence leave little scope for genuine human freedom, and require drastic revision and modification. I agree with his objections to these doctrines, derived as some of them are from ancient forms of tyranny and political misrule. These things we hold in common, and more especially a sense of the basic importance of natural theology both for philosophy and for religion. If Mr. Hartshorne had been more willing to argue with me than with what he calls "Thomism," and with that strange array of theories which he claims to have culled from what he calls "the tradition," I think that our discussion might have been more profitable. I agree with him that this "tradition" needs to be rethought and to be corrected and revised in certain respects.

His surrelativist reconstruction, however, seems to result in an anthropomorphic Deity which can satisfy neither the demands of philosophy nor those of religion. The evident contingency and dependence of finite being seems to found a rational and cogent argument for an infinite and unconditioned existence. I know of no defensible argument whatsoever which offers any evidence for the existence of such a composite, deprived, and schizoid entity, partly absolute and partly relative, as he describes. Even if such a being did actually exist, its confusion with limited creatures, and its lack of perfect spontaneity and transcendence would make it an unfitting object for a rationally purified form of religious worship.

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Critical studies

THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE VALUE PROBLEM

Value: A Cooperative Inquiry, ed. by Ray Lepley. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1949) pp. 487.

A Digest of Purposive Values, by Stephen C. Pepper. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1947) pp. 100.

God's Failure or Man's Folly, by Helge Lundholm. (Cambridge, Mass.: Sci-Art Publishers, 1949) pp. 471.

Treatise on Values, by Samuel L. Hart. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949) pp. 165.

Traité de l'Existence Morale, by Georges Gusdorf. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1949) pp. 415.

La Creation des Valeurs, by Raymond Polin. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1944) pp. 306.

La Compréhension des Valeurs, by Raymond Polin. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1945) pp. 138.

Those philosophical issues that are of the most vivid contemporary significance usually exhibit two striking characteristics. First, there is a widely-shared conviction as to the proper solution of the problem at issue. But, secondly, this conviction cannot be justified and elaborated. A certain general answer to the difficulty is felt to be correct. But this answer cannot be made logically and empirically reasonable. So inquiry, deprived of any basic doctrine that can give it impetus and direction, dwells morbidly upon the same questions: it digs its foundation deeper and deeper, but it seems never to feel sufficiently secure to start work on a super-structure. The terms in which the problem is conceived are, by continuing analysis, rendered ever more subtle; but the hypotheses that might satisfy the conditions posed by the problem, though everywhere implied and frequently adumbrated, are never systematically developed.

The recent studies listed above give evidence that this is the present status of the problem of value. The authors of these works are men of widely different philosophical persuasion; they come to their task with different special trainings; they select for emphasis different aspects of the complex phenomena that are gathered under the single term "values." Yet these

varied inquiries can be embraced within a common — and rather compact — frame of reference: they are all animated by the same general intention; the terms in which they propose to study values are highly similar; and they all finally confront the same difficulty, which is not only unresolved but almost unrecognized.

Generalizing rather broadly, one can say that the impetus behind all of this work is to guarantee the intimacy and immediacy of values, while at the same time establishing standards of valuing and a system of evaluations. The most persistent theme in these books is that of the personal quality of values: the real being of values is in being valued. It is in the fact of human emotions, desires, interests, preferences, purposes and satisfactions that values have their first and most important existence. The source of value is in man's choices and enjoyments; the measure of value lies in the intensity of emotion, effort, and consummation that men realize through things; the meaning of value is found in the richness of the felt qualities that life provides. That a thing should be valued — should be cherished, or sought, or done, or even acknowledged — for any reason other than its impact upon human awareness, is a proposition too absurd to be refuted. For all of these studies, values are never transcendent but always only immanent.

But there is also present throughout this work an insistence that values are more than merely the creatures of human impulse and predilection. There is an evident unwillingness to accept a position that would make values utterly subjective, private, and relative. All of these studies reach toward a doctrine that will permit individual value discriminations to be criticized and corrected. They recognize that, for both personal and social reasons, man's realization of value must be ordered and systematized. Obviously, this demands criteria that are external to the immediate consciousness that values; and it demands a life program that can subordinate the actual present to an anticipated future. Values are somehow things that ought to be valued; and what men do value must be brought into line with these requirements.

There is an evident and inevitable tension between these two strains of thought. Theory is trying to reach a balance between poles that can probably never be perfectly reconciled. These poles can be variously defined; as objectivism and subjectivism; as absolutism and relativism; as authoritarianism and individualism. These various identifications all center upon the same issue: values seem to be public, orderly, and coercive, and to impose themselves upon men with a demand to be accepted; but, on the other hand, values seem to be objects of interest and sources of satisfaction, which are determined as such by the fact of being wanted and enjoyed. Value, when theory tries to explain it, always presents these two moments of obligation and preference. The problem for thought is to grasp and satisfy both moments.

This is certainly not a new problem. Since Plato elaborated his twin themes of the *Form of the Good* and the *Eros*, philosophy has been confronted with it. Seen in these terms, contemporary value theory has three distinguishing characteristics. First, and perhaps most superficially, modern inquiry manifests an extraordinarily acute awareness of this dilemma that confronts it. So much so, in fact, that it has experienced a widespread failure of nerve: realizing vividly the sharp internal tension that pervades the realm of value, inquiry is inhibited from accepting this tension as inevitable and trying to reduce and control it. Rather, it attempts to dissolve the tension by negating one of the poles that gives rise to it. This broaches the second characteristic of modern theory; it everywhere assigns primacy to the subjective, individualistic, and preferential moment of the value situation. It insists that values are above all vivid moments that are intrinsically worthwhile; it is intent upon saving values from becoming remote and inert entities that obtrude upon life from without. This emphasis upon the immanence of values dictates the third feature that distinguishes present inquiry: this is the common acceptance that the proper method of approach to the value problem is by a study of the behavior through which man realizes value. This point is of particular significance, and must be expanded somewhat.

The course of any inquiry is largely determined by the manner in which it envisages its problems, the terms in which it defines its data, and the techniques it proposes to apply. These are the primitive acts of intellectual commitment that contain implicitly the future movement of thought: even when they are themselves implicit — which is often — they exert a pervasive influence. The content of these commitments, as concerns modern value theory, is briefly stated. The value problem is conceived as an exclusively human one: values are meaningless without men, they are determined by their appearance within the context of men's efforts and achievements, and they are to be studied by reference to the processes that govern their occurrence within this context. Since we are all moderns, this may appear to be self-evident. But it is not so.

If we ask the plain question, "What is value?", and demand an equally plain answer, there are two broad alternatives. Values may be defined as occurrences within experience; or they may be defined as elements within reality. *A priori*, one alternative is as sound as the other; *a posteriori*, remembering the duality of obligation and preference that characterizes the value situation, they seem to have equal empirical support. But contemporary value inquiry almost unanimously returns the first answer: of values, as Berkeley insisted of ideas, their *esse* is *percipi*. With this answer, inquiry receives a definite orientation. Values are human, not cosmic, phenomena; they are controlled by psychological, not ontological, principles; they are to be understood by an analysis of the processes by which men apprehend them, not of the processes through which nature (or reality) impose them. In sum, attention is very largely centered upon the epistemology of value, with a corresponding neglect — which frequently becomes a denial — of the metaphysic of value.

Seen in historical perspective, contemporary value theory appears as the climax of the movement that was first given systematic statement by Franz Brentano and then developed by Ehrenfels and Meinong. These men shifted the direction of inquiry from the "value quality" of things to the process of "valuation." This lead has been faithfully followed. Husserl

and the phenomenologists, notably von Hartman, gave it additional impetus. D. W. Prall, throughout his writing, accepted as his basic tenet the distinction between the "judgment of value" and the "experience of valuing," and he assigned primacy to the latter. R. B. Perry has followed this same path in his exhaustive analysis of "interest," as has Köhler in his studies of "requiredness." C. I. Lewis bases his recent investigations upon the distinction between the "objective meaning" and the "expressive meaning" of value terms, and holds that the former can be clarified only through a study of the latter. The critiques and the doctrines of John Dewey and his followers on this issue have entered so massively into the modern tradition that they need no specification. With a very few exceptions, such as W. M. Urban in this country, John Laird in England, Nicolai Hartmann in Germany, Rene Le Senne and Louis Lavelle in France, values have been held to be both more completely real and more readily available as they occur in experience than as they exist in things.

This movement seems now to have arrived at a crucial moment in its history, and to be threatened with failure. It is giving rise to extreme positions within itself — positions which appear to be almost gestures of defiance. It is arousing violent professional reactions from without, and is beginning to lose its hold upon the literate lay imagination; this latter is especially interesting, because while never a valid criticism it is often a revealing symptom. Finally, even the writings of its confirmed adherents are becoming continually more technical, more self-centered, and more disputatious. In this latter connection, it is interesting to re-read Ehrenfels' article on "The Ethical Theory of Value," which appeared in 1896. This paper, in which Ehrenfels discusses the developments of Brentano's ideas that had been carried out by Meinong and himself, seems completely contemporary. The disagreements that it reports are still being fought out, and have changed in only two respects: the terms at issue have become more subtle and complex; and the temper of the dispute has grown more introverted and pessimistic.

This is admittedly a harsh indictment of a movement that was extremely stimulating and fruitful during its earlier period of growth. But there is no need at this late date to rehearse the contributions, theoretical as well as practical, that have been made by the men and the schools I have mentioned. It is the present status of this still dominant line of value inquiry that concerns us; and it concerns us not in order to question and criticize, but in order to see why it has reached its apparent impasse and how it can be given a fresh impetus. If inquiry of this type is tending to become intellectually sterile, as I think it is, there must be a reason for this; and if such inquiry still has a great deal to offer, as I think it has, then it is important to discover and remove this reason for its present check.

There is but one method by which we can hope to isolate the crucial difficulty which, because it is unrecognized and so unsolved, impedes the further advance of this movement. There must be such a difficulty: the fact that this inquiry into the subjective occurrence and conditions of value, which was for long so direct and so creative in its analyses, has become tortuously subtle and critical, indicates that there is some hidden issue that blocks progress and turns the movement back upon itself. To find this issue — this difficulty — we must return to the source of the movement, to the original data that it accepts and the original questions that it asks. These data have not yielded the answers that it seeks; so there must be some inadequacy in the data, or some important questions that have not been put. A close investigation of the starting point of inquiry should clarify the present situation.

This point of departure was, of course, the process of valuation. But the term "valuation" must here be taken in a more protean and amorphous sense than that assigned to it in current discussions. In starting with the "process of valuation," the inaugurators of this movement meant only to state the necessity of studying values from the point of view of the human subject. The character of this process was then to be clarified by further analysis, and these men committed themselves at first to no particular interpretation: the essence of valuation may lie in attitudes, interests, emotions, satisfactions,

or elsewhere. But it does lie in a subjective state: to that these men did commit themselves, and that commitment founded the movement of modern value theory. The point to be remarked about this founding act is that it is at once so obviously correct and so utterly mistaken. These men were searching for value-data that could not be questioned, and so could guarantee a secure empirical foundation for value theory: that is, they were looking for occasions when the presence of value was clear and compelling. They found such occasions in human acts of valuing: they argued that value is self-evident when it occurs in man's awareness. This insight is sound, and is to prove fruitful. But it is also only partial: it ignores the fact that men do not simply "value," they "value things." Valuing is an activity that demands an object: it does not take place in a vacuum. Bare value or valuing are not primitive data, but high abstractions. It is "valued things" and the "valuing of things" that actually occur in awareness. But these men, though they insist on the relational character of value, neglect one of the elements that constitutes this relation. From the subject-object value relation they abstract the subject, declare it to be the source and locus of value, and reject the object as unimportant. There were compelling historical reasons for this misplaced concretion; but they do not prevent it from being a fallacy that haunts the movement throughout its development. We shall return to this theme shortly. First, let us trace the succeeding steps in the analysis of the valuing subject; we can note these more briefly until we reach their climax.

Since value as a subjective occasion is taken as the primitive datum, the task of inquiry is to lay bare the character and conditions of these occasions. The entire emphasis of study is now placed on discovering the occurrence and the location of values in experience. This continuing investigation has done much to clarify the mechanics and the dynamics of the processes that are involved in human valuing. But it has not reached any coherent and embracing body of doctrine; and, in fact, it seems to be getting further from this rather than closer to it. The responsibility for this lies, I think, in the original act that abstracts the subject as the sole item of study. Because of this,

the conditions of value must be found exclusively within experience. This inevitably leads to an attempt to isolate some single factor in experience that is the "value factor"; in order to justify and explain value as a distinct and significant subjective occurrence, it is felt that value must have a source and a locus strictly its own. Since values cannot now be distinguished by any objective traits, there seems the more need that their subjective traits be clearly designated. So the value attitude is sharply contrasted with other attitudes, the value experience with other types of experience, the value act with other acts, the value judgment with other judgments. In short, the natural line for this whole theory is to seek out some simple location and simple occurrence of values. From this tendency spring the disputes that have continued from Meinong and Ehrenfels to the present. One finds this simple location in attitude, another in desire, another in emotion, another in interest, another in conation, another in satisfaction. It would seem to be a more correct and fruitful hypothesis, both theoretically and empirically, that the subjective occurrence of value is a complex of these elements, and that it takes different specific forms. But inquiry, though frequently recognizing the soundness of this idea, is prevented from systematically pursuing it. It is so because it feels a powerful impetus to find for values some special and unique source within experience. And it falls under this necessity because it has cut itself off from any objective designation of value.

This attempt to find a simple location for value as a subjective occurrence has entailed serious misinterpretations of the character of experience. These can all be brought under one heading: they are so many variants of the divisive fallacy. In its effort to isolate values as experienced occasions, this movement has disrupted the cohesion and integrity of experience; it has tended to regard experience as the additive compound of different moments and segments. This divisive tendency has operated with respect to both the contents and the temporal organization of experience. In the first case, the search has been for elements, and these have been found in abundance: *sensa*, emotions, attitudes, desires, conations, satisfactions, etc.

In the second case, the search has been for separate and distinct acts or operations: enjoying, caring, prizing, appraising, valuing, evaluating, etc. In both cases, the actual flux of experience, which is always complex and synthetic, is reduced to hypothetical "simples," which are then regarded as the discrete particles that together compose experience. If this analysis were valid and successful, it would supposedly reveal the locus of experienced value. In fact, it does violence to the essential nature of experience. And the reason is obvious: analysis divides experience in the search for values; then it can find no principles to guide it in putting these pieces back together and recovering experience as it is actually lived.

We here approach the heart of the present situation. A close study of the work that is now being done in value theory reveals that this work culminates in the problem of the organization of experience — or, if one prefer, of behavior. Inquiry, as a result of its minute analysis in the search for values, now finds itself with experience lying scattered in bits at its feet. If these bits are to be re-assembled — if experience is to be explained by theory as having the continuity and cohesion that it clearly exhibits in fact — some integrative principles must be discovered. That is, inquiry must lay its hands on some ideas that can describe and account for the general structure of experience. For experience obviously has structure: it is not a mere congeries of moments and elements; the various aspects that it presents clearly inter-penetrate one another. As a matter of sheer logic, these integrative principles might be discovered either within experience or outside of experience. Modern value theory has largely confined its search to the first of these areas; as I have indicated, that is the task to which its original commitment pledged it. That search has not proved successful. Instead of moving toward a unified account of experience and the world that is given in experience, it has rent these with a whole series of bifurcations: the vast difference in status and reference that is assigned to perceptual and emotional factors in experience; the different treatment accorded the fact-qualities and the value-qualities of things; the distinction of descriptive and normative judgments; the separation of the

actual and the ideal; these are but a few of the artificial entities that are awaiting synthesis. But still inquiry in this direction continues apace, as though it were pursuing the only course by which an answer could be found, with all the prestige of a self-evident truth and all the inertia of tradition behind it.

But when one withdraws in thought from the momentum of this movement, and considers the problem at issue, this method of solving the difficulty appears far from obvious. To search for the structural principles of experience within the flow and content of experience is reasonable only on one assumption: *that experience is an autonomous and isolated series of events*. And now we are at the heart of the matter. For as soon as we state this assumption, it is clear that modern value inquiry has been acting upon it. There has been no systematic attempt to connect human experience and human behavior with anything beyond themselves. Conscious experience has been taken as an independent subjective world that can be completely described by introspection and by reduction to its neurological correlates. Overt behavior has been taken as an independent objective world that can be completely described by observation and by physiological analysis. These two together are regarded as constituting a human cosmos that can be perfectly understood without any reference beyond itself. The human agent who experiences and behaves, and within whose experience and behavior values occur, is isolated from his surroundings; and inquiry proceeds as though this human agent could be explained entirely in terms of himself.

I think that to state this assumption explicitly is to refute it. But I think it is perfectly clear that it is the controlling assumption behind the dominant movement in present value theory. The adherents of this movement analyze experience and behavior in an exhaustive manner. But they never conscientiously face the question of the source and function of experience and behavior. These two, along with the biological mechanisms on which they depend, are treated as an isolated system that sustains no relations with an external environment. This is not to say that this question never arises for these theorists: it does, inevitably. Nor is it to say that they con-

sistently answer it by positing the cosmic autonomy of man: few of them do, save perhaps the critical idealists. In most of their studies, there are references to "continuities" that hold between man and some objective factor, such as society, culture, the environment. But these suggested continuities are never explored. Inquiry, even where acknowledging them, does not choose to pursue them. To the question, "What is experience?", there is a single answer that is everywhere implied and that controls inquiry: "Experience is that which is given." And again, "behavior" can be freely substituted for "experience." There is here no point at issue between the "behaviorists" and the "introspectionists," the "observers" and the "analysers." Whatever the terms they prefer, they agree in taking the human creature who experiences and behaves as an ultimate and isolated datum.

At first glance, all of this might seem remote from the problems of value, and irrelevant to them. But that is not the case. For values, it must be remembered, are themselves defined as occurrences within experience-behavior. So values become elements within the given. They must share the fate of the medium that supports them: if this has no source, no function, no outcome, no obligation, save just to be itself, then neither have they. This is the position to which value theory must come because of its commitment to regard values as occurrences within a subjective order, and because of its failure to investigate the objective order that grounds this. In the course of this movement, much has been done to illuminate the ways in which values — that is, desirings, prizings, enjoyings, etc. — actually appear and operate in man's experience and behavior; that is a positive contribution. But also in this course, values as demands with which humanity is confronted, values as expressions of the conditions imposed by the objective order, have almost dropped from view: and that is a serious loss. To the problem of how this loss might be made good without surrendering the important insight of the modern value movement, we can turn later. First, certain of these studies must be examined in some detail for the light they can throw on this problem. I shall center attention especially upon the cooperative volume edited by Mr. Lepley, and upon the French books.

II

A few words concerning the history of the Lepley volume are necessary to an understanding of it. The inquiry had its origin in a paper by John Dewey,² in which he expressed his discouragement with present discussions of value; he concluded that this discouragement "proceeds from the feeling that little headway is being made in determining the questions or issues fundamentally involved" in value inquiry. He then stated the questions that seemed to him most important; and he invited others to state their opinions as to what are the basic issues. The present volume is the response to that invitation. It consists of essays by fourteen authors; and then of round-table criticisms and rejoinders based on the original essays. The selected authors represent an interesting cross-section of American philosophy. And there are also some interesting omissions: there is no adherent of the intuitionist school; there is no one to speak for a doctrine of transcendent value; and there is no spokesman for the explicitly "emotive" theory of value.

The tone of the volume is set by the original questions proposed by Mr. Dewey; so it seems advisable to state them in full:

"I. What connection is there, if any, between an attitude that will be called prizing or holding dear and desiring, liking, interest, enjoying, etc. ?

"II. Irrespective of which of the above-named attitudes is taken to be primary, is it by itself a *sufficient* condition for the existence of values ? Or, while it is a necessary condition, is a further condition, of the nature of *valuation* or *appraisal*, required ?

"III. Whatever the answer to the second question, is there anything in the nature of appraisal, evaluation, as judgment or/and proposition, that marks them off, with respect to their logical or their scientific status, from other propositions or judgments ? Or are such distinctive properties as they possess

² *Some Questions about Value*. Journal of Philosophy, XLI (1944), pp. 449-55.

wholly an affair of their subject-matter — as we might speak of astronomical and geological propositions without implying that there is any difference between them *qua* propositions?

"IV. Is the scientific method of inquiry, in its broad sense, applicable in determination of judgments and/or propositions in the way of valuations or appraisals? Or is there something inherent in the nature of values as subject-matter that precludes the application of such method?" (p. 5).

At the end of the article, Dewey appends a final question: "Are values and valuations such that they can be treated on a psychological basis of an allegedly "individual" kind? Or are they so definitely and completely socio-cultural that they can be effectively dealt with only in that context?" (p. 12).

The essays, criticisms, and rejoinders that are the answers to these questions are a highly condensed report — almost an abstract — of the work their authors have been doing; and they represent, so to speak, the rebuttal stage in an argument the body of which is familiar to these writers but not to the reader. This procedure has the advantage of centering the articles upon significant points that remain unsettled, but it makes review in the ordinary sense impossible. The only recourse is to identify briefly the major themes that are accepted in substance and debated as to detail; to describe the total impact of the book; and, especially, to discuss the leading suggestions it contains for the further study of values.

Perhaps the most interesting and important point of fundamental agreement that emerges is that concerning the "transactional" character of value. This is not a new thesis, having been previously treated by several of these authors, among others. But it is significant that it here attains virtually the status of a postulate. Value occurs in transactions between subjects and objects. This agreement is of the first importance because, if it is taken really seriously, it must sooner or later turn attention to the contribution that the object makes to the value transaction. The moment for that is apparently not yet. Here, only the role of the valuing subject is studied. Save for several explicit strictures to the contrary — it is revealing that

they should be thought necessary — objects might almost be thought to be neutral with respect to value.

In the analyses of the value act which really constitute the book, three points stand out: two of these deal with matters of substance, the other with method; of the substantial questions, one concerns the relation between the emotional, conative, and cognitive aspects of subjective value, the other the respective roles of interest and satisfaction in determining value. These two substantial issues are closely connected, and both come to a crux in the question whether value is immediately apprehended or mediately judged. Values sometimes leap out of an intense and apparently spontaneous emotion or caring; sometimes they reside in a highly stable attitude; sometimes they result from deliberation, self-criticism, and willed effort, sometimes from sheer enjoyment; sometimes they are modified and corrected by reference to past experience and future intention, sometimes they defy any response but fulfillment. We encounter conflicts between desire and approval, and our choices may frustrate our carings. All these and many other distinctions, which are real facts of the value life, are raised and debated in this symposium. The result is two-fold. On the positive side, the occurrence of values in experience is exhibited with great subtlety and care; we are made forcefully aware that value appears in many guises. On the negative side, there is no sustained effort to join these discrete insights into an integrated account. There is no cooperative search for a common source of value that manifests itself in these various ways. We are left with many perceptive ideas but no coherent theory.

The methodological issue that pervades these essays is itself protean, and thus difficult to phase. But it can at least be approximated as a dispute over behavioral vs. introspective methods of inquiry; or, since the term "introspective" seems to be in bad odor as implying a strict privacy of what is thus discovered, it is perhaps better to say that it is a dispute as to what types of value behavior are most available to observation and most amenable to analysis. But it must be emphasized that under this phrasing, which seems preferred by the authors, subjective experience is to be included as a kind of behavior;

otherwise, three-fourths of the book could never have been written. Dewey, for instance, first rules out "introspection" of what is "wholly private," and then makes "anticipation or foresight" a pre-requisite to the existence of value. This case merely points up the fact that methodological questions must reflect substantial ones: the methods that are approved depend upon the identification of essential value. As the latter varies — frequently within the work of the same man — so does the former: the methods that are actually employed range from the openly introspective, through neurological, socio-cultural, and historical, to statistical sampling. It would appear that all of these are necessary, and that not even in combination are they sufficient. They are all methods of empirical observation and induction. For their completion, they must wait upon a substantive hypothesis that will permit systematic deductions that they can then put to the test.

What is the outcome of this elaborate cross-examination? Several of the contributors are openly discouraged and even impatient with the results of their inquiry. They feel — and say — that their disputes have become too technical and professional, too devoted to tenuous distinctions, too much matters of terminology; and that because of this they have lost touch with values as real occurrences in life and real demands from life. There is undoubtedly a measure of truth in these self-charges. But a more appreciative judgment is also, I think, a truer one. As I have indicated, the complexity of the value-act is here explored in all its detail. Further, the cohesion and inter-dependence of its various moments emerge from the total work, if not always from its separate essays; and in such a cooperative inquiry it is only proper to judge the papers in terms of the supplementation they afford one another. Finally, I think it can be said that all of the implications of the position defined by Brentano, Ehrenfels, and Meinong are here at last made explicit. Value as subjectively determined has been exhaustively analyzed; we should now be able to summarize this movement, reap its lessons, and move on. This study clearly prepares us, both by what it has done and what it has

left undone, to consider now the objective determining factor in the value transaction.

To get a sense of the work as a whole — of the position it defines and the solutions it proposes — it is necessary to adopt an attitude that is consciously naive and laic. When that is done, one comment leaps forth: "But these men are not talking about values; they are talking about preferences. They are not concerned with ideals and standards, but merely with tastes. They are not interested in man's duties, but only in his purposes." In terms of the attitude adopted, this comment is justified. From the point of view of common-sense, the element of obligation is of the essence of value. But the participants in this inquiry, with the exception of Campbell Garnett, systematically ignore obligation. They offer logical, empirical, and semantic analyses of preferential and purposive behavior. But they largely neglect the question of possible standards by which preferences and purposes could themselves be judged. The reasons for this, I have insisted, are inherent in the movement of thought in which these men are engaged. Preferences and purposes are elements within the given of experience; that is, they are empirical ultimates, primitive data. They are what they are, and as such they define values. Consequently, an appeal beyond them in order to establish their relative value is theoretically impossible. Since the human order has been isolated from the objective order, no criticism or correction of preferential values from outside the human system is available.

How, then, can values be investigated? What further avenues of inquiry does this study propose? Whatever these are, they must confine themselves to the value-facts disclosed by man's actual preferences and choices: description can only be of what man does, and criticism can only be internal. Within the field that is thus defined, there are four major proposals for future study.

The most detailed of these is that projected by S. C. Pepper, in his essay in the Lepley volume and in his *A Digest of Purposive Values*. Pepper's point of departure is the empirical recognition that "at least some values lie within the structures of purposive activities"; leaving aside the question

whether this is the locus of all value, he proposes to analyze "what values purposes do contain and where they are localized." Pepper develops a very interesting and systematic treatment of purposive behavior; and he introduces much needed clarity concerning such psychological factors as the drive, the anticipatory set, the mutation of means to ends, the cognitive or judgmental moment, and the goal as itself actually a means to quiescence of the original drive. This culminates in the identification of three main types of purposive value: affective, conative, and achievement; and in an acute defense of the position that affective value takes precedence, thus justifying pleasure as "the supreme standard of value in individual purposive behavior." This individualistic emphasis is then balanced, in a short concluding chapter, by a recognition of the "functional ethics" that is demanded by group life. All of this establishes a precise behavioral framework within which more fruitful psychological work should follow. The necessary weakness of the method appears only when Pepper seeks to make the transition from the factual to the normative level. He makes it perfectly clear how "ought" can be predicated of purposive behavior that is a more efficient means to an envisaged value-end, whether conative, affective, or achievement. But it remains far from clear how "ought" can be predicated of the values that an organism actually pursues, save in purely internal terms of quantity of affective, conative, and achievement value. And Pepper is on the side of common-sense in wanting more than this. I do not see how he can get it without appealing beyond man and society to an objective order which, by defining the conditions of human life, imposes obligatory values upon man, both as a psychological and a social entity.

Mr. Morris's proposal eschews anything beyond a strictly descriptive analysis of actual human preferences, and of the factors that seem to condition these preferences. His search is for "the laws of preferential behavior." He intends to find these first by determining the actual "valuings and evaluations of specific persons"; then by examining the individual and group influences that have formed these preferences; and finally by trying to isolate "patterns of preference." In sum, Morris

holds that it is the function of "scientific axiology" to discover "who prefers what and under what conditions." The possibilities and the limitations of this proposal are transparent. It should extend our sociological knowledge of the systematic ways in which men develop and express their preferences. But it is a travesty of "a science of man" — which it purports to be — when it intends to study man with no reference to the biological and environmental forces that condition his life and success, with no recognition of the aspirations and obligations that men themselves so readily acknowledge, and by a mere poll of man's circumstances and opinions. Certainly both life and science have suffered in the past from the imposition of rigorous and arbitrary "oughts"; but this seems to be going rather far in honoring the "actual." It should be possible to admit that "everything is what it is and not another thing," without thereby admitting that every act of self-assertion is of equal value status. Such an axiology would, as Morris claims, finally reach a point where it could control preferences with great accuracy; but it could never criticize or correct them.

The two other proposals that emerge from this study are suggested rather than elaborated. Mr. Rice, in another acute defense of an affective theory of value, insists that inquiry is vitiated chiefly by its acceptance of psychological concepts that are simplistic and out-moded. He holds that at least one very fruitful path to an understanding of value, conceived here as experience that contains joy, is through a close study of the neurological factors that support experience. The proposal seems both sound and interesting: if values are elements in experience, as these men all agree; and if experience is a function of neural activity, which it clearly is in part; then a study of the latter should clarify the former. I find Rice's argument completely logical. He is saying: if we are going to study value as a psychological occurrence, then let us use the findings of physiology and neurology, which the psychologists themselves accept as basic to their work. Mr. Geiger and Mr. Garnett are distinguished from most of these authors by a strong and persistent sense of the moral significance of values. They insist that individual value judgments are socially conditioned and

have social consequences. So they emphasize the necessity of studying values in terms of the socio-cultural environments in which they occur and operate.

It would be highly unfair to suggest that these are the only constructive proposals that emerge from this work, or that I have done justice even to these. They do define the major directions in which these men would push inquiry. The most striking fact about these and other positive suggestions is the spirit in which they are received. This is hard to define: it is not animosity, much less disdain; it is not rejection; it is perhaps best described as a conservative amazement at the thought of applying ideas that are not yet fully developed and established. To all proposals of cooperative constructive effort, there comes the reply that this constitutes hasty action. One finds over and over the insistence, most openly stated by Mr. Lee, that the foundations of value inquiry are too "theoretically inadequate," that no hypotheses are yet secure, that terms are not sufficiently defined; and the accompanying insistence that all these details about the exact subjective character and occurrence of value must be entirely resolved before the development of a system of values can be started. In short, as Mr. Lee again says, "there is nothing to do but to argue it out."

This hesitancy is at first difficult to understand. The usual history of any science shows a progress from ideas that are quite vague, very general, and highly synthetic in content toward refined, exact, and detailed concepts; and the medium of this progress is empirical testing and practical application of the original ideas. Since these men are so anxious to make axiology a science — to move from abstract "value" to concrete "values" — their reluctance to embark on this course seems contradictory. For there certainly is wide agreement among them on their primitive ideas: values are individualistically determined, and individual men are socio-culturally conditioned. As Mr. Ayres puts it, "nobody denies this." And he is quite correct as concerns the participants in this symposium. So there is this agreed-upon foundation for further detailed inquiry. And given this foundation, the directions indicated by Pepper, Morris, Rice, Garnett, and Geiger seem to be the

proper and natural ones to take: in fact, they seem to be the only ones that are available. And this appears to be the rub. For there is apparently a general unwillingness to accept this logical conclusion. When the time comes to translate ideas into action — even only theoretical — most of these men reveal themselves as hauntingly unsure of the individualistic and socio-cultural bases of value on which they are ostensibly agreed. They appear to want more than their position can yield, and to be waiting upon this.

The books of Mr. Hart and Mr. Lundholm are of a different character and quality than this cooperative volume. I shall not pretend to do justice to them, but shall use them quite arbitrarily to further my general diagnosis. These studies do not aspire to the analytical precision, the caution and restraint, of the preceding essays. Aware of both the preferential and the obligatory moments in the value situation, their primary concern is to find some theoretical way of recognizing both of these and reconciling them. Faced with the difficulty of at once satisfying the demands of logical rigor and accounting for the common human feeling about values, they are inclined to opt for the latter. Both hold that values are public and coercive: that they have a ground that is objective and independent of individual human determination. They insist on the real status of standards and ideals of value. But it must be stressed that these authors are still firmly of the modern movement in denying that values are self-subsistent entities: they too hold that value is transactional, and comes alive only as it is felt and realized in human consciousness. But they seek to interpret the value transaction in such a way as to find within it a factor that is independent of the subject and so capable of imposing an obligation upon him.

In both cases, this position is supported by an argument that appeals chiefly to the necessity of justifying the felt character of the value situation. It is argued that since subjective value entails the quality of obligation, there must be a source of this obligation. If empirical inquiry and logical analysis do not disclose this source, that indicates the short-comings of these methods, not the non-existence of obligation. So these

methods must be supplemented. Mr. Hart attempts this through an extreme philosophical eclecticism. In the course of this, the complex character of human values is nicely exhibited; but no satisfactory synthesis of the life of values is effected. We are left with the insistence that emotion, reason, a regard for consequences, social conditioning, aspiration, and a sense of duty all influence our valuing; but we are not offered a theory that interprets these as phases of a cohesive process.

Mr. Lundholm bases his argument upon a very careful psychological analysis of conation: he contends that man's "purposive, insightful, and foresightful activity" is necessarily denied by a physicalist interpretation of man and the world; he insists that these activities are real and significant — that "man's greatness and uniqueness is his creativeness." If this creation and striving are to be adequately explained, they demand a goal whose progressive realization measures and justifies them. This goal — "the Supreme" — is the objective source of value.

These studies are animated by an attitude and intention that are to be admired: they attempt to account for the total quality of our value experiences. In a real and important sense they are more empirical than the consciously and scrupulously factual essays considered above; for they refuse to sacrifice the fact of obligation at the behest of scientific method. But they pay a terrible price for their honesty: the theories they present fall into two parts, one empirical and the other speculative, and there is little connection or continuity between the two. In this, these studies reflect the extreme intellectual confusion of modern philosophic thought. This is at once enthralled and unsatisfied by the world-view that emerges from the sciences. It longs for entities that this does not contain, and it cannot really accept such entities. Prominent among these are obligatory values. Until our thought can compass a more unified and inclusive world-view, values are doomed to suffer from empirical denigration on the one hand and from eclectic speculation on the other.

III

In turning to the value doctrines of contemporary French philosophy, as seen in the work of Polin and Gusdorf, we move into quite a different intellectual climate. In the first place, the thought of these men has a very strong moral and practical orientation: values are conceived as the center of all human endeavor, and value inquiry is meant to terminate in a guide to life. Man must live, and the task of the moralist is to aid him to attain an equilibrium between the possibilities of his individual character and the conditions that the world offers him. Secondly, these men are deeply concerned to justify and guarantee the individual against the various organized repressions and coercions of society. They regard life — the realization of value — as a highly personal thing. They recognize that life must have pattern and principles. But they insist that this pattern must be proper and private to the individual; and that man must express this pattern from within, not accept it from without. Thirdly, the intellectual point of departure of this work is a conscious opposition to the tradition — still apparently powerful in French life and thought — that interprets values as transcendent, rationally-known, and absolute entities. These men seem to have absorbed, qualified, and moved on from the emotive-individualistic insight that is still such a ferment in American thought; having accepted the individual as the locus of value, they are now at grips with the problem of disciplining the individual so that he can be an effective agent of value. They feel their task as that of transforming man into a moral agent, who creates his values in realizing his intentions in the world. The chief negative condition for success in this task is to free man from the coercion of institutional values that are extraneous to him. The positive condition is to train man to express and realize himself through a coherent system of self-imposed values.

These men remain firmly within the classical French philosophic tradition in presenting arguments that are extraordinarily closely knit: the best that one can attempt is to indicate the general line that the argument follows. Polin commences

with a critique of all objective axiologies. He contends that any objective theory of value depends upon three basic principles, or axioms: that objective values have a real existence, that they are transcendent, and that they can be adequately known. And he argues that there is a contradiction between the axioms of *transcendence* and *connaissance*: for if values are to be known, this can only be through operations that in that very act make them immanent. This internal contradiction can be avoided only if values surrender their transcendence, or if they are admitted to be unknowable: an objective theory can accept neither course, so it is untenable. Obviously, Polin proceeds, values must be knowable: otherwise they could not function in human action. So values must be made immanent: they have their locus in the individual man, not in some absolute objective order. At first sight, it might seem that this would lead to a complete subjectivism, and even nihilism, of values. But this is not the case; and it is not, because of the character of the human agent who creates values in willing his acts. Man recognizes that he has to act; that he has to act without any possible certainty of the rectitude or outcome of his decision; and that he still owes himself an obligation to choose and act for what appears the best. That is, Polin here enunciates two postulates that are necessary to his own theory of immanent value: the postulate of liberty, which affirms man's possibility and obligation to choose and act; and the postulate of self-esteem, which affirms man's responsibility to assert those values which he regards as most truly expressive of himself. Since values are created rather than known, there can be no question of their truth or falsity in the sense of relative conformance to a known standard. But there is a truth in values, because there is a truth in action: such truth is the accord of the reality created — the act willed and the act performed — with the axiological intention that grounds it. This obviously is a doctrine of value expressionism. Polin is perfectly aware of the consequences of this doctrine, and perfectly prepared to accept them. To do so, he says, is simply to recognize the human situation for what it actually is. There are no value absolutes, no categoricals, no standards that can guarantee human conduct. Every man is responsible for

the values he creates through his willing and acting. What, then, can value theory do for men? It can acquaint man with the various value attitudes that, as general patterns, are possible and coherent; it can help him to become clear about his own value-intentions; and then it can aid him to construct the unique hierarchy of values that is the proper expression of his own individual creative value attitude. In simpler language, it can help him to choose the role that he wants to play in the world, and the conditions that this entails. That, Polin would say, is much; and he ventures to do it in detail.

Gusdorf also accepts as his basic thesis the immanence of value: value "is that which is in fact sought by the individual... that which occurs in man first as intention and which man's conduct then seeks to make explicit." The analysis and defense of this position that Gusdorf offers are more psychological and less metaphysical than Polin's. He insists first of all upon the fact that value emerges in experience as an act of commitment: value is chosen, not known; it is not an affirmation of a mere thinking subject, but an engagement of the whole man. Hence, value is present throughout conscious life; it has no simple location, and no single guise; it engages our instincts, our emotions, our intellects, and our wills. The system of human values is the system of ends of whatever sort that men propose: it stretches from the biological to the spiritual aspects of man; from within this vast panorama, it is the responsibility of each man to choose the organization of values to which he is to devote himself. Gusdorf thus arrives at the same climactic problem as Polin, and he faces it as openly. If values are created by man in his choices and action, how can values be coercive, and how can value theory pretend to guide man? His answer is similar to Polin's, though more empirical in its form and content. Men share in a "primitive human unity" which is biological, psychological, social, and spiritual. This defines the general context within which man has to choose his values and create his life: but the selection and the ordering are each man's private obligation. Value theory can support him only to the extent of acquainting him with various types of value attitude and value synthesis that have been proved in life. These are

what Gusdorf calls "styles of life"; and they can only serve as approximate patterns of what must always be "a regime of personal existence." The human individual is responsible to himself, to humanity, and to life. But each man must define his responsibility, will his values, and create his own career in the world. For both of these thinkers, immanent values attain a measure of transcendence to the extent that man transcends the shallowness and chaos of his nature, and creates for himself a willed and coherent life.

IV

The character and status of the value problem as it presents itself to contemporary thought stand out more clearly in the work of these French philosophers than in that of their American colleagues. The reasons for this are easy to discern, and are closely associated with the respective philosophic traditions of the two countries. The French thinkers are more systematic in their treatment of the problem; more than any Americans save Urban and perhaps Dewey, they deal with values with a rigorous view to all the implications of their doctrines. They are more aware of the necessity to commit themselves to a position, and in doing this to deny themselves the comforts of other positions. They are more willing to face the consequences of their position. And, as a result of this, they are more diligent in their efforts to counter these consequences when they threaten theory or practice.

But the crucial problem that confronts contemporary value theory emerges with equal force in both movements. How can values be at once immanent and objective? If values are primarily occurrences in human experience, created in being preferred and chosen, how can they be coercive? If man is responsible for his values, how can values impose an obligation upon man?

I think this is the central problem that, in one guise or another, now vexes all value inquiry. I also think, as I have previously indicated, that it is largely a spurious problem. It exists only because modern philosophic thought has treated

man as an isolated creature; it has over-looked and neglected the continuities that bind man to his surroundings; it has studied the human system with insufficient reference to its context in nature and reality. It is only because of this separation that value theory encounters the fierce dualisms of objective-subjective, absolute-relative, coercive-individualistic, obligation-preference. The French thinkers have created this difficulty — these dualisms which they then cannot reconcile — by their insistence that values are immanent; the Americans, through their assumption that experience is a given — an autonomous series of events — and the consequent centering of their attention upon only the role of the subject in the value transaction. The result in both cases is to isolate man, to make him at once both unaccountable to the objective order and so unaccounted for by the objective order. Once the continuity of the human order and the world order is recognized, these dualisms lose their harshness. Man then becomes a creature who must satisfy the objective conditions of life, but who encounters real subjective alternatives in the ways he can satisfy them. Experience becomes a functional instrument rather than an autonomous series of events; its contents — perceptions, emotions, purposes, ideas, etc. — reflect both the demands of the environment and the choices of the experiencing agent. Finally, values become both reports of the conditions that life imposes and expressions of the individual's response before these conditions. Values are obligatory because they define the general demands and possibilities with which life confronts the human creature; they are preferential because they incarnate what each man seeks to realize and create through his life. The exploration of these continuities that hold between man and the world — between the human order and the cosmic order — is a task that out-reaches value theory. But it is only through pursuing it that value theory can solve its own problems.

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ANALOGY IN PLATO

"Of all bonds the most beautiful is analogy."¹ Such is the epigraph of the recent important contribution to Platonic scholarship made by Professor Paul Grenet of the Grand Séminaire at Rouen.² "Man and God, Earth and Heaven, Soul and Body, all realities imitate one another. All, by the selfsame relation, are linked together." This paraphrase of two of the last four lines of the poem which prefaces and in a sense epitomizes the author's thought on Platonic analogy, indicates clearly the ontological status that analogy in Plato's doctrine is seen to have. Though the primary emphasis is given to analogy as a method of reasoning, analogy in Plato, and in truth, is held to be the, not simply a law of being. Indeed, Professor Grenet holds that analogy is not only the law of being, but also the law of knowledge and of action: "*L'Analogie . . . est précisément la loi du connaître, de l'être et de l'agir.*"³

A comprehensive review of Grenet's book would have to approach book-length itself, for "analogy" is discovered in all the Dialogues, and the Platonic principle and method of reasoning to which Grenet gives this name, and to which he attributes absolute universality, he treats extensively in heavily documented, text-packed treatises. His book in fact is divided into four "books." I shall therefore limit myself to two general questions: (1) What does Grenet find to be the fundamental meaning of "philosophical analogy" in Plato? (2) Is this "analogy" philosophical, and if so, in what sense and with what value?

¹ Δεσμῶν κάλλιστος ἀνιλογία. *Timaeus*, 31C.

² Paul Grenet: *Les origines de l'analogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon* (Paris: Boivin & Cie., 1948). Unless otherwise indicated, all page references are to this book.

³ P. 234 in Ch. 14: "L'analogie platonicienne."

I

THE MEANING OF THE TERM ANALOGY
IN PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY

The single really systematic analysis of this term is found in an Appendix where⁴ Grenet clearly defines his understanding of "analogy" in relation to myth, allegory, parable, apologue, comparison, metaphor and symbol. And his understanding of this word is precisely that which he considers to have been Plato's.⁵

The forms of speech named above, Grenet explains, have this in common, that they are signs: media of knowing and of making known indirectly one object by means of another. If analogy were merely a method of representing the inaccessible by the substitution of the familiar, he rightly points out, all these kinds of figures would be cases of analogy. But analogy implies two elements over and above the representative factor just noted: firstly, resemblance mingled with difference; secondly, a proportional structure, namely, likeness of relations and not mere relation of likeness. Where there is no resemblance at all between two given terms, there is no analogy, the author asserts: "*Il n'y aurait donc plus analogie, dès là que disparaîtrait toute ressemblance entre les deux termes.*"⁶ This would be the case in that kind of theological symbolism wherein the symbol, far from being a natural or even a formal sign, remains purely arbitrary. (This requirement, that there be at least some resemblance between analogous terms, is a key to understanding the nature and the limitations of Platonic analogy, as I shall try to show later.) On the other hand, Grenet truly remarks that there would be no analogy if the resemblance between the two terms were a likeness of qualities taken absolutely. Rather, analogy properly so called entails likeness of relations, not direct resemblance between terms. This important point Grenet emphasizes throughout his book. He shows

⁴ Pp. 247 ff.

⁵ See Grenet's "Tableau," p. 248.

⁶ P. 247.

in great detail that in Plato analogy (*ἀναλογία*) specifically and primarily consists in likeness of relations among dissimilar terms, not at all in mere likeness between terms themselves.

Philosophical analogy, according to the author,⁷ is not found in the following signs, that is, objects which, once known, can lead to the knowledge of other things: (1) Signs manifesting no likeness to the thing signified, but only a liaison, whether purely conventional or due to some spatio-temporal contiguity, as in emblems and many kinds of symbols; (2) signs marking a resemblance to the thing signified, but a resemblance pure and simple, not a likeness of relations: comparisons, and metaphors based on a common genus or species; metonyms, examples, apologues, parables, proverbs — complex terms such as events or situations resembling other events or situations either as one particular case resembles another particular case or as it resembles a general type. Most often, Grenet observes, the apologue and the parable tend to exhibit a proportional structure, as in the following category; (3) signs that present both resemblance with the thing signified and resemblance of relations. "In these instances only can one speak of analogy in the strict sense."⁸

Where do we find this kind of analogy — analogy "strictly so called"? Grenet first cites three non-Platonic loci: (1) the comparisons or metaphors *κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον* of Aristotle,⁹ i.e., comparisons and metaphors having a proportional structure; (2) the "metaphorical analogies of the Scholastics"; (3) allegories, i.e., "series of coordinated analogical metaphors." Let us consider these instances in order.

1. In the *Poetics*,¹⁰ Aristotle states: "Metaphor (*μεταφορά*) consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else, the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy (*κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον*). Aristotle

⁷ P. 248.

⁸ "Ce sont les seuls cas où l'on puisse parler d'analogie au sens strict." P. 248.

⁹ *Poetics*, 21: 1457^b 9 and 16 ff.

¹⁰ 1457^b 7-9.

gives examples of each kind of metaphorical transference, pointing out that the transference "from analogy" (*δὲ ἀνάλογον*) is possible whenever there are four terms so related that the second (B) is to the first (A) as the fourth (D) is to the third (C): for one may then metaphorically put D in lieu of B, and B in lieu of D . . . Thus a cup (B) is in relation to Dionysus (A) what a shield (D) is to Ares (C). The cup accordingly will be metaphorically described as the "shield of Dionysus" (D + A), and the shield as the "cup of Ares" (B + C). Or to take another instance: As old age (D) is to life (C), so is evening (B) to day."¹¹ Here it is a question simply of metaphorical proportion, or proportionality, not at all of proper proportion, or proportionality. For in its essence metaphorical analogy or proportion consists in the transference, in virtue of some perceived likeness of relations, of a univocal term to another subject or to other subjects to which it does not apply properly and intrinsically. Proper and non-metaphorical analogy, on the other hand, arises not from any transference of univocal terms, but from the proportional realization, in diverse subjects, of a term that is by its very essence realizable only proportionately, only according to like proportions or relations.

The specifically analogical character of metaphorical analogy, as conceived by Aristotle, consists in the likeness of relations or proportions involved. There are many illustrations of this fact both in the *Rhetoric* and in the *Poetics*.¹² For Aristotle, science is of course demonstrative knowledge, and "all the sciences are built up through definition."¹³ But "clearly metaphors and metaphorical expressions are precluded in definition."¹⁴ The statement is universal. All metaphor, according to Aristotle, is excluded from the order of science as such.¹⁵

¹¹ 1457^b 16-22.

¹² E.g., *Rhet.*, III, 2: 1045^a 11, 1046^b 30, 1047^a 15, 1048^a 8, 1048^b 4, 1411^a 1, 1411^b 3 and 22, 1412^a 5, 1412^b 34; *Poet.*, 1448^b 38, 1457^b 11, 16, 25.

¹³ *Anal. Post.*, II, 17; 99^a 22.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 13; 97^b 37.

¹⁵ It seems that the concept of analogy in the sense of proportionality — equality and/or likeness of proportions — is ubiquitous in the writings of Aristotle. See G. L. Muskens: *De vocis ἀναλογίας significatione ac usu*

2. Grenet does not explain what he means by "the metaphorical analogies of the Scholastics." Nowhere in his book does he treat of any "scholastic" doctrine of analogy. He refers in passing to Penido's distinction between religious symbolism entailing natural and formal signs and theological symbolism wherein signs have become purely arbitrary.¹⁶ As a Catholic professor of philosophy, Grenet could not be unaware of the ordinary so-called scholastic teaching on analogy. I therefore assume, and I think there can be no reasonable doubt about this, that "the metaphorical analogies of the Scholastics" are substantially the same as the metaphorical analogies of Aristotle, as we have just seen them explained in the *Poetics*.

3. The allegory, Grenet says,¹⁷ is defined perfectly by Cicero as a series of coordinated analogical metaphors — *plures continuæ tralationes*.¹⁸ Grenet correctly notes that Cicero's *tralatio* here clearly means metaphor. Indeed, Cicero in this place refers to Aristotle's strictures on the abuse or excessive use of metaphor.¹⁹

Is the Platonic myth excluded from the class of analogies "in the strict sense"? Grenet states²⁰ that the myth, in the ethnological sense, is a crude belief to which the believer attributes no other meaning than the immediate one that the words themselves convey. But a myth may be interpreted or explicated allegorically and so become an *analogical* representation, for it then exhibits a resemblance of relations with the object signified. The author maintains that not all the Platonic

apud Aristotelem (Groningen, Holland, 1943), a doctoral dissertation which traces the use of the term *ἀναλογία* throughout the Aristotelian corpus. Dr. Muskens finds this concept to have considerable significance in the logical works, in the writings on rhetoric, poetics, physics, astronomy, metaphysics, biology, botany, zoology, psychology, ethics, politics. Indeed, *ἀναλογία* appears to be absent from none of the authentic works of Aristotle.

¹⁶ P. 247. Cf. pp. 68 f. in Penido's important *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique* (Paris: Vrin, 1931).

¹⁷ Pp. 248 and 249 (5).

¹⁸ Cf. *Orator*, in *Opera Omnia*, edited by C. F. A. Nobbe, (Leipzig, 1850), I, 169, col. 1.

¹⁹ Cf. *Rhetoric*, III, 3.

²⁰ Pp. 249 f.

myths are allegorical, nor, therefore, analogical, because some of them do not rest upon or manifest a proportional structure. Many of the myths, however, are analogical "in the strict sense"; for example ²¹: the myth of the *φρονιρά* in the *Phædo* (62B), of the winged horses and charioteers of the gods in the *Phædrus* (246), of the battered and encrusted sea-god in the *Republic* (X, 611B), of the Atlantis in the *Timæus* (20-26) and the *Critias* (108D-121C), Aristophanes' myth on the origin of sexual attraction in the *Symposium* (189D ff.), the myth of the nomothete who gives laws to language in the *Cratylus* (388E), of the birth and decay of the Ideal City in the *Republic* (II, VIII, IX), the genetic cosmogony of the *Timæus*.

It seems that for Grenet the essence of Platonic analogy lies in metaphorical proportionality. It is significant that he does not in his systematic analysis of the meaning of *ἀναλογία* take into account the non-metaphorical concept of proportionality that plays such an important part in the philosophical and scientific thought of Aristotle and the Thomists. Indeed I have found in Professor Grenet's book no mention whatever of this concept. I do not however suggest that the Thomistic metaphysical analogy of proper proportionality is to be equated with the Aristotelian concept of analogy even as it is presented, fragmentarily, in the *Metaphysics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, to name the most important Aristotelian philosophical loci.

II

THE PHILOSOPHICAL VALUE OF PLATONIC ANALOGY

Professor Grenet attributes the master-idea of his work to two statements made by two men, one the Dominican philosopher H. D. Gardeil: "If the Aristotelian theory of the analogy of being was not in fact made explicit nor was exploited by Plato, nevertheless it is virtually included in the

²¹ P. 170, note 616.

thesis of the *Sophist*,"²² the other, an anonymous reviewer of Father Gardeil's book: "It would not be difficult to demonstrate in the work of Plato (whom the philosophers so much love to oppose to Aristotle, while the historians are tempted to reconcile him and his disciple) the origin of analogy, along with the positing (*position*) of the diversity of being."²³

Both of these remarks, I think, can be misleading. In the first place, to my knowledge no complete, definitive study of Aristotle's theory of analogy has ever been made. Above all, no one, as far as I know, has determined precisely what the phrase "analogy of being" signifies or can signify in Aristotle. Has analogy in Aristotle an ontological status? If so, what is it? These and derivative questions I believe have not been really answered. In my opinion, Father Gardeil's statement, because of its vague and unsubstantiated character, could not but be an unsatisfactory guide. The second statement, that of the anonymous reviewer, is partly vague and partly false. For the question of course is: The origin of *what* analogy? I think that Grenet's book shows that metaphorical or symbolic proportionality, specifically as a method of philosophical (though not yet strictly demonstrative) reasoning, originates or rather comes to something like full flower in Plato. The last phrase in the anonymous writer's remark, however, is simply false. There is no *diversity* of being ("*diversité de l'être*") in Plato; and I shall argue presently that for this very reason there is in Plato no philosophical analogy "in the strict sense."

Analogy, according to Professor Grenet, exhibits at once resemblance with the object signified and resemblance of relations: "*à la fois ressemblance avec le signifié et ressemblance de rapports.*"²⁴ Toward the beginning of his book²⁵ he had said that, to be rigorous, an analogy must imply three elements: (1) likeness mingled with unlikeness ("*ressemblance mêlée de*

²² H. D. Gardeil, O.P., *Les étapes de la philosophie idéaliste* (1935 edition), p. 45.

²³ P. 15.

²⁴ P. 248.

²⁵ P. 11.

dissemblance"), (2) two terms belonging to two heterogeneous orders of reality, or at least to two irreducible levels of intelligibility, (3) likeness of relations between the terms, in contradistinction to mere likeness of qualities or of things. It is in this last "element," Grenet rightly observes, that analogy essentially consists; analogy posits not a relation of likeness but a likeness of relation.²⁶ "The anticipations and the divinations of the poet, the discoveries and the hypotheses of the savant, the principles and the transcendentals of the philosopher, the dogmatic speculations of the theologian, all rest upon analogy. Poetic metaphors, scientific theories, philosophical systematization, theological illustration, all are based upon a likeness between the familiar relations that two terms present in human experience and the similar relations exhibited by two other terms which in themselves escape our apprehension. Literary analogy, scientific analogy, philosophic analogy, theological analogy, when they are rigorous, all have as their foundation a proportional structure."²⁷ This passage expresses a fundamental insight of great value. Now, Grenet's book is nothing less than an attempt to demonstrate the proportional structure and the central significance of analogical reasoning throughout the Platonic Dialogues.

The author successfully defends himself against the charge of having thomisticized Plato by seeking to discover analogy in his thought. One need not be a Thomist, he says truly,²⁸ in order to have recourse to analogy: one need only be a poet, a savant, a philosopher, a theologian; and surely Plato was all these things. Certainly this statement is true, though it seems to suggest that the author puts in the category of "analogy" a wide variety of insufficiently differentiated forms. Analytically the book as a whole is weak, I think, just because its author has failed to distinguish clearly between modes of analogy or proportion. There is a marked tendency to lump together under the title "analogy" all proportional forms or

²⁶ P. 10.

²⁷ Pp. 10 f.

²⁸ P. 12.

structures, disregarding their essential variety, and as we saw in the first section of this paper, metaphorical proportionality is in effect made the prime analogate of all these forms. For this reason, if for no other, it could not be said that Professor Grenet has thomisticized Plato. Yet he has in some scarcely definable ways Christianized and scholasticized Plato. For example, when Grenet speaks of the Platonic god or gods, he always uses the capital D (*Dieu, Dieux*), and he never indicates that the Platonic conception of divinity is far removed from the Christian one.²⁹ Also significant seems his liberal, and for the most part vague, use of typically scholastic terms and phrases, such as: "mode of being" (*mode de l'être*), "diversity of being" (*diversité de l'être*), "the proportional structure of analogy" (*la structure proportionnelle de l'analogie*), "analogical likeness" (*la ressemblance analogique*), above all, "likeness of relations" (*la similitude des rapports*). I wish to state emphatically, however, that nothing I have said or will say in this paper is to be taken as destructive criticism of the work under consideration. Platonic scholarship is under considerable debt to Professor Grenet for his identifications and expositions of the proportional structure of Plato's religious, mythical, theological, mathematical, aesthetic, moral, political, and ontological thought.

In the scholarly, that is, the fundamentally historical, part of his work lies its primary worth: its speculative value, though by no means negligible, is comparatively much less, for this reason: the author's claim that analogy in Plato has attained to the level of philosophical science, has not been substantiated, and yet speculatively the success of the book depends absolutely upon the substantiation of that claim. It seems to Professor Grenet that in Plato's hands analogical reasoning can have and in some instances does have the same degree of demon-

²⁹ I think it has been established that Plato speaks of god or gods indifferently, that he is never fully monotheistic, that for him the gods were inferior to the Ideas (which, though not gods, are more "divine" than the gods), that there is no evidence that Plato identified "God" with the Idea of the Good. Cf. G. M. A. Grube: *Plato's Thought* (London, 1935), and Gilson: *God and Philosophy* (New Haven, 1941).

strative rigor and of certitude, in purely philosophical contexts, as have mathematical demonstrations of the fourth term in geometrical proportions.³⁰ The demonstrative or scientific character of Platonic "philosophical analogy" appears to be the primary assumption on which Grenet's work rests. I find no proof of the truth of that assumption. On the contrary, if Platonic analogy, though consisting essentially in proportional likeness, nevertheless at the same time has a basically metaphorical or symbolic character, then as far as I can see it cannot support philosophically demonstrative argument.

In saying that "Plato recognized in the first place that proportion or analogy is an admirable instrument for the identification of the diverse,"³¹ Professor Grenet undoubtedly has put his finger upon a point indispensable for the understanding of a great many of the most important Platonic argumentations, but he has also made a statement that is historically false. He should have said "different," not "diverse." For "diverse" properly means simple otherness, whereas what Grenet (and Plato) had in mind is difference, that is, relative otherness. Here we reach the center of the problem. Analogy in the properly philosophical sense is not, I submit, a likeness of relations or proportions among different (and therefore like) things, but among things simply diverse in their being.

Grenet, I have no doubt, is perfectly correct in holding that for Plato analogy in the strict sense entails at once resemblance mingled with difference, and likeness of relations.³² It is because analogy in Plato is a proportional unity of terms relatively the same and relatively different that it can consist in the metaphorical or symbolic transference of univocal notions in virtue of relational likenesses. That Plato constantly makes use of this concept of analogy as an instrument for identifying terms that are heterogeneous, though not simply diverse, there can be no question. Grenet exposes this analogical method and this analogical structure thoroughly, with respect to a large

³⁰ See the explicit statement of this opinion on page 152, with note 539.

³¹ P. 109.

³² Pp. 247, 249, *et alibi passim*.

number of the most celebrated Platonic texts.³³ These cases, as far as I can determine, are either metaphorical proportionalities, of varying complexity, or proportionalities among terms generically and/or specifically different from one another, that is, between terms formally univocal, however universal in extension they may be conceived to be. There are here no metaphysical analogies of proper proportionality: proportionalities among terms simply other or diverse with respect to existence or mode of realization, the only likeness lying in their mutual proportions or relations.

Ultimately a philosopher's theory of analogy is unintelligible apart from his doctrine of being. In the last analysis the determination of the philosophical value of Platonic analogy goes hand-in-hand with the understanding of Platonic ontology. The great value of Grenet's book is to be found precisely in the detailed, scholarly expositions of Plato's brilliant use of his method of "analogical reasoning" through relational likenesses. The book's relative lack of speculative success stems from the author's failure, as I see it, to evaluate justly the method itself and the results obtained by it. For I think that the method could be an instrument of philosophical science strictly so called only were it divested completely of symbolism or metaphor, and thus of univocity; yet analogy in Plato seems to remain essentially a method whereby univocal concepts, are transposed via symbolic proportionalities to contexts not immediately accessible to our natural experiential knowledge. The comparative analytical inefficacy and speculative weakness of Professor Grenet's work, result, in turn, from the author's inadequate grasp of the ontological substructure or superstructure of Plato's thought. Grenet says that Plato was unaware of "the analogical structure of the notion of being."³⁴ I take it he means that Plato did not have in mind what Thomists commonly call "the analogy of being," namely, the doctrine of the proportional predication of *ens* — though this doctrine is variously understood even among Thomists, not to

³³ See especially Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

³⁴ Pp. 15 f.

mention non-Thomistic Scholastics. Of course Plato could not have been aware of these developments and problems. But the explicit thesis of Professor Grenet's work is that "Plato nevertheless stands at the origin of the philosophical employment of analogy. Not [Grenet explains] that Plato himself alone invented this method, nor even explicitly and systematically developed it. Yet, having received from his predecessors and contemporaries the 'analogy' they utilized in particular domains (notably the religious, the artistic and the mathematical, along with the fields wherein the latter was already in Plato's time exerting its influence), Plato transposed to the properly philosophical plane these very [analogical] methods, whose limitless fecundity he was the first to perceive."³⁵

The question is whether those analogical procedures are fecund in respect of philosophical science. I think that enough has been said to show that essentially and radically they are not. The true ultimate cause of this scientific or demonstrative infertility of Platonic analogy must be sought in the Platonic ontology — specifically, I venture to maintain, in the doctrine of the communion of being ($\tauὸ ὄν$), not-being ($\tauὸ μὴ ὄν$), same ($\tauὸ ταὐτόν$), and other ($\tauὸ θάτερον$).³⁶ These terms are related as follows: being: same: not-being: other. This is perhaps the primary ontological analogy in Plato. Now, for Plato the essence of being is self-sameness; really to be is to be permanently self-identical ($\alphaὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό$). Being and not-being are variables between which these are innumerable degrees of reality, and all relations of being and not-being are relations of sameness and otherness.³⁷ Of this there can be no doubt. "Then not-being," says the Stranger in the *Sophist*,³⁸ "necessarily exists in the case of motion and of all classes or kinds. For the nature of the other ($\eta\theta\alpha\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$) entering into them all, makes each of them other than being, and so not-being; and therefore of all of them we truly say that they are

³⁵ P. 16.

³⁶ Cf. *Sophist*, 256E - 257A.

³⁷ Cf. Gilson: *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, 1949), pp. 10 ff.

³⁸ 256E.

not; and again, inasmuch as they partake of being, that they are and are beings (*ὄντα*). "Every one of the Forms [or Kinds], then, has plurality of being and an unlimited amount of not-being." In other words, "being is not, in respect of as many other things as there are; for not being these, it is *its own unique self*, and is not the other things, which are infinite in number."³⁹ Thus "not-being" is one among many kinds (*γέννη*) and is distributed throughout all reality."⁴⁰ In sum: "There is a communion of classes or kinds [all entities are mutually related] and... being and difference or otherness traverse all beings and mutually interpenetrate, so that the Other partakes of being, and by reason of this participation is and yet is not that of which it partakes, but is other, and being other than being, not-being clearly must be. And again, being, through partaking of the Other becomes a class other than the remaining classes, and being other than all of them, is not each one of them, and is not all the rest, so that undoubtedly there is an infinity of cases in which being is not, and all others, whether regarded individually or collectively, in many respects are in many respects are not."⁴¹

If passages such as these represent absolutely essential elements of the ontological structure of the Platonic universe, then I think it must be said unqualifiedly that for Plato there is no simple diversity of being, but on the contrary, innumerable degrees of likeness and difference, of sameness and otherness, of being and not-being. In consequence I maintain that the ground has been cut from under a properly metaphysical analogy, namely, one whose only basis is diversity in existential act. If any analogy can be called "metaphysical," and thus philosophical in the primary mode, it must be rooted in or founded upon the existence exercised by things. And in respect of their very act of existing, things are not relatively the same and relatively different, but simply diverse. Now, in so far as philosophical analogy bears upon the order of existence, in the

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 257A. Italics mine.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 260B.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 259A-B.

primary and conceptually indefinable sense of act of being, it cannot but have the character of analogy of proper proportionality, which posits proportional likeness among terms simply diverse from one another as regards their act of existing. In this order there is found not "resemblance mingled with difference" (Professor Grenet's, and Plato's, "*ressemblance mêlée de différence*"), but resemblance amid diversity, namely, likeness of relations among terms simply diverse in their mode of being, of realization — terms mutually other, absolutely, in existential act.

Professor Grenet has seen that in Plato and in truth the very essence of analogy lies in proportional likeness, in likeness of relations or proportions. In this insight the speculative value of his book primarily consists. On the other hand, I find no evidence in his work of awareness of the crucially important fact that proportional likeness alone does not suffice to constitute a properly scientific philosophical analogy. Metaphorical proportionalities, for instance, are not philosophical analogies in a definitively scientific and demonstrative sense; yet, as we have seen, Professor Grenet's cases of "analogy in the strict sense" are all metaphorical analogies. And unless I am greatly mistaken, of such a nature are the analogies discovered by Professor Grenet among the multifarious Platonic Forms and levels of the Real, and, correspondingly, in all the major spheres — religious and mythical, meta-mathematical and physical, moral, political, ontological — wherein the Platonic dialectic moves.

If there is one word that is the key to the method of Platonic analogy, I mean to that method's conceptual identification, it is, I think, "transposition." This term, borrowed explicitly from Diès,⁴² sets the three great themes of Grenet's work: The

⁴² See A. Diès: *Autour de Platon* (Paris, 1927), II, 401. Grenet appears to make considerable use of this work. He also draws heavily, though not without critical reservations, from the Platonic studies of P.-M. Schuhl, especially Schuhl's *La fabulation platonicienne* (Paris, 1947) and his *Essai sur la formation de la pensée grecque* (Paris, 1934). Indeed, Grenet has learned from Schuhl that "Proportion is a fundamental theme that dominates the entire work of Plato" (quoted by Grenet on the title

Transposition of Religious and Mythical Analogy (Book I), The Transposition of Mathematical Analogy (Book II), The Transposition of Artistic Imitation (Book III). Now, the first question that these titles themselves raise is: What is the origin of these "transpositions"; on what are they based? Careful study I believe yields this answer: Univocal notions derived from three main sources: "Human experience" (to use Grenet's own vague term), mathematics, in the classical sense of the science of quantity and quantitative relations, and art or artistic imitation. Analogy arises when these univocal notions are seen to apply proportionately to heterogeneous, though never simply diverse, objects. Ideas that fall within the orders of direct experience or knowledge or artistic activity are extended to realms transcending these orders. Analogy thus becomes "a means of surpassing the limits of experience" (Ch. 2), of going beyond the directly experienced or experienceable. It is clear from Grenet's own analysis of Platonic texts that this method proceeds via metaphorical or symbolic proportionalities. Such seems to be the pattern of many of the Platonic myths. Yet Grenet sees in them philosophical analogies. Grenet in fact argues that the "analogical" myths demonstrate two of the three conditions *sine qua non* of philosophical analogy: (1) the elimination of anthropomorphism (Ch. 3), (2) the perception and establishment of a proportion between "the empirical quality and the metempirical subject," namely, of an analogy between the experiential and the supra-experiential (Ch. 4). The third necessary condition for philosophical analogy is the formally determinative one: likeness of relations or proportions. It is in Professor Grenet's analysis of The Transposition of Mathematical Analogy (Book II) that this ground is made manifest. Here (Ch. 5-8) is the core of the book. The substance of the author's contribution to Platonic

page of Book II of *Les origines...*). The studies of Victor Goldschmidt (*Le paradigme dans la théorie platonicienne de l'action*, 1945, and *Le paradigme dans la dialectique platonicienne*, 1948) fall within the same general line of Platonic research as Grenet's present work. Goldschmidt's studies, however, appeared after Grenet had completed his book (p. 55, note 141).

scholarship is found in his analysis of this principle of proportional or relational likeness as "an instrument for the identification of the diverse," that is, of the dissimilar (Ch. 5), as "an instrument of discovery" of unknown terms and relations (Ch. 6), and as "an instrument of the unification of the multiple" (Ch. 7). A significant chapter (No. 8) is devoted to a successful defense of Platonic analogy against the many-pronged attacks of those who have in various ways charged that Plato mathematized this principle. Grenet shows in fine detail how Plato borrowed from mathematics the concept of proportional likeness wherein his "analogy" essentially consists. However, he correctly points out that from this ubiquitous analogical framework appropriated from mathematics one cannot conclude that Plato mathematized the very content of his thought.⁴³ On the contrary, Grenet demonstrates the purely qualitative character of the analogies or proportions involved in a large number of Platonic texts. Many of Plato's arguments, he shows, are mathematical only in appearance. He understands that Plato sometimes, as in the *Timaeus*, does use analogy mathematically, though the "physical analogy" employed in this dialogue, he points out, is qualitative no less than quantitative.⁴⁴ In general, Grenet exposes in this middle and most significant part of his work the proportional structure of Platonic analogy. But in this writer's judgment, he in no place proves that that proportional structure transcends the univocity of symbolism. Quite the reverse: Symbolism — metaphorical proportionality — however spiritualized, however elevated beyond common modes of knowing, stands out everywhere. I say "the univocity of symbolism" because symbolism I understand to consist precisely in the transference of univocal terms (those signifying quidditative sameness) in virtue of proportional likenesses. I do not see how univocity can be eliminated from authentic Platonism if in that philosophy "being" means sameness in essence, or self-identity; if to be really is to be Form or Idea, and if the being of the Form or Idea is the being of its own self-identical essence. May I repeat

⁴³ P. 150.

⁴⁴ Cf. p. 154.

that, as I see it, philosophical analogy in the strict and primary sense can arise only in the order of simple diversity in being: the order of existential act. In a doctrine of "degrees of being" — of the correlativity of being and not-being, of sameness and otherness — analogy in this sense therefore can have no place.

The doctrine of degrees of being in Plato itself sets up the framework for what Cajetan calls an analogy of inequality. This analogy consists in unequal participation in a common essence. Now, all things participate in the Platonic Forms and imitate them, and thereby they participate in the supreme Form and imitate it. Thus the Platonic intelligible world is characterized primarily by this, that in the last analysis all things participate unequally or in various degrees in one and the same ultimate Essence: the Good which, though said to be beyond or above essence,⁴⁵ is nevertheless conceived as an essence. The point is that, in logical structure and status, if not in the explicit thought of Plato, the Good is a super-genus, a super-universal, in which all other universals (logically the Ideas or Forms function as universals despite the reality attributed to them by Plato) participate unequally, that is, according to "analogy of inequality." Participation in Plato entails proportional community in the order of Idea, of intelligible Form, in a word, of essence, and for this reason Platonic participation is in fact, though not in the mind of its author, formally logical, because that which is common essentially, in contrast with that which is common existentially, does not exist actually, but only logically, as common.⁴⁶

The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing, I think, is this: Platonic participation formally and fundamentally is univocal, even though it does involve proportional structures, as Grenet has shown. From the standpoint of analogy, the Platonic First Philosophy appears to me to present an overall "analogy of inequality" (if I may give this phrase an unwonted though in my opinion legitimate extension) *within*

⁴⁵ *Republic*, VI, 509B.

⁴⁶ For the argument of this entire paragraph, see my book *The Bond of Being* (St. Louis: Herder, 1949), pp. 58-60.

which there are myriad proportionalities of a predominantly, if not exclusively, symbolic or metaphorical character, but no proper proportionalities in so far as the latter are understood to rest directly or indirectly upon simple diversity in existential act or in mode of existing.

I trust it is clear that in this paper I have not been concerned primarily with the properly historical problem of Platonic analogy, namely, the question of Plato's own actual understanding and use of analogy. Rather I have of necessity ventured into the always controversial area of speculative assessment of historical doctrine. The reason for this necessity is that the work under consideration is far from being historical exposition pure and simple. As a matter of fact, the author uses the analogical materials he finds in Plato in order to construct a quite elaborate philosophical theory of analogy, for which I think he certainly intends to claim intrinsic speculative validity and truth. I have therefore undertaken a critical examination of that theory. Apart from such an examination a work that is at once historical and speculative cannot be evaluated.

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NATURAL PHILOSOPHY OF CAUSE AND CHANCE

by Max Born. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1949.) pp. viii + 215.

This book represents the Waynflete Lectures, given by the distinguished author at St. Mary Magdalen, Oxford, in 1948. Born is the discoverer of the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics which is current today, and the book may be said, therefore, to be the most authoritative in its field.

A definition of causality, somewhat general but clear, is given early in the book. Two ideas which in the popular use of the term "cause" are often intermingled and hidden from view, are exhibited and distinguished; they are *antecedence* and *contiguity*. Born's definition of causality is sufficiently wide to include both of them.

In the body of the book the main theories of classical and modern physics are reviewed and their significance for the causal problem is carefully examined. Mechanics of particles is exhibited as a theory which, by virtue of its reversibility, is neutral to the postulate of antecedence. The demand for contiguity, however, led scientists to formulate the mechanics of continuous media and the field theories of electrodynamics. In thermodynamics the descriptive method of physics comes to its climax and also to its end. The failure of this method calls for an application of statistical reasoning as it appeared for the first time in the kinetic theory of gases.

Two things happen at this stage of the development of physical theory: time becomes irreversible and the principle of antecedence is satisfied. Chapter VII, where these facts are discussed, is, despite its brevity ($2\frac{1}{2}$ pages), one of the most brilliant treatments of the problem of reversibility. For it shows succinctly why, mathematically and logically, the mechanics of many particles is not in contradiction with the reversibility of ordinary mechanics. Boltzmann's transfer equation contains a term known as the "collision integral," and irreversibility may be directly traced to its presence.

There is a brief survey of the elements of quantum mechanics which confers emphasis upon the statistical matrix and the differential equation it obeys, and which places in evidence the useful contributions to this subject by the author himself and by his collaborator, H. S. Green. In Born's view, the occurrence of probabilities in quantum mechanics is not a subterfuge, nor is it to be regarded as forced upon us *à faute de mieux*. Probabilities are more natural in a description of physical reality than is the determinism of classical physics, and they are far more successful. Despite this admission, however, Born takes what has always appeared to the reviewer to be the only correct stand on the problem of causality: quantum physics has not abandoned the causal postulate; it has rejected its traditional interpretation as rigid determinism and has modified causal description to make it more significant in human experience.

It is well known that Einstein disavows this change. The reader with an interest in recent history of science will be delighted at the inclusion in this book of some personal correspondence between Born and Einstein, correspondence which shows the development of this conflict of ideas. Final remarks, entitled "Metaphysical Conclusions," deal rather loosely with a variety of topics, and even extend in a somewhat uncritical way the logical vagaries that have been carried into philosophy via the so-called complementarity principle. Yet they add a wholesome human flavor to the austere and rigorous treatment pervading the book.

Much of its excellence lies in the technical mathematical perfection given to the development of a difficult subject matter. The philosopher and the casual reader who are unwilling to study the book with care will gain little from it. But it is a gold mine of information to the student who takes the trouble to examine it minutely, particularly to him who scans the useful appendices.

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Notes and observations

LAW AND OTHER MATTERS

Harvard University Press adds a fourth volume, *The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch and Dabin*, to its excellent "20th Century Legal Philosophy Series." Lask is a somewhat obscure innovator in the Kantian tradition; Dabin is a Thomist who writes illuminatingly on natural law; Radbruch, a neo-Kantian and a follower of Lask, is the most distinguished of the three. Radbruch has in fact been having a growing influence, despite a singular lack of system, and a peculiar atomicity to his thinking. Edward H. Levi's *An Introduction to Legal Reasoning* (University of Chicago Press), called by Thurman Arnold "the greatest piece of jurisprudential writing that has ever come to my attention" — praise by legal thinkers is often quite lavish — is a reprint from the *Chicago Law Review*. Descriptive rather than analytic, the book exposes somewhat the process by which lawyers reason from example. Edmond N. Cahn, *The Sense of Injustice* (New York University Press), stresses the need to make legal concepts relevant to individual cases. He too has had an extraordinarily fine reception from distinguished legal thinkers, but he is more deserving, for his is a sensitive, well-written, philosophically perceptive work.

New York University Press has been publishing a series of studies on the nature and meaning of time, under the general heading of "Time and Its Mysteries." So far three series of discussions have appeared. There have been some rather good studies of the making of watches and of time as pertinent to science, history and anthropology. Philosophy has been represented by John Dewey. No attention has as yet been paid to the metaphysical and cosmological aspects of time. An historical survey of major philosophic views would also be of value.

Max Scheler was evidently the genius of the phenomenological movement. It is surprising that none of his works have been translated into English. There have been few references to him in our literature and hardly any articles dealing with him. Dr. John M. Oesterreicher's splendid survey of Max

Scheler's leading ideas in the *Thomist* for April is therefore all the more welcome. The *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* for January-March contains articles in French by Bertrand Russell and Charles Hartshorne on "English philosophy." Russell in a paper strangely called "The Principle of Individuation" concludes "that there is no theoretical need for proper names in opposition to qualities and relations. Whatever is dated and located is complex and the notion of simple particulars is an error." Hartshorne writes on Whitehead. Roger Hazelton argues in his "Time, Eternity and History" in the *Journal of Religion* for January that it is sin alone which cuts off eternity from time. I find it hard to see how such a metaphysical breach can be achieved by an act of disobedience. In the same issue, Samuel Stumpf opens up a much neglected subject in his "Christian Theology and Juristic Thought." He apparently supposes that theology is the only alternative to positivism; but ethics, science and cosmology claim to stand in between. George Beiswanger is one of the few contemporary philosophers who know how to write. He discusses in the *Journal of Philosophy* (XLVII, No. 9), the logic of conscience, in a spirit reminiscent of Hegel's *Phenomenology*. John E. Smith in the same issue makes many excellent distinctions in his thoughtful metaphysical essay, "Is Existence a Valid Philosophical Concept?" He fails though to remark the difference between the idea of existence as predicate and as attribute. Existence is a predicate, a part of judgment, not an attribute, a character of fact. Most discussion about existence, to be sure, confounds these two ideas, but it is disappointing to find the confusion continued in the writings of one usually so alert as Dr. Smith.

Of some interest to our readers: "The British Moralists and the Fallacy of Psychologism," by James Ward Smith in the *Journal of the History of Ideas*, April, 1950; Herbert W. Schneider's review of Philip P. Wiener's *Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism* in the same issue; Eliseo Vivas' thoughtful, sensitive, sympathetic review of Jordan's *The Good Life*, in *Ethics*, for April.

The following is the chairman's address of welcome to the Metaphysical Society of America at its first meeting at Yale University, April 15th, 1950. It is entitled, "The Four-Fold Art of Avoiding Questions."

It has been said and will undoubtedly often be said again that this is an historic occasion. Not only are we about to hear a most distinguished group of speculative thinkers, not only does our panel cut across school, creed, doctrine and nation for the purpose of promoting truth regardless of where it may lead, but today we open a forum devoted exclusively to the pursuit of questions lying at the root of all knowledge and action.

Isaiah Berlin has recently remarked that men in the twentieth century, instead of continuing the struggle to answer the basic questions all men ask, tend rather to avoid or to cancel them. Our century has been characterized by a series of somewhat violent efforts to reject the problems that have plagued mankind in the past — problems which continue and will continue to haunt every one of us throughout our lives. His observation has particular pertinence to twentieth century philosophy, especially as it has been practiced in this country. With few notable exceptions, our philosophers have spent most of their energies denying to themselves and trying to deny to others the right and opportunity to think creatively on matters of basic importance to us all. Instead of affirming that the hard questions, the unsolved, the perennial problems of mankind are precisely those with which men must continue to deal freshly and freely, they have instead attempted to run away from them by one of four routes — the geographic, the historic, the methodologic and the dogmatic.

It is possible to avoid thinking through an issue by attaching oneself to some other nation of thinkers and patiently following the curve of its thought, repeating what had been said before. There is humility in the attitude, there is freedom from provincialism, there is catholicism of spirit, some courage too. But they overlay a more serious error. Speculation demands all the power, all the freedom a man can master; it does not allow one merely to repeat what had been said elsewhere,

though it surely does permit one to agree with, build on and make use of the insight and wisdom of others. When we realize how shamefully we in this country neglected such men as Peirce and Veblen, Gibbs and Sullivan while we subscribed to minor variations on the thought and art dominant in Berlin or Vienna, Oxford or Paris, we come to see that we in this country have been slack in our pursuit of cosmic truth. Happily we are almost entirely out of this period, and a growing number now reflect on issues and pursue lines of inquiry with complete indifference as to where they may have originated. It is the nature of things as found anywhere, not the views as promulgated somewhere which should drive us on and which will enable us to transcend the borders that keep men politically opposed.

Philosophy is a living, incredibly difficult enterprise in which one must take advantage of the genius of men of every time, and use what we can to reach, if possible, a higher level of understanding and perceptiveness than was characteristic even of them. He who tries to force inquiry inside the pattern forged by men of some previous age belies what they themselves set out to do and defrauds future generations of the fruits which might have been won today. We owe it to ourselves and to those who come after neither to keep within, nor to stay resolutely outside any time. The Greeks and the medievals, the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries are all part of our heritage. To ignore whatever was not handled in the past is almost as bad an act of treachery to the rights of reason as is a deliberate refusal to try to learn from some particular period of time.

The characteristic American way of avoiding hard questions — one is tempted to say, our contribution to this art — is to insist on using some one method, say that of pragmatism, instrumentalism, idealism, analysis, linguistics or logistics, and to deny the importance or meaningfulness of anything which lies beyond its scope or power. But we have been given no assurance by fact or dialectic that the mysteries which beset us are to be solved in only one way. We need not one, but many methods, not one but hundreds of schools — or better, we must avoid prescribed methods, limitative schools and programs.

and instead invite a host of independent inquirers to submit to one another's criticisms the products of their honest thought. No man or school has mastered all the ways by which we can learn all that we should. He who approaches issues from only one direction denies himself and us the truths that require another approach.

At the present time the dominant denial of the existence and validity of many basic problems comes from the positivists and existentialists, the Marxists and the semanticists who, in the name of science, God, economics or logic deny the meaning of any questions which cannot fit inside the limits they have set up as defining the nature of meaning and the possibility of being. Disturbed by the fact that men disagree and have long disagreed, that there are very old questions that have not yet been answered, that no known method seems adequate to the task of wresting the last secret from man and nature, they suggest that we give up the unending task and settle only for what is compatible with some arbitrarily assumed criterion or framework. It is certainly true that scientists and Kierkegaardians, communists and Carnapians use language with considerable precision, that they communicate with the members of their schools with considerable success, that they seem to make some kind of progress, and that they are fairly clear as to just how to distinguish what they will accept to be truth from what they will reject as falsehood. But this is far from justifying their belief that questions which their systems cannot accommodate are, by that fact, shown not to be questions at all.

The one great intellectual crime, C. S. Peirce observed, is the crime of blocking the road of inquiry. This we do when we use the devices of geography, history, methodology or outright rejection to deny to men the need and the right to deal with such root questions as the nature and relation of being and non-being, God and the world, time and eternity, good and bad, logic and existence, the individual and the totality. I deem it a great privilege to be able to share with you the pleasure of pursuing these questions once again in the company of these eminent thinkers.

Yale University.

PAUL WEISS

The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. IV, 1 September 1950.

THEOLOGY AND OTHER MATTERS

A theological and philosophical controversy of considerable intensity and proportions has been undertaken in recent times in France, with the Jesuits of the Lyons Province opposing what they call the "Garrigou-Lagrange and Maritain school" of Thomism. The March, 1950 issue of *Thought* devotes thirty one pages to an article by Robert F. Harvanek setting forth the main lines and issues of the controversy, as seen from the Jesuit position, under the title, "Philosophical Pluralism and Catholic Orthodoxy."

Although any generalization in matters of such scope is risky, the central issue involved would seem to be this: Can man achieve, and know that he has achieved, a true and adequate philosophy? The Jesuit tendency is to stress the developmental aspects of philosophy and theology, identifying them more closely with the natural sciences. The Dominicans, on the other hand, see in this tendency great dangers, with theological pluralism as perhaps the gravest, short of outright skepticism.

The importance of these problems to American readers is obvious. There are indications of a very strange philosophical alliance, for if the Jesuit position is considered on its philosophical basis alone, without the transcendent revelation and dogma, it becomes difficult indeed to distinguish from certain elements in American positivism.

Two recent and noteworthy reprints in thirty-five cent pocket-size editions are: *The Revolt of the Masses*, by Jose Ortega y Gasset (Mentor 49); and *The Next Development in Man* (Mentor 50), by L. L. Whyte. Both endeavor, in broadly different ways, to deal with modern problems in social philosophy against, and in terms of, a properly metaphysical background. Ortega is the champion of excellence and nobility, as an unabashed aristocrat in the best sense of that term. Whyte is an equally unabashed Heraclitean, seeking and finding flux and impermanence on every hand.

Two articles by Henry Veatch, — "Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic," in *The Thomist* for January, 1950; and "In Defense of the Syllogism," in *The Modern Schoolman* for March, 1950, carry further the investigations represented in his article, "Concerning the Ontological Status of Logical Forms," published in *The Review of Metaphysics*, in December, 1948. Also of interest to all those concerned with this view of logic will be the translation (by John J. Glanville, G. Donald Hollenhorst, and Yves R. Simon) of the *Basic Treatises* of the Logic of John of St. Thomas, to be published by the University of Chicago Press; an excerpt from this appears in *The New Scholasticism* for October, 1949, under the title, "Entia Rationis and Second Intentions."

At the first meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America, held at Yale University on Saturday, April 15, 1950, the following temporary officers were elected: Chairman, Paul Weiss, Yale University; Secretary, Richard L. Barber, Tulane University; Treasurer, John E. Smith, Barnard College.

The responsibility for appointing a Constitutional Committee was delegated to the temporary Chairman. Ellen Haring, Wellesley College; George B. Burch, Tufts College; and George A. Schrader, Jr., Yale University, were subsequently appointed to this committee. The election of a Nominating Committee was deferred until the Constitutional Committee shall have settled upon procedures for making nominations and holding elections. It was recommended that those members who had presented papers at this first meeting be constituted a provisional Program Committee; these were: The Rev. Gerald Phelan, Notre Dame University; Arnold Metzger, Cambridge, Mass.; G. Watts Cunningham, Cornell University; Karl Menger, Illinois Institute of Technology; and John E. Smith, Barnard College.

Approximately one hundred and fifty persons attended this first meeting. The Society is open to all on the basis of interest, without professional or academic restriction. A token annual membership fee of one dollar will be charged. Meetings are to be open to the public.

Correspondence may be addressed to the Secretary, at the Department of Philosophy, Tulane University, New Orleans, La. Inquiries for further information are cordially solicited.

RICHARD L. BARBER

Tulane University.



Books received

(Listing does not preclude a subsequent review)

Horace M. Kallen: *Patterns of Progress*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1950. 87 pp. \$1.75.

Cornelia Geer LeBoutillier: *American Democracy and Natural Law*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950. 204 pp. \$3.00.

Surendranath Dasgupta: *A History of Indian Philosophy*. Volume IV — "Indian Pluralism." New York: Cambridge University Press, 1949. 483 pp. \$11.50.

Charles Duell Kean: *The Meaning of Existence*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947. xiv + 222 pp. \$3.00.

Dr. H. Dooyeweerd: *Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte*. Boek I — Het Grieksche Voorspel. T. Wever te Franeker, 1949. 496 pp.

The Idea of Progress. A collection of readings selected by Frederick J. Teggart. Revised edition, with an introduction, by George H. Hildebrand. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949. 457 pp. \$6.00.

Ernest Lee Tuveson: *Millennium and Utopia*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949. xi + 254 pp. \$3.50.

Wendell Thomas: *On the Resolution of Science and Faith*. New York: Island Press, 1946. xii + 300. \$3.50.

Fr. Agostino Gemelli and Sac. Giorgio Zunini: *Introduzione Alla Psicologia*. Seconda Edizione. Milano: Societa Editrice "Vita E. Pensiero," 1949. 490 pp.

Paul Grenet: *Les Origines de l'analogie Philosophique dans les Dialogues de Platon*. Paris: Editions Contemporaines, Boivin & Cie, 1948. 300 pp.

E. Jordan: *The Good Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. 453 pp. \$5.00.

John Edwin Smith: *Royce's Social Infinite*. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1950. xiii + 176 pp. \$2.75.

Philosophic Thought in France and the United States. Edited by Marvin Farber. Buffalo: University of Buffalo Publications in Philosophy, 1950. 775 pp. \$7.50.

James F. Anderson: *The Bond of Being*. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949. xvi + 341 pp. \$4.00.

Hugh Miller: *The Community of Man*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. 169 pp. \$3.00.

Albert C. Knudson: *The Philosophy of Personalism*. Reprint. Boston: Boston University Press, 1949. 438 pp. \$2.75.

Gordon McKenzie: *Critical Responsiveness*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949. 311 pp.

Human Rights. A symposium edited by Unesco, with an introduction by Jacques Maritain. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. 288 pp. \$3.75.

Basil Willey: *Nineteenth Century Studies*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. 288 pp. \$4.00.

Roy Mitchell: *The Exile of the Soul*. Toronto: The Blavatsky Institute. 155 pp. \$1.50.

Stanley Matthew Daugert: *The Philosophy of Thorstein Veblen*. New York: King's Crown Press, 1950. 134 pp. \$2.25.

Henry Steele Commager: *The American Mind*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950. 476 pp. \$5.00.

P. W. Bridgman: *Reflections of a Physicist*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. xii + 392 pp. \$5.00.

The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin. Translated by Kurt Wilk, with an introduction by Edwin W. Patterson. (20th Century Legal Philosophy Series: Vol. IV.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950. xliii + 493 pp. \$7.50.

Maxwell Silver: *The Way to God*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. 303 pp. \$3.00.

Albert Einstein: *Out of My Later Years*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. 282 pp. \$4.75.

Paul Claudel: *The Eye Listens*. Translated by Elsie Pell. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. ix + 293 pp. \$5.00.

Esme Wynne-Tyson: *The Unity of Being*. London: Andrew Dakers Ltd., 1949. 230 pp. 8s 6d net.

A Commentary on the Creed of Islam. Translated, with introduction and notes, by Earl Edgar Elder. (No. XLIII of the Records of Civilization Sources and Studies.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1950. xxxii + 187 pp.

Vladimir Jankelevitch: *Traité des Vertus*. Paris: Editions Bordas, 1949. 807 pp.

Aristotle's Prior & Posterior Analytics. A revised text, with introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross. London: Oxford University Press, 1949. 690 pp. \$8.00.

Paul Weiss: *Man's Freedom*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950. 325 pp. \$5.00.

Arthur N. Prior: *Logic and the Basis of Ethics*. London: Oxford University Press, 1949. 111 pp. \$1.75.

W. F. Lofthouse: *F. H. Bradley*. London: Epworth House. 237 pp. 10s 6d.

Ernest Cassirer: *The Problem of Knowledge*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950. 334 pp. \$5.00.

Philosophical Studies: Essays in Memory of L. Susan Stebbing. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 156 pp. 15s.

Charles A. Moore: *Second East-West Philosophers Conference: A Preliminary Report*. Occasional Paper 52, Dec. 1949. University of Hawaii.

Martin Heidegger: *Existence and Being*. With an introduction by W. Brock. Chicago: Henry Regnery & Co., 1949. 399 pp.

Sterling P. Lamprecht: *Nature and History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950. 155 pp. \$2.50.

W. H. Auden: *The Enchafed Flood*. New York: Random House. 154 pp.

C. G. Jung and C. Kerenyi: *Essays on a Science of Mythology*. Translated by R. F. C. Hull. Bollingen Series XXIII. Pantheon Books. 289 pp. \$4.00.

Gladys A. Reichard: *Navaho Religion — A Study of Symbolism*. 2 vols. Bollingen Series XVIII. Pantheon Books. 800 pp. \$7.50.

Frank Chapman Sharp: *Good Will and Ill Will*. A study in moral judgments. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950. 248 pp. \$5.00.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. III: Alciphron or the Memite Philosopher. Edited by T. E. Jessop. London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1950. 337 pp. 30s.

Victor Goldschmidt: *La Religion de Platon*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949. 156 pp. 200 fr.

John Plamenatz: *Mill's Utilitarianism*. Reprinted with a study of English Utilitarians. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949. 228 pp. \$2.25.

L'Eglise Catholique et l'organisation de la société internationale contemporaine (1939-40). Studia Collegii Maximi: Compagnie de Jésus à Montréal, 1949. 266 pp. \$3.00.

La Filosofia en America. I, John Dewey en sus Noventa Años: Union Panamericana. Washington, 1949, 45 pp. II, Centenario de Verona, 1950, 21 pp.

John A. Nicholson: *Philosophy of Religion*. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1950. 419 pp. \$3.75.

The Philosophy of Plotinus. Edited by Joseph Katz. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950. 158 pp. \$1.75.

Corliss Lamont: *The Illusion of Immortality*. Second Edition. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. 316 pp. \$3.95.

Time and Its Mysteries, Series III. Four lectures given on the James Arthur Foundation, New York University, by Henry Norris Russell, Adolph Knopf, James T. Shotwell, George P. Luckey. New York: New York University Press, 1949. 126 pp. \$3.00.

George Santayana: *Atoms of Thought*. An anthology of thoughts from George Santayana, selected and edited by Ira D. Cardiff. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. 284 pp. \$5.00.

Gordon W. Allport: *The Individual and His Religion*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950. 147 pp. \$2.50.

Henry Margeneau: *The Nature of Physical Reality*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950. 479 pp. \$6.50.

John Calvin on God and Political Duty. Edited, with an introduction, by John T. McNeill. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1950. 102 pp. \$0.50.

Joseph Butler: *Five Sermons*. With an introduction by Stuart M. Brown, Jr. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1950. 90 pp. \$0.50.

Bruno Snell: *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*. Hamburg: Classen & Goverts, 1948. 300 pp.

Gallo Galli: *Due Studi Di Filosofia Greca*. Estratto da: Scritti Vari (1). Editore Gheroni Torino, 1950. 109 pp.

Gallo Galli: *Saggio Sulla Dialettica Della Realta Spirituale*. Terza Edizione. Editore Gheroni Torino, 1950.

Francis Warrain: *La Theodicee de la Kabbale*, suivie de *La Nature Eternelle* d'après Jacob Boehme. Paris: Les Editions Vega, 1949. 222 pp.

Friedrich Nietzsche: *The Use and Abuse of History*. Translated by Adrian Collins, with an introduction by Julius Kraft. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1949. 79 pp.

Melvin Rader: *Ethics and Society*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950. 401 pp. \$3.25.

Dr. S. Strasser: *Edmund Husserl. Cartesianische Meditationem und Pariser Vortrage*. (Husserliana, Vol. I.) Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950. 244 pp.

R. B. Kershner and L. R. Wilcox: *The Anatomy of Mathematics*. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1950. 416 pp. \$6.00.

Robert C. Baldwin and James A. S. McPeck: *An Introduction to Philosophy Through Literature*. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1950. 595 pp. \$4.50.

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